What's wrong with the World Trade Organization

A guide to where the mines are buried
By Peter Costantini ~ Seattle ~ November 2001
http://www.speakeasy.org/~peterc/wtow

Contents
The WTO’s Bill of Wrongs
You cannot restrict trade in a good based on how it is produced.
You must use the 'least trade-restrictive' method—not the most effective one—to protect people and the environment.
You must first prove a substance dangerous before restricting its use.
You must lower national standards if they are higher than international standards.
You must treat life forms and life-saving drugs as commodities.
You must deregulate and privatize essential public services.
You cannot use trade policy to encourage development in poor countries.
You must subordinate human rights to free trade.
The WTO v. democracy
WTO processes favor big business and rich countries.
The WTO resolves disputes unfairly behind closed doors.
Visions of change
Alternative paths to fairer trade rules
WTO Cases & Controversies
Cases
Controversies
WTO Treaties
Sources for this site
About the author

Submerged within the mind-numbing verbiage of the World Trade Organization treaties and their interpretations are a handful of principles that subordinate all other values—environmental sustainability, consumer and worker safety, public health, freedom of labor and human rights—to maximizing trade.  The provisions and interpretations articulating these principles impede nations from enforcing their own laws to protect the public good.  They imperil rights and protections won by citizens over the last century and undermine democracy and transparency.
Most of these strictures are not intrinsic to international trade.  Rather, they have resulted from the veiled efforts of the most powerful nations and corporations, who use WTO rules and rulings as crowbars to wrench open markets and batter down laws defending the quality of human life and the environment.
The record of the past six years is clear: nearly all WTO decisions have gutted democratic restrictions on trade, effectively lowering environmental, consumer protection, public health, and human rights standards.  Even when reasonable standards were applied equally to all domestic and foreign producers, the WTO has repeatedly struck them down as trade barriers, demolishing shelters that citizens have built against the stormy side effects of market forces.
When is trade “free”?
A central principle of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now enforced by the WTO) was non-discrimination: products imported from one country should be treated the same as those imported from all other countries and those produced within the importing country.  This principle is expressed in two technical terms:
•	National treatment - Goods imported from countries that have signed the treaty must be treated the same as domestic ones.
•	Most-favored nation treatment - Goods imported from each signatory country must be treated equally.
WTO provisions and rulings, though, go far beyond these concepts, turning trade into an end in itself rather than a means to improve people’s lives.  Under them, even standards that respect these well-established benchmarks can still be declared illegal restrictions on trade.
And the WTO’s version of “free trade” has distinct limits.  Countries and corporations of means can manipulate negotiations and dispute settlements to their advantage.  When it comes to intellectual property, for example, the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement enforces restrictions on trade—copyrights and patents—in the name of encouraging innovation.  This benefits almost exclusively wealthy nations and transnational enterprises, while harming small farmers and indigent AIDS victims.  Yet the WTO outlaws other exceptions to free trade that might benefit poor people and countries.
For many sectors in many countries, lowering barriers to international trade may be a viable policy.  But no developed country has industrialized without protection and government support of critical industries.  And many developing countries who have thrown their economies open to international markets have sunk deeper into poverty and debt.
Developing and industrialized countries alike should be able to weigh the pros and cons of trade liberalization for their particular economy against other social values and goals.  The WTO is harmful not because it promotes free trade, but because it forecloses with closed tribunals and draconian penalties the possibility of any economic strategy other than corporate-managed trade.  It attempts to impose an anti-democratic monoculture on an exuberantly heterogeneous world.

Opinions

“We are writing the constitution of a single global economy.”
— Renato Ruggiero, former WTO Director-General

“The WTO is basically the first constitution based on the rules of trade and the rules of commerce.  Every other constitution has been based on the sovereignty of people and countries.  Every constitution has protected life above profits.  But WTO protects profits above the right to life of humans and other species.”
— Vandana Shiva, author and environmentalist, India
~
“There are some who believe that simply opening markets on a global scale is the be-all and end-all, no matter how it is done or no matter who benefits.  I subscribe to a different view.  It is imperative that we open markets in a manner consistent with the rules of the WTO, but we must make sure Americans benefit directly from the process, and to do that Americans must drive the rules of the new global landscape and the opening of markets.”
— Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative

“From the free-market paradigm that underpins it, to the rules and regulations set forth in the different agreements that make up the Uruguay Round, to its system of decision-making and accountability, the WTO is a blueprint for the global hegemony of Corporate America.”
— Walden Bello, Director, Focus on the Global South, Bangkok, Thailand
~
“In broad terms, the WTO is designed to entrench ‘grow-now, pay-later’ globalization by removing the power of governments to regulate corporate activity in the public interest.  The result is that it will undermine our capacity to redirect current economic, development and trade policies towards a truly sustainable path.”
— Steven Shrybman, former Executive Director, West Coast Environmental Law Association, Canada

The WTO’s Bill of Wrongs

You cannot restrict trade in a good based on how it is produced.
“Production & processing methods” can't be considered in trade rules, even if they damage people or the environment.

Several GATT and WTO decisions have established that the methods used in producing, harvesting or processing a good cannot be invoked as reasons to restrict trade in that good.  This means in practice that the environmental, health, labor and social side effects of a firm or industry are off-limits in determining whether its products violate trade regulations.  These precedents set up barriers against efforts by societies to impose their values on the international economy.
For example, you must treat a carpet or soccer ball produced using child labor the same as one produced without violations of human rights.  And you must treat tuna caught with methods that kill dolphins the same as dolphin-safe tuna.  Laws of WTO-signatory countries cannot make a distinction in either case.  This makes it very difficult to design effective human and environmental protection policies, because these often require altering how goods are produced or processed.
Even the market-driven approach of eco-labeling— for example, “dolphin-safe” on canned tuna or “organic” on produce—has run into criticism in the WTO.  The Clinton administration challenged as illegal restraints of trade the European Union’s law mandating the labeling of food containing genetically modified organisms and its proposal to label hormone-treated beef.  The U.S. has even called country-of-origin labels potentially WTO-illegal because they allow consumers to discriminate against countries whose policies they don’t like.  These arguments, if successful, would deny consumers the right to vote with their dollars for values that matter to them, and prohibit businesses from appealing to customers based on how their production methods affect these values.

Opinions
“WTO rules run roughshod over local laws and regulations.  The WTO agenda relentlessly pursues the elimination of any strictures on the free flow of trade, including how a product is made, by whom it is made, and what happens when it is made.  By doing so, the WTO is eliminating the ability of countries and regions to set standards, to express values, or to determine what they do or don’t support.  Child labor, prison labor, forced labor, and substandard wages and working conditions cannot be used as a basis to discriminate against goods.  Nor can environmental destruction, habitat loss, toxic waste production, and the presence of transgenic materials or synthetic hormones be used as the basis to screen or stop goods from entering a country.  Under WTO rules, the boycott of South Africa would not have existed.”
Paul Hawken, director, Natural Capital Institute, U.S.
~
“GATT dispute resolution panels have ruled that products cannot be treated differently on the basis of how they are produced or harvested.  The ability to distinguish among production methods is essential to environmental protection and environmentally sensitive economic policies.  A key component to setting sustainable policies is the ability to change the conditions and processes under which goods are produced and commodities grown, harvested and extracted to more environmentally friendly ones.  Trade rules that forbid the differentiation between production methods make it impossible for governments to design effective environmental policies.”
Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, U.S.
~
“Trade agreements also can be used behind the scenes by governments to attack food labeling requirements that enjoy widespread support among consumers. For example, the USTR claimed that the EU's 1998 requirement for labeling foods containing genetically modified corn or soybeans is a barrier to international trade because ‘the United States believes that such labeling is unnecessary, in the absence of an identified and documented risk to safety or health.’ Public opinion polls, however, show that most Americans (as well as Europeans) favor labeling of genetically engineered food.”
“In an analogous case, EU officials asserted that the mandatory nutrition labeling required by the United States is a trade barrier. The U.S. requirement was instituted to help Americans improve their diets and reduce their risk of heart disease and cancer. Nonetheless, the European Commission has claimed that the U.S. labeling law favors American producers and is a barrier to trade. Consumer surveys, however, show that more than two-thirds of Americans rely on nutrition labeling and European consumer groups are actively seeking similar requirements. Clearly in these instances, the United States and the EU are attempting to use trade agreements to challenge food labeling regulations that enjoy the popular support of consumers on both sides of the Atlantic.”
Bruce Silverglade, Director of Legal Affairs, Center for Science in the Public Interest, U.S.
~
“Various efforts have been made by industry leaders in past years to limit the use of voluntary labels.  Timber and paper corporations have sought to ban labels such as ‘sustainably harvested’ and ‘recycled’ by getting them declared WTO-illegal on the basis that they unfairly prejudice consumers towards certain products based on methods of production.  World Trade Organization rules do not allow differential treatment of a product based on its method of production.  But these labels are voluntary, not obligatory, and they are as important for consumer choice as product content and nutritional information.”
“Don’t we have a right to know if a product we buy was produced in a sweatshop or with living wages?  We have the right to know how a product affects our own bodies, so shouldn’t we have the right to know how it affects the earth and how it affects the people who produced it?  Shouldn’t companies that voluntarily follow sustainability and social justice criteria be legally able to communicate that message to consumers eager to make consumer choices according to their beliefs about the importance of living wages?”
Deborah James, Global Exchange, U.S.

Legal Basis
These treaties are enforced by the World Trade Organization.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947)
See GATT page
Article I – Most Favored Nation Treatment (non-discrimination between products of different countries).
“Like” products of different countries must be treated the same, and “like” products cannot be distinguished based on how they are produced or harvested.
Article III - National Treatment (non-discrimination between domestic and foreign products).
III.4
“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.”
[Emphasis added]

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
See TBT page
Article 2 - Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations
by Central Government Bodies.
Especially 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.

Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP)
See AGP page
The Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) prohibits members who have signed it from withholding government contracts on basis of labor, human rights or environmental standards.  Companies or nations who violate these cannot be discriminated against in procurement.
Some exceptions to the non-discrimination principles of national treatment and most-favored nation status have become widely accepted around the world.  For example, government procurement practices have not been covered by previous trade agreements.  Although some procurement standards may violate non-discrimination principles, they generally do this in order to further legitimate policy goals such as fair employment, a living wage, or encouraging local businesses in poor communities.
The AGP, however, turns these exceptions into illegal trade barriers.  It also prohibits withholding government contracts from companies or nations that violate labor or human rights or environmental standards.  Under it, government support for the international boycott against South African apartheid probably would have been illegal.

Cases & Controversies
GATT 1947
•	Mexico v. U.S. on Marine Mammal Protection Act protections of dolphins
See Tuna/Dolphin Case I page
•	EEC v. U.S. on Marine Mammal Protection Act protections of dolphins
See Tuna/Dolphin Case II page
•	Thailand, Pakistan, India, and Malaysia v. U.S. on shrimp caught without sea turtle excluder devices
See Shrimp/Sea Turtle Case page
Ruled that the U.S. Endangered Species Act was theoretically protected by GATT Article XX, but that the law's certification requirements were not because they affected other governments, not private producers.
•	Canada v. France on asbestos
See Asbestos Case page
TBT
•	U.S. v. EU on hormone-treated beef
See Hormone-Treated Beef Case page
The U.S. argued that labeling artificial hormone-treated beef is illegal under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which requires that technical criteria be based on product performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics.  The dispute-settlement panel found that TBT prohibited labeling of beef based on how cattle are raised, which is analogous to GATT prohibitions against discriminating on the basis of production and processing methods.
•	U.S. v. Europe, Japan and Australia on labeling of genetically modified foods
See Genetically Modified Foods Controversy page
See also Precautionary Principle page.
•	U.S. and Canadian efforts to limit voluntary eco-labeling
See Eco-Labeling Controversy page
See also page on least-trade-restrictive methods.
The U.S. and Canadian governments have argued in the WTO that even voluntary eco-labeling (labeling products as environmentally friendly) is a technical regulation that should be scrutinized under TBT.
AGP & TBT
•	EU and Japan v. U.S. on Massachusetts law targeting Burmese military dictatorship (TBT, AGP & TRIMS)
See Myanmar Sanctions Case page

Resources
Non-governmental
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
“The Environment,” pp. 13-19.
“The Burma Case: Human Rights Affected By Finance and Investment,” pp. 38-39.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. ”GMOs Continue to Create a Stir.” BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 4, Number 29, July 25, 2000.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1825&browse=1&SID=#GMOs%20Continue%20to%20Create%20a%20Stir
•	Environmental Research Foundation. "The WTO Turns Back the Environmental Clock."
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
•	Deborah James. "Free Trade, Not Fair Trade."
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
•	Panos. "More Power to the World Trade Organization? The international trade controversy." Panos Briefing No. 37, November 1999.
http://www.wtowatch.org/faq/faq.cfm?faq_id=3#36
•	Public Citizen Global Trade Watch. “Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).”  Washington, DC: Public Citizen, May 1, 1999.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/gats/documents/articles.cfm?ID=4315
•	Bruce Silverglade. “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Weakening Food Safety Regulations to Facilitate Trade?” Center for Science in the Public Interest. Food and Drug Law Journal, Vol. 55, No. 4, June 5, 2001: p. 517
http://www.wtowatch.org/library/admin/uploadedfiles/WTO_Agreement_on_Sanitary_and_Phytosanitary_Me.htm
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 1: “The WTO’s Environmental Impact,” pp. 12-50.
Chapter 7: “Human and Labor Rights Under the WTO,” pp. 172-192.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
•	Mark Weisbrot. “Tricks of Free Trade.” Sierra Magazine. San Francisco: Sierra Club, September-October 2001.
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200109/weisbrot.asp
•	Frances Williams. “EU Stance on Environment Threatens New Trade Round.” London: Financial Times, October 4, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2001/1005eu.htm
Governmental
•	Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp
•	European Commission Directorate-General for Trade
EC approach to Trade and Environment
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/envir/seaenvir.htm
•	Office of the United States Trade Representative
Trade & the Environment
http://www.ustr.gov/environment/index.shtml
Labor and Environment “Toolbox”
http://www.ustr.gov/toolbox.pdf

Official WTO Web site
•	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
See GATT page
•	Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
See TBT page
•	Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP)
See AGP page
•	Trade-and-environment material on the WTO website
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm
•	Trading Into the Future: Beyond the agreements. The environment — a new high profile
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey4_e.htm
•	Trading Into the Future: Beyond the agreements. The tuna-dolphin dispute
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm

You must use the 'least trade-restrictive' method—not the most effective one—to protect people and the environment.
The WTO enshrines commerce as a higher value than other more fundamental human values.  Environmental or human-rights standards that are more effective at protecting victims of pollution or dictatorships are trumped by weaker standards that marginally increase trade.

This approach implicitly elevates increasing trade above any other values that national or local regulations are trying to protect or promote.  Measures that impose core societal values on the economy are effectively hamstrung.  An environmental regulation, for example, must use the least trade-restrictive approach to regulate disposal of toxic waste rather than a method that is more effective in protecting nearby human and ecological communities but slightly more restrictive of trade.
WTO treaties shift the burden of proof onto member countries that they could not have met the goals of any law in a less trade-restrictive way.  And they impose a vague but onerous “test of necessity,” forcing governments to also prove that regulations are no more restrictive than “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”  Where the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) includes an exemption from this necessity test for measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources," the newer General Agreement on Trade in Services drops this exception.
The Uruguay Round negotiations that created the WTO also expanded the range of environmental and public health protections that could be classified as “non-tariff barriers” to trade.  Non-tariff barriers are policies that are not tariffs but that affect trade.
Exceptions to these provisions for some kinds of public-interest policies under Article XX of GATT have been upheld only once by WTO dispute-settlement rulings, in the dispute over asbestos between Canada and France.

Opinions
“Restrictions on goods must be the least trade-restrictive possible and the restrictions must be ‘necessary.’  To prove that a regulation is ‘necessary,’ a country must prove that there is a worldwide scientific consensus on the danger, and a WTO tribunal of corporate lawyers must agree that the proposed regulation is a reasonable response to the danger.  Furthermore, any regulation must be the ‘least trade-restrictive’ regulation possible.  Obviously, this puts an almost insurmountable burden of proof on any government wanting to protect its citizens and its environment from harm.  Thus the WTO has shifted the burden of proof back onto the public.  The dead bodies must be lined up once again.”
Environmental Research Foundation, U.S.
~
“The WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement is an international regime to harmonize environmental and other standards, which, in effect creates a ceiling but no floor for such regulation.  Under its rules, a nation must be prepared to prove, if challenged, that its environmental and safety standards are both ‘necessary’ and the ‘least trade restrictive’ way to achieve the desired conservation goal, food safety or health standard.  This means that a country bears the burden of proving a negative—that no other measure consistent with the WTO is reasonably available to protect environmental and public health concerns.  The WTO TBT Agreement also sets out an onerous procedural code for establishing new laws and regulations so arduous that it is very difficult for any nation to meet.”
Maude Barlow, national chairperson, Council of Canadians
~
“The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) requires that product standards—a nation’s rules governing the contents and characteristics of products—be the least trade restrictive version and, with extraordinarily limited exceptions, be based on international standards.”
Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, U.S.

Legal Basis
These treaties are enforced by the World Trade Organization.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947)
See GATT page.
Article XX - “General Exceptions”
This article has been interpreted to require that exceptions use the “least trade restrictive” and non-discriminatory methods for exempted protections.
XX(b) - Laws "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."
•	"Necessary" has been interpreted to require that environmental laws be the least trade restrictive way to achieve the environmental goal.
XX(g) - Laws "related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources."
•	In several cases, GATT and WTO panels ruled that Article XX(g) exceptions did not apply.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
See TBT page.
National laws or regulations to protect the public or the environment must be both “necessary” and the “least trade restrictive” way to achieve the desired goal.
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
See GATS page.
Article 6 - Rules on domestic regulation
The rules on domestic regulation  in GATS Article 6 are analogous to TBT rules on "least trade-restrictive" regulations. They require that domestic regulations "do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services."  Disciplines based on this section could be used to overturn national, state and local regulations even if they do not discriminate in violation of National Treatment or Most Favored Nation.

Cases & Controversies
GATT 1947
•	Mexico v. U.S. on Marine Mammal Protection Act protections of dolphins
See Tuna/Dolphin Case I page
•	EU v. U.S. on fuel efficiency standards for automobiles
See Automobile Fuel-Efficiency Case page
In both the above cases, U.S. invoked article XX, but GATT ruled that the exceptions did not apply.
•	Thailand, Pakistan, India, and Malaysia v. U.S. on shrimp caught without sea turtle excluder devices
See Shrimp/Sea Turtle Case page
Ruled that the U.S. Endangered Species Act was theoretically protected by Article XX, but that the law's certification requirements were not because they affected other governments, not private producers.
•	Canada v. France on asbestos
See Asbestos Case page
TBT
•	EEC v. U.S. on Marine Mammal Protection Act protections of dolphins
See Tuna/Dolphin Case II page
This 1994 GATT case ruled that a U.S. secondary trade embargo was not "necessary" to protect dolphins and failed the "least trade restrictive" test.
•	U.S. & EU v. Japan on clean-air laws implementing Kyoto Protocol
See Greenhouse Gases Controversy page
•	U.S. and Canadian efforts to limit voluntary eco-labeling
See Eco-Labeling Controversy page
The U.S. and Canadian governments have argued in the WTO that even voluntary eco-labeling (labeling products as environmentally friendly) is a technical regulation that should be scrutinized under TBT.   TBT requires that product standards use the least trade-restrictive method possible and be based on international standards where applicable.
See also page on production & processing methods.
•	U.S. v. Europe, Japan and Australia on labeling of genetically modified foods
See Genetically Modified Foods Case page
GATT 1947 & TBT
•	Venezuela & Brazil v. U.S. in challenge of gasoline pollution standards
See Gasoline/Clean Air Act Case page

Resources
Non-governmental
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
“The Environment,” pp. 13-19.
“Agriculture, Food and Public Health,” pp. 20-27.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	Ruth Caplan. “GATS Handbook  (WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services).” Waltham, MA: Alliance for Democracy, 2000: p. 5.
http://www.afd-online.org/campaigns/2000/Globalization/handbook.htm
•	Environmental Research Foundation. "The WTO Turns Back the Environmental Clock."
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
•	Ellen Gould. "The 2001 GATS Negotiations: the Political Challenge Ahead." Waltham MA: Alliance for Democracy, 2001: pp. 2-3. http://www.thealliancefordemocracy.org/campaigns/2000/Globalization/2001_gats_negotiations.htm
•	Public Citizen Global Trade Watch. “Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).”  Washington, DC: Public Citizen, May 1, 1999.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/gats/documents/articles.cfm?ID=4315
•	Public Citizen Global Trade Watch. “WTO Talking Points: The World Trade Organization Ruling Against the Reformulated Gasoline Regulations of the U.S. Clean Air Act.”  Washington, DC: Public Citizen, May 16, 1998.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/gats/documents/articles.cfm?ID=1621
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 1: “The WTO’s Environmental Impact,” pp. 12-50.
Chapter 2: “The WTO, Food Safety Standards and Public Health,” pp. 52-85.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
•	Mark Weisbrot. “Tricks of Free Trade.” Sierra Magazine. San Francisco: Sierra Club, September-October 2001.
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200109/weisbrot.asp
•	Frances Williams. “EU Stance on Environment Threatens New Trade Round.” London: Financial Times, October 4, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2001/1005eu.htm
Governmental
•	European Commission Directorate-General for Trade
EC approach to Trade and Environment
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/envir/seaenvir.htm
•	Office of the United States Trade Representative
Trade & the Environment
http://www.ustr.gov/environment/index.shtml
Labor and Environment “Toolbox”
http://www.ustr.gov/toolbox.pdf

Official WTO Web site
•	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
See GATT page
•	Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
See TBT page
•	General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
See GATS page
•	Trade-and-environment material on the WTO website
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm
•	”Trading Into the Future: Beyond the agreements. The environment — a new high profile.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey4_e.htm
•	”Trading Into the Future: Beyond the agreements. The tuna-dolphin dispute.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm

You must first prove a substance dangerous before restricting its use.
The WTO assumes untested chemicals and technologies are safe until proven otherwise. This stands the Precautionary Principle – better safe than sorry – on its head, and can force nations to lower their public health, safety and environmental standards.

The Precautionary Principle is an established pillar of public policy and common sense.  In essence, it says that when doubts exist as to the safety of substances or processes, governments may take precautions to protect the public until they are proven safe.  In other words, err on the side of caution; when in doubt, play it safe.  Articulated in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, this principle is an important basis of public health and environmental legislation around the world.
A classic example of why the Precautionary Principle is necessary is thalidomide.  This drug tested safe on laboratory animals.  The birth defects it caused showed up only in the children of women who took it.
The WTO doesn't allow countries to make value judgments or take social priorities into account in food-safety or public-health policy, even in a non-discriminatory way (between national and foreign producers and among different foreign producers ).  For example, the United States’ zero-tolerance of listeria bacteria violates WTO rules.
Instead, trade rules force countries to use a method of risk assessment that is difficult and expensive, as risk is often hard to quantify scientifically.  For example, one reason for efforts to regulate genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is the lack of scientific data available on them. Article 5.2 of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), however, requires that a government wishing to regulate a GMO must justify the regulation with a risk assessment based on scientific evidence that the organism is a threat.
The SPS Agreement also adopts by reference international standards biased in favor of business, such as some of those of the Codex Alimentarius and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).  Rather than set floors on safety provisions, allowing nations and localities to set higher levels of safety and protection, the WTO does the reverse: it sets ceilings and can be used to strike down any protections that exceed them.

Opinions

“The safe use of modern agricultural biotechnology has become one of the most contentious debates worldwide. There is general agreement on the need to ensure the safety of biotechnology products through effective risk assessment, management and communication. However, countries differ on how to reflect these measures in public policy. Some require that ‘sound science’ is used as a basis for restricting trade in products that pose a threat to the environment and human health. Others, however, argue for ‘precautionary measures’ that allow policy action to be taken in the absence of full scientific certainty.”
“In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) adopted Principle 15 which states that ‘where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ A version of this principle was recently incorporated into the Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity. There is considerable controversy on the meaning, scope, context and application of the precautionary principle in international trade and environmental management.”
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, U.S.  International Conference on Biotechnology in the Global Economy: Science and the Precautionary Principle, 22-23 September 2000.
~
“According to the United States, labeling of genetically modified (GM) foods is a potential dispute that may lead to accusations against the World Trade Organization. If all GM foods had to be labeled, it would force the U.S. to separate out GM soya and maize which are now mixed in with non-GM grains. The U.S. has argued that labeling GM foods is a barrier to trade because if GM foods are labeled consumers may choose not to buy them. Countries that ban GM products because of safety concerns could also be taken before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body for not conforming with the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, which requires convincing scientific proof of the exact nature of the health risk before a country has the right to ban an import.”
Panos
~
“… [T]he WTO seeks to remove decisions regarding health, food and safety from national governments and delegate them to international standard-setting bodies such as the Codex Alimentarius, an elite club of scientists located in Geneva, largely controlled by big food and agribusiness corporations.
“The WTO SPS Agreement has been used to defeat the use of the ‘precautionary principle.’  A WTO tribunal held that this principle could not be a justifiable basis upon which to establish regulatory controls.  (The precautionary principle allows regulatory action when there is risk of harm, even If there remains scientific uncertainty about the extent and nature of the potential impacts of a product or practice.)”
Maude Barlow, national chairperson, Council of Canadians
~
“Under the SPS Agreement, WTO may force a nation to choose between weakening its health standards for humans, animals, or plants, or paying an international penalty. The penalty can take the form of either compensating the foreign government whose exports to the nation are limited by the stricter standard or permitting that country to impose additional trade restrictions on exports from the nation with the more protective health standard.”
Bruce Silverglade, Director of Legal Affairs, Center for Science in the Public Interest, U.S.

Legal Basis
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
See SPS page
SPS is one of the treaties enforced by the World Trade Organization.
This treaty “sets constraints on government policies relating to food safety and animal and plant health, from pesticides and biological contaminants to food inspection, product labeling and genetically engineered foods.”
Article 5
Assessment of Risk and Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection
“2. In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine or other treatment.”
SPS also effectively establishes international standards as ceilings, including those set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), both industry-dominated bodies.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
See TBT page
TBT is one of the treaties enforced by the World Trade Organization.
This treaty has also been interpreted to drag down democratically chosen consumer-safety standards.  Among other restrictions, it limits the right of countries to adopt standards more stringent than those set by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992
http://www.unep.org/unep/rio.htm
Principle 15
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme
Work on this protocol began in Cartagena, Colombia, in February 1999 and the final agreement was adopted in Montreal, Canada, in January 2000.
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp
Biotechnology Agreement (proposed)
Prior to the Seattle Ministerial in 1999, the U.S. government reportedly proposed a new WTO agreement that would prevent other countries from prohibiting imports of genetically engineered (GE) foods.  This proposal would shift the burden onto governments to prove that a GE food was not safe before restricting imports of it, rather than requiring the producer to prove that the product is safe.

Cases & Controversies
•	U.S. & Canada v. EU on hormone-treated beef
See Hormone- Treated Beef Case
•	Canada v. Australian on uncooked salmon
See Uncooked Salmon Case
•	U.S. v. Japan on pesticide residues
See Pesticide Residues Case
•	U.S. v. Europe, Japan and Australia on labeling of genetically modified foods
See Genetically Modified Foods Controversy
•	Hong Kong & China v. U.S. & Canada on Asian longhorn beetle
See Longhorn Beetle Controversy

Resources
Non-governmental
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
“Agriculture, Food, and Public Health,” pp. 20 – 27.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. ”GMOs Continue to Create a Stir.” Geneva: BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 4, Number 29, July 25, 2000.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1825&browse=1&SID=#GMOs%20Continue%20to%20Create%20a%20Stir
•	Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University - International Conference on Biotechnology in the Global Economy: Science and the Precautionary Principle. 22-23 September 2000.
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbiotech/bioconfpp
•	Konrad von Moltke. “The institutions of precaution.” Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID).
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbiotech/comments/comments74.htm
•	Julian Morris. “Defining the precautionary principle.” Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID).
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbiotech/comments/comments79.htm
•	Marc Saner. “An ethical analysis of the precautionary principle.” Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID).
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbiotech/comments/comments80.htm
•	Bruce Silverglade. “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Weakening Food Safety Regulations to Facilitate Trade?” Center for Science in the Public Interest: Food and Drug Law Journal, Vol. 55, No 4, June 5, 2001: p. 517
http://www.wtowatch.org/library/admin/uploadedfiles/WTO_Agreement_on_Sanitary_and_Phytosanitary_Me.htm
•	Trade Policy Monitor. “Food Trade and the Biosafety Protocol.” Trade Policy Monitor, February 2000.
http://www.thunderlake.com/biosafety.html
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 2: “The WTO, Food Safety Standards and Public Health,” pp. 52-85. Chapter 3: “The WTO’s Impact on Emerging Health and Environmental Issues: Genetically Modified Organisms,” pp. 86-98.
Also pp. 94, 218-220.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
Governmental
•	Codex Alimentarius Commission
http://www.codexalimentarius.net
“Understanding the Codex Alimentarius: Codex and the international food trade.”
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e06.htm
•	International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
http://www.iso.ch
•	Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
http://www.unep.org/unep/rio.htm
•	Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp
•	South Centre. “WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: Issues for Developing Countries” Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) Working Papers 3. Geneva: South Centre, July 1999.
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/s&p/toc.htm
•	European Commission
Precaution in the WTO
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/2000_round/prec.htm
WTO Committee on Agriculture - EU additional negotiating proposals – Food Safety
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/wto/officdoc/foodsafety_en.htm
Official WTO Web site
•	Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
See SPS page
•	Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
See TBT page

You must lower national standards if they are higher than international standards.
The WTO sets ceilings rather than floors for national consumer, environmental, and worker protections.  When international standards are lower than your own, you must harmonize your standard downwards.

Under WTO rules, member countries cannot surpass international standards in the cases where these exist. Such requirements tend to reduce national standards to the least common denominator. And compared with  national or local laws, international treaties and bodies are harder for citizens to influence.
The Agreement on Technical Barriers To Trade (TBT), Article 2.4, requires that WTO members use relevant international standards as the basis for their technical regulations.  In effect, it imposes any existing international standards as a ceiling on national standards for consumer protection, public health and the environment.
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) sets maximum rather than minimum standards for national regulations and requires that domestic standards be based on international ones.
Article 5.1 of SPS also requires that members’ sanitary or phytosanitary measures assess risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account those “risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organizations.”  Such risk assessment methods require the determination of a “tolerable” level of risk, thus undercutting the “zero tolerance” standards that some countries choose to adopt when confronting serious risks to public health and safety.
The two main international bodies on which the WTO relies to set standards in these areas are the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).  Both bodies are heavily influenced by the industries to which their standards apply and operate mainly behind closed doors.
On the controversial issue of artificial hormone residues in beef, for example, after four years of intense lobbying by the United States government and agribusiness the Codex Commission adopted a lenient standard in a very close vote.  The U.S. was then able to use this standard to win a WTO dispute-settlement victory over higher European Union standards banning hormone-treated beef.  In other areas, however, many of the food-safety standards imposed by the Codex are lower than those established by U.S. law and could be used to undercut U.S. standards.		
The WTO constrains its members from adopting standards stronger—from the point of view of the environment or public health and safety—than those set by the Codex Alimentarius or ISO.  This imposition of ceilings, rather than floors, pressures countries toward a downward harmonization of national standards in areas covered by international standards.
On the other hand, when international standards are high, as in the case of some environmental treaties or public-health codes, the WTO undercuts them by favoring trade over other social values.  For example, when Japan tried to implement reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions required by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on global warming, the U.S. and E.U.―on behalf of their auto industries―used the WTO to attack Japan’s efforts as illegal restrictions on trade.
The most notable exception to the weakening of national standards by the WTO is the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  This treaty forces WTO members to accept higher standards (from a business point of view) for intellectual property protection.  The raised standards, though, do not benefit the great majority of citizens who do not hold patents or copyrights.

Opinions

“The adoption of Codex standards as scientifically justified norms for the purpose of the SPS and TBT Agreements is of immense significance. The standards have become an integral part of the legal framework within which international trade is being facilitated through harmonization. Already, they have been used as the benchmark in international trade disputes, and it is expected that they will be used increasingly in this regard.”
— Codex Alimentarius Commission
~
“The overwhelming industry influence over Codex decision-making has led to the adoption by the Codex of standards that provide less health protection than U.S. food safety regulations.  For instance, at its July 1999 meeting, the Codex approved pesticide residues that do no take into account their health impacts on children, as is required by U.S. law.”
— Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, U.S.
~
“To make progress, the WTO needs support from the standardization world. It has neither the resources nor the skills, inside its unwieldy TBT Committee composed largely of non-specialists in standardization, to change things alone.”
“That is where ISO should come in. If there is a global body which offers proven competence in both standardization and win-win progress for the developed and developing world alike, it is ISO. To capitalize on the opportunity, ISO needs only to accept the additional mission of the top facilitator of the use of standards in the WTO model, without changing any of its core activities.”
— Raymond Schonfeld, consultant on Technical Barriers to Trade issues, on Web site of International Organization for Standardization
~
"From an environmental perspective, the ISO isn’t ideal because it’s captured by industry. … The part that’s most troublesome is when an ISO standard becomes a default standard under the WTO rules."
— Stephen Porter, trade lawyer, Center for International and Environmental Law, U.S.
~
"There’s at least one global institution shaping commerce that corporations control completely, with no pretense of public involvement. That is the International Standards Organization (ISO). … And once ISO standards become part of the WTO, what was a voluntary system receives the force of law, without public involvement."
— Abby Scher, Co-Editor, Dollars and Sense, U.S.

Legal Basis

Agreement on Technical Barriers To Trade (TBT)
See TBT page
“TECHNICAL REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS
Article 2
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations by Central Government Bodies
With respect to their central government bodies:
[…]
Article 2.4
“Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.”
Article 2.6
“With a view to harmonizing technical regulations on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the preparation by appropriate international standardizing bodies of international standards for products for which they have either adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations.”

TBT limits the right of countries to adopt standards more stringent than those set by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a private-sector body.

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
See SPS page
Article 3
“1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement.”
Article 5
Assessment of Risk and Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection
“1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organizations.”

SPS effectively establishes international standards as ceilings, including those set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), both industry-dominated bodies.

Cases & Controversies
•	U.S. & Canada v. EU on hormone-treated beef
See case Hormone-Treated Beef Case page
•	U.S. v. Japan on pesticide residues
See Pesticide Residues Case page
•	Canada v. France on asbestos
See Asbestos Case page
Canada cited the ISO standard for regulating asbestos in arguing that France should not have banned asbestos when it could have restricted its use.
•	U.S. v. EU on electronics industry pollution
See Electronics-Industry Pollution Controversy page
The American Electronics Association claimed an EU proposal was WTO-illegal in part because its restrictions on trade in certain heavy metals used to manufacture electronics products are not based on international standards.
•	U.S. v. Guatemala on baby-food trademark
See Baby-Food Trademark Controversy
U.S. threats of WTO action on behalf of the intellectual property rights of Gerber, the baby-food producer, forced Guatemala to weaken a successful public-health code protecting mothers and infants. The Guatemalan code was based on the based on the Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes drafted by the World Health Organization and UNICEF.
•	U.S. v. Europe, Japan and Australia on labeling of genetically modified foods
See Genetically Modified Foods Controversy page
•	U.S. v. Denmark on ban on lead compounds
See Lead Compounds Controversy page
U.S. threat to challenge Danish ban on lead compounds.
•	U.S. & EU v. Japan on clean-air laws implementing Kyoto Protocol
See Greenhouse Gases Controversy page
When Japan adopted auto fuel-efficiency proposals to curtail greenhouse gases in accordance with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. and E.U. threatened WTO action under the Agreement on Technical Barriers To Trade on behalf of Ford and Daimler-Chrysler.  In this case, even though the Japanese law complied with the Kyoto Protocol and did not exceed its standards, the regulations were challenged as discriminatory and unnecessarily trade-restrictive.
•	Chemical companies v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency restrictions on a fungicide
Folpet is a fungicide registered as a probable human carcinogen. In the early 90s, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency eliminated tolerances for Folpet residues on most foods because the manufacturer did not provide the data necessary to set standards.  U.S. and European chemical and agribusiness companies attacked the restrictions. Most of the challenges said that the U.S. standard was WTO-illegal because the Codex Alimentarius allows Folpet residues on food, and under the WTO the U.S. could not have a higher food safety standard than the Codex without scientific proof to support it.  Eventually, the manufacturer of Folpet provided data on several food items and the EPA set tolerances for residues on them.

Resources
Non-governmental
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999. “Agriculture, Food, and Public Health,” pp. 20 – 27.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	INFACT (Canada)
www.infactcanada.ca
“The Gerber Baby--Trademark or Con Artist?”
http://www.infactcanada.ca/newsletters/winter96/gerbbaby.htm
WHO's Breastmilk Substitute Code
http://www.infactcanada.ca/whocode/codeview.htm
Innocenti Declaration On the Protection, Promotion and Support of Breastfeeding. 1 August, 1990, Florence, Italy
http://www.infactcanada.ca/whocode/innocent.htm
•	International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
http://www.iso.ch
“WTO, ISO, and world trade.” Geneva: International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Web site, 2001.
http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/comms-markets/wto/iso+wto.html
•	Raymond Schonfeld. “What standardization can do to help the WTO.” Geneva: ISO Bulletin (International Organization for Standardization), June 2001.
http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/commcentre/comment/2001/June2001.html
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 2: “The WTO, Food Safety Standards and Public Health,” pp. 52-85.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
Governmental
•	Codex Alimentarius Commission
http://www.codexalimentarius.net
“Understanding the Codex Alimentarius: Codex and the international food trade.”
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e06.htm
•	World Health Organization. International Code of Marketing Breast-Milk Substitutes. 1981.
http://www.who.int/dsa/cat98/mat8.htm#The International Code
Official WTO Web site
•	Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
See SPS page
•	Agreement on Technical Barriers To Trade (TBT)
See TBT page

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The WTO honors monopolies in intellectual property over human needs for medicine and food, threatening public health, small farmers, indigenous knowledge and biodiversity in developing countries.

The WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) undermines public health and food security in developing nations.  By impeding developing countries in their efforts to make or obtain cheap drugs for AIDS and other critical needs, TRIPS increases the costs of medicines and limits access to them.  And it enables powerful transnational corporations to rob the heritage of small and indigenous farmers in developing countries, turning life forms into commodities.
The WTO confers absolute rights on intellectual property holders, a departure from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) focus on non-discrimination  (between domestic and foreign producers and among different foreign producers).  TRIPS protections are not about free trade: rather, they are restrictions on trade and protections of monopoly justified in theory by their aim of fostering innovation.  In practice, however, they often end up merely protecting the rights of the powerful to extract more wealth from poor countries.
AIDS drugs
Although a loophole in TRIPS theoretically allows governments to bypass medical patents in cases of public-health emergencies, wealthy countries—particularly the United States—and transnational pharmaceutical firms have exerted heavy pressure on developing countries against such policies.  From Thailand to South Africa, from Israel to Brazil, despite the most devastating plague since the 14th-century Black Death, U.S. trade officials and drug companies have threatened trade sanctions and brought lawsuits to prevent the manufacture or importation of cheap generic anti-AIDS drugs.  But growing international outrage has finally forced the companies to drop the lawsuit against South Africa, and is pressuring the WTO to revise its rules on medical patents in poor countries.
Through compulsory licensing and parallel importing to circumvent pharmaceutical patents, Brazil and Botswana have both created successful programs to provide AIDS care to all who need it by manufacturing or importing cheap generic copies of antiretrovirals.  They have even found that these campaigns have positive side effects on their overall health-care systems.  Brazil has cut its AIDS death rate in half and radically reduced hospitalization.  In April 2001, The U.N. Human Rights Commission voted 52 to 1 in favor of a Brazilian resolution encouraging all governments to promote access to AIDS medicines.  Only the U.S. abstained.
Food security
The TRIPS Agreement also threatens the food security of many countries.  It encourages holders of intellectual property rights in agricultural technology to foster dependency on expensive imported seeds and inputs among small and subsistence farmers, the bulwark of food supplies in much of the world.  At its most extreme, this trend has led each of the five dominant biotech firms to patent “terminator” technologies, seed varieties that produce sterile plants and therefore must be purchased again each year.  These firms also push crops that are genetically engineered to tolerate pesticides, which may cause increased pollution from dangerous chemicals and “biological pollution” as genetically engineered strains hybridize with neighboring weeds.  And as monopoly ownership of crop varieties encourages monocultures of major crops, TRIPS dangerously undermines the biodiversity long conserved by traditional communities.
Bio-piracy
As corporations search the world for plant varieties with medicinal or agricultural applications, “bio-piracy” has become a serious problem for some developing countries.  The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and the Principles of Farmers’ Rights of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization acknowledge the rights of indigenous and local communities to the knowledge, practices and plant varieties cultivated collectively over generations.  Yet the TRIPS Agreement promotes the expropriation of these rights by forcing local government to enforce questionable patents from rich countries.
For example, since the 1970s U.S. and Japanese firms have been granted patents on a variety of products extracted from the neem tree.  Yet the neem tree’s pesticidal and medicinal properties had been known and used for centuries in India.  Finally, when the W.R. Grace Company applied for a patent on a traditionally used pesticidal extract from the neem seed, over 200 non-governmental organizations from 35 countries challenged the application.
The Texas company RiceTec received a U.S. patent on a minimally altered variety of Basmati rice, even though Basmati has been grown in India and Pakistan for generations and farmers were already exporting large quantities of the rice.  Once such patents are granted, TRIPS obligates all signatories to enforce them against their own people. In another case, when Thailand passed a law protecting traditional medicines in 1997, the U.S. State Department sent a letter to the Thai government challenging the legislation as a “possible violation of the TRIPS Agreement.”

Opinions
“Concerned about the situation in which one third of the world’s population has no guaranteed access to essential drugs, in which new world trade Agreements may have a negative impact on local manufacturing capacity and the access to and prices of pharmaceuticals in developing countries, … [nations must] ensure that public health rather than commercial interests have primacy in pharmaceutical and health policies and to review their options under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to safeguard access to essential drugs.”
Executive Board of the World Health Organization, a body of the United Nations
~
"What we must see now is pressure being brought on the WTO to change the trade rules which prevent poor people buying life-saving medicines."
Justin Forsyth, Oxfam, U.K.
~
“Brazil is showing that no one who dies of AIDS dies of natural causes. Those who die have been failed  by feckless leaders who see weapons as more alluring purchases than medicines, by wealthy countries (notably the United States) that have threatened the livelihood of poor nations who seek to manufacture cheap medicine and by the multinational drug companies who have kept the price of antiretroviral drugs needlessly out of reach of the vast majority of the world's population.”
“Brazil, by defying the pharmaceutical companies and threatening to break patents, among other actions, has made drugs available to everyone who needs them. Its experience shows that doing this requires something radical: an alteration of the basic social contract the pharmaceutical companies have enjoyed until now.”
Tina Rosenberg, New York Times Magazine
~
“The [drug] companies counter [criticisms] with an economic argument: these [anti-AIDS] drugs would not exist if not for the monopoly profits that finance research and development. But there are other ways to fund this researchin fact many of most expensive new drugs were discovered with the help of public funds.”
“From a strictly economic point of view, a patent monopoly is a very inferior means of financing research. A basic principle of standard microeconomics is that the price of a good should be equal to the cost of producing an additional unit. Monopoly pricing, especially at 15 or 20 times the cost of production, is enormously wasteful and inefficient. And in the case of essential medicines, the toll of this inefficiency is measured in human lives.”
Mark Weisbrot, co-director, Center for Economic and Policy Research, U.S.
~
“Liberalization, privatization and tighter intellectual property rights are shaping the path for the new technologies, determining how they are used. But the privatization and concentration of technology are going too far. Corporations define research agendas and tightly control their findings with patents, racing to lay claim to intellectual property under the rules set out in the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).”
“Poor people and poor countries risk being pushed to the margin in this proprietary regime controlling the world’s knowledge. …”
“Tighter property rights raise the price of technology transfer, blocking developing countries from the dynamic knowledge sectors. The TRIPS agreement will enable multinationals to dominate the global market even more easily. …”
“Intellectual property rights under the TRIPS agreement need comprehensive review to redress their perverse effects undermining food security, indigenous knowledge, biosafety and access to health care. …”
“[M]ost developing countries previously exempted agriculture, medicines and other products from national patent laws, but with the passage of the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), almost all knowledge-based production is now subject to tight intellectual property protection, unified internationally. Further, the TRIPS agreement is unbalanced: it provides an enabling environment for multinationals, tightening their dominant ownership of technology, impeding and increasing the cost of transfer to developing countries.”
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1999
~
“A United Nations sub-commission last week called on the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights to analyze the impact the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights has on human rights. The sub-commission criticized TRIPS obligations as, at times, being in conflict with human rights as they relate to health, food and the benefits of scientific progress.”
”In its August 17 resolution, the UN Sub-Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights said ‘there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights regime embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights law, on the other.’”
Inside US Trade, August 25, 2000
~
“In essence the TRIPS agreement aims to bring intellectual property rights protection standards in developing countries up to the standard and pattern established in the advanced industrial countries. Furthermore, in order to enable the holders of intellectual property rights to enforce protection, complaints procedures and remedies must also be enshrined in national law.”
“The implementation of the Agreement will introduce major changes in the way that developing countries deal with intellectual property matters. It drastically limits the freedom of countries to shape their intellectual property systems in accordance with national objectives and degrees of development. Nevertheless, as a legal text, the TRIPs Agreement contains many ambiguities and loose definitions which leave scope for differing interpretations to be incorporated in national legislation.”
South Centre, an intergovernmental organization of developing countries
~
"The granting of patents covering all genetically engineered varieties of a species, irrespective of the genes concerned or how they were transferred, puts in the hands of a single inventor the possibility to control what we grow on our farms and in our gardens. At a stroke of a pen the research of countless farmers and scientists has potentially been negated in a single, legal act of economic highjack."
"Trade liberalization is dismantling the last protections of the poorand robbing their last resources.  For the thousands of farmers in India who have been pushed to committing suicide due to indebtedness after the seed sector was opened up to TNCs, the economy has ... [consumed] their very lives.  For coastal communities whose lives have been devastated by the shrimp industry, for the small ghanis and oil mills and oilseed farmers whose markets have been snatched by imports of artificially cheap genetically engineered soya oil, the WTO is not a protector but a threat."
Vandana Shiva, Director, Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Natural Resource Policy, India
~
“The theft and patenting of our biogenetic resources is facilitated by the TRIPs (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) of the WTO.  Some plants which Indigenous Peoples have discovered cultivated, and used for food, medicine, and for sacred rituals are already patented in the United States, Japan, and Europe. … Our access and control over our biological diversity and control over our traditional knowledge and intellectual heritage are threatened by the TRIPs Agreement.”
Indigenous Peoples' Caucus – Seattle Declaration
~
“On March 29, 2001, a Canadian judge dealt a blow to farmers around the world by ruling that [Canadian canola farmer Percy Schmeiser] must pay the biotechnology giant Monsanto Company thousands of dollars because the company's genetically engineered canola plants were found growing on his field. Mr. Schmeiser did not obtain the seed illegally - pollen from a neighboring farm blew onto his fields and contaminated his crop. Mr. Schmeiser was a victim of genetic pollution from GM crops, and the courts now say he must pay Monsanto $10,000 for licensing fees and up to $75,000 in profits from his 1998 crops. This is in addition to the enormous legal costs he and his family have endured. Percy Schmeiser has filed a counter-suit against Monsanto, and is planning to appeal the ruling.”
International Forum on Globalization

Legal Foundations
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).
See TRIPS page
TRIPS is one of the treaties enforced by the World Trade Organization.
Convention on Biological Diversity
United Nations Environment Programme
Adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro as part of a comprehensive strategy for "sustainable development."
http://www.biodiv.org

Cases & Controversies
•	U.S. v. India on law excluding plants and animals from patenting
See Plant and Animal Patents Case
TRIPS requires that by 2005 developing countries must change their patent laws to allow foreign companies to patent local plant varieties.
•	U.S. & international pharmaceutical industry v. South Africa, Thailand and Brazil on AIDS drugs
See AIDS Drugs Controversy
•	U.S. v. Guatemala on baby-food trademark
See Baby-Food Trademark Controversy
U.S. threats of WTO action on behalf of the intellectual property rights of a Gerber, the baby-food producer, forced Guatemala to weaken a successful public-health code protecting mothers and infants.
•	U.S. v. Thailand on traditional medicines
See Traditional Medicines Controversy
•	U.S. v. Europe, Japan and Australia on labeling of genetically modified foods
See Genetically Modified Foods Controversy

Resources
Non-governmental
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
“Intellectual Property Rights,” pp. 31 – 35.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	José Bové. “Revolting Choice.” London: The Guardian, June 13, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2001/josebove.htm
•	John F. Burns. “Tradition in India vs. a Patent in the U.S.” New York Times, September 15, 1995.
•	Center for International Development at Harvard University - Global Trade Negotiations Home Page – Intellectual Property Rights
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/ipr.html
•	Carlos Correa. “Review of the TRIPs Agreement: Fostering the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries.” Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, September 2000.
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/foster.htm
•	Prangtip Daorueng. “Thailand: Tussle Over Fungi Strains Brings Painful Lessons.” Inter Press Service, September 4, 1998.
http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/sept98/08_54_007.html
http://mai.flora.org/forum/6816
•	Prangtip Daorueng. “Farmers Protest Copycat ‘Jasmine’ Rice.” Inter Press Service, May 13, 1998.
http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/may98/04_30_007.html
•	Kristin Dawkins. “US Unilateralism: A Threat to Global Sustainability?” Geneva: Bridges Between Trade And Sustainable Development, Volume 1, Number 4, October 1997.
http://www.ictsd.org/html/review4.9.htm
•	Inside US Trade. “UN Calls for Analysis of Human Rights Impacts of TRIPS.” Washington, DC: Inside US Trade, Vol. 18, No. 34, August 25, 2000.
•	International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. “IPRs For Development Take Centre Stage At WTO.” Geneva: BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 5, No. 23, 19 June 2001. http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getcurrentbulletin.cfm?bulletin_id=14&sid=
•	International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. “Drug Companies Drop Case Against S. African Government.” Geneva: BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 5, No. 15, 24 April 2001. http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1983&browse=1&SID=
•	Joris Kocken & Gerda van Roozendaal. “The Neem Tree Debate.” Biotechnology and Development Monitor, March 1997: pp. 8–11.
•	Witoon Lianchamroon & Piengporn Panutampon. “Jasmine Rice of Thailand.” Synthesis/Regeneration 17, Fall 1998.
http://www.greens.org/s-r/17/17-20.html
•	Gumisai Mutume. “Africa: Opposition Mounts to Patenting of Life Forms.” Mexico City: Inter Press Service, September 8, 1999.
http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/corner/worldnews/other/441.html
•	Oxfam. “Intellectual Property and the Knowledge Gap.” Oxford, UK: Oxfam Policy Papers, December 2001.
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/knowledge/knowledge.html
•	David Pilling & Ted Bardacke. “Genetic Pirates Walk the Plank.” London: Financial Times, January 9-10, 1999: p. 7.
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ik/thailand.htm
•	Arvind Panagariya. "TRIPS and the WTO: An Uneasy Marriage." University of Maryland, August 1999.
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/Panagariya/song/tripswto2.pdf
•	Alejandro Reuss. “World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).” In Dollars and Sense Collective. “The ABCs of the Global Economy.” Cambridge, MA: Dollars and Sense, March-April 2000.
http://www.dollarsandsense.org/2000/0300collect.html
•	Philippe Rivière. “Recul des multinationales pharmaceutiques. Après Pretoria, quelle politique contre le sida?” Paris: Le monde diplomatique, 20 avril 2001.
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/pretoria
•	Tina Rosenberg. “Look at Brazil.” New York Times Magazine, January 28, 2001.
•	Vandana Shiva. “TRIPs and the Environment.” Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 2001.
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/trips-ch.htm
•	Vandana Shiva. Stolen Harvest: The Hijacking of the Global Food Supply. Boston: South End Press, 1997.
http://www.southendpress.org/books/stolen.shtml
•	Vandana Shiva. Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge. Boston: South End Press, 1997.
http://www.southendpress.org/books/biopiracy.shtml
•	Rachel L. Swarns. “Free AIDS Care Brings Hope to Botswana.” New York Times, May 8, 2001.
•	Third World Network. “Re-thinking TRIPS in the WTO.” Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, no date (2001?).
http://attac.org/nonewround/wto/wto02.htm
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 4: “WTO Intellectual Property Rights For Corporations Threaten Food Security and Access to Medicines,” pp. 100-129.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
•	Bill Weinberg. “Bio-Piracy in Chiapas.” New York: The Nation, August 20, 2001.
http://www.thenation.com/docPrint.mhtml?i=20010820&s=weinberg
•	Mark Weisbrot. “Why We Need Free Trade for Life-Saving Medicines” Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, March 19, 2001. Also published in Baltimore Sun, March 21, 2001.
•	Frances Williams. “Battle over cost of pharmaceuticals moves to WTO.” London: Financial Times, June 20, 2001. http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010620001154&query=TRIPS+AND+WTO
•	“No to patenting of life! Indigenous peoples' statement on the Trade-Related Aspects Of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of the WTO.” At the United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 25 July l999.
http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Issues/lifepat.pdf

Governmental
•	World Intellectual Property Organization (United Nations)
http://www.wipo.org
•	Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
http://www.unep.org/unep/rio.htm
•	Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp
•	Codex Alimentarius Commission
www.codexalimentarius.net
Understanding the Codex Alimentarius: Codex and the international food trade.
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e06.htm
•	Weerawit Weeraworawit. "The TRIPs Agreement." World Bank, July 1999.
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/manila/TRIPS_handbook.pdf
•	South Centre. “Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licences: Options for Developing Countries” (T.R.A.D.E. Working Papers 5). Geneva: South Centre, October 1999.
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/complicence/toc.htm
•	South Centre. "The TRIPs Agreement: A Guide for the South. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights." Geneva: South Centre, 1997.
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/trips/toc.htm
•	Royal Government of Thailand. “Policy Position Paper.” No date.
http://www.oz.uc.edu/~harknerj/thaipp.htm
•	Organization of American States – Foreign Trade Information System – Intellectual Property Rights
http://www.sice.oas.org/int_prop.asp
•	European Commission Directorate General for Trade
Intellectual Property
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/intell/index_en.htm
EC approach to Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/intell/seaintel.htm
•	U.S. Department of State - The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/ipr/
•	Office of the United States Trade Representative – Sectors – Intellectual Property
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/intellectual.shtml

Official WTO Web site
•	Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)
See TRIPS page
•	TRIPS Council’s discussion on ‘Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines’ – 20 June 2001
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/counciljun01_e.htm

You must deregulate and privatize essential public services.
The WTO pressures member nations to open their basic public services and resources to the market, to the detriment of their citizens and the benefit of transnational corporations.

The WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) threatens to commercialize public resources and services and subordinate human needs for them to the interests of transnational corporations and wealthy countries.  It has begun to erect new fences around the global commons, promoting privatization of public services and deregulation of private services while eroding consumer, worker and environmental protections.
The wide-ranging provisions of GATS encompass all service sectors, from banking, energy and telecommunications to predominantly public services such as prisons, water delivery, health care, and education.  The treaty is also, in effect, a multilateral investment agreement because it covers direct provision of services by foreign corporations.
Built into GATS is the presumption that signatory governments will continue to negotiate with the goal of liberalizing more services.  Although the treaty does not cover sectors unless a country lists them in its “schedule of specific commitments,” the U.S. and Europe are putting heavy pressure on developing countries to continually expand their coverage.  Yet for poor nations, the agreement’s “national treatment” and “market access” provisions could hamstring their ability to promote development and protect infant industries, by forcing them to throw open their markets to foreign service providers.
GATS mandates that services essential to human life and social stability be increasingly exposed to the vagaries of international markets.  And because commitments under GATS are practically irreversible, it endangers local democratic control over these services.
GATS 2000 talks continue
GATS is one of the original treaties included under WTO jurisdiction at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1994.  GATS is a “multilateral framework agreement,” a core treaty that will be continuously expanded through negotiations to include new sectors and rules.  These ongoing negotiations on GATS are part of the "built-in agenda" agreed on when the WTO was formed.
In compliance with this provision, the “GATS 2000” talks were launched in February 2000, chaired by Canadian Ambassador to the WTO Sergio Marchi, and continue today.  The United States has been the strongest proponent of expanding this treaty; for its part, the European Commission has pressed for including drinking water in it.  The U.S., Europe and Canada share the goal of reaching an expanded agreement by December 2002.
The idea of a services agreement was originally advanced 20 years ago by a small group of major U.S. corporations.  American Express and Citicorp were instrumental in promoting the adoption of GATS in 1994.  The U.S. Coalition of Service Industries, according to its Web site, “played a major role in shaping” GATS and the 1997 WTO Telecommunications and Financial Services Agreements.
The current process continues to be shaped behind closed doors by powerful industry associations such as the U.S. Coalition of Service Industries and the European Services Forum, working closely with the trade representatives of the wealthy governments and the WTO bureaucracy.  Public debate has been minimal both in national legislative bodies and in civil society.  Representatives of developing countries and citizen groups have been marginalized and excluded.

Opinions
“The GATS is not just a treaty that exists between governments; it is first and foremost an instrument for the benefit of business.”
Industry Canada (Canadian government ministry)
~
"[W]ithout the enormous pressure generated by the American financial services section ... there would have been no services agreement."
David Hartridge, director of the services division of the WTO
~
"The GATS is ... the world's first multilateral agreement on investment since it covers not just cross border trade but every possible means of supplying a service, including the right to set up a commercial presence in the export market."
WTO Secretariat
~
“Since services do not face trade barriers in the form of border tariffs or taxes, market access is restricted through national regulations.  Thus the liberalization of trade in services implies modifications of the national laws and regulations, which make these negotiations more difficult and more sensitive for governments.”
Sherry Stephenson, Deputy Director, Trade Unit, Organization of American States
~
“The privatization of institutions of higher learning will soon be followed by the globalization of education.  One of the U.S. proposals for the WTO Seattle meeting was to enlarge services in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to include health and education, transform them from being fundamental rights into freely traded commodities, accessible on global markets for those who have the purchasing power.  This clearly leaves the large majority without access to basic needs and will push millions out of jobs and livelihoods.”
Vandana Shiva, Director, Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Natural Resource Policy, India
~
"What concrete impacts would an extension of WTO rules over the services sector have?  The short answer is they would entrench privatization and deregulation worldwide, largely for the benefit of American and European transnational corporations.  They would impose profound, permanent constraints on democratic policy-making.  For citizens of the North, valued public services and regulations are at risk.  Citizens of the South are facing the prospect of having IMF/World Bank-style structural adjustment locked in place for all time."
Ellen Gould, World Development Movement, U.K.
~
“Privatization of services impacts how our kids get educated, the elderly are cared for, workers are treated, even how we obtain water to drink. GATS rules will accelerate a trend toward privatization of human services already underway in the United States. In a democracy, people should be able to decide what human services they want the government to provide.”
Ruth Caplan, Alliance for Democracy, U.S.
~
“Essentially, the GATS is mandated to restrict government actions in regard to services through a set of legally binding constraints backed up by WTO-enforced trade sanctions.  Its most fundamental purpose is to constrain all levels of government in their delivery of services and to facilitate access to government contracts by transnational corporations in a multitude of areas including: health care; hospital care; home care; dental care; child care; elder care; education—primary, secondary and post-secondary; museums; libraries; law; social assistance; architecture; energy; water services; environmental protection services; real estate; insurance; tourism; postal services; transportation; publishing; broadcasting and many others.”
Maude Barlow, national chairperson, Council of Canadians

Legal Foundations
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
See GATS page
GATS is one of the treaties enforced by the World Trade Organization.
Domestic regulation (Article VI)
GATS rules on domestic regulation (Article VI) are analogous to Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade rules on "least trade restrictive" regulations. They require that domestic regulations "do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services" and are “not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service.”
While Article XIV, General Exceptions, exempts measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health," GATS drops the GATT exception for measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources."
Necessity is not clearly defined and will be subject to interpretation by the WTO dispute settlement system.  Tests of necessity that are hostile to public-interest regulation will likely be imported into GATS from other WTO agreements.
These provisions appear to place the burden of proof on governments to show that service regulations are "necessary," and that no less “trade-restrictive" mechanism was available to achieve a particular goal. Governments would have to prove that a regulation served the pursuit of a "legitimate" WTO objective, which again is not defined.  Disciplines based on this section could be used to overturn national, state and local regulations even if they do not discriminate in violation of National Treatment or Most Favored Nation provisions.
National treatment rules  (Article XVII)
This article and market-access provisions compromise the ability of governments to promote development.  Under them, governments cannot distinguish between domestic and foreign service providers in order to encourage the development of domestic services in poor countries.
~
“The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is drawing up regulatory proposals which could force governments to open up their public services to foreign investors and markets. As part of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) negotiations, the WTO working party on reform of domestic regulation is developing a regulatory reform agenda which could mark a new era of compulsion in international trade law. Article VI.4 of the GATS is being strengthened with the aim of requiring member states to show that they are employing least trade-restrictive policies. The legal tests under consideration would outlaw the use of non-market mechanisms such as cross-subsidisation, universal risk pooling, solidarity, and public accountability in the design, funding, and delivery of public services as being anti-competitive and restrictive to trade. The domestic policies of national governments will be subject to WTO rules, and if declared illegal, could lead to trade sanctions under the WTO disputes panel process. The USA and European Union, with the backing of their own multinational corporations, believe that these new powers will advantage their own economies.”
Allyson Pollock & David Price in The Lancet (UK)

Cases & Controversies
Drinking water
Under pressure from World Bank and IMF, the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia, entrusted its water services to a private consortium of international corporations including U.S. construction giant Bechtel.  Water bills quickly became unaffordable for most citizens, leading to strikes and protests, violence, and finally termination of the contract.
Major firms in the U.S.Azurix, Enron’s water subsidiary—and Europe—Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux and Générale des Eaux—are pushing to privatize municipal water supplies around the world.  The European Commission’s GATS negotiators want to include drinking water in GATS commitments.
~
“In 1999 water privatisation was part of a package of reforms required by the World Bank so that Bolivia could receive debt relief. In Cochabamba the sale – to UK company International Waters Ltd – led to charges so crippling they sparked mass protest. Water suddenly cost more than food. Those on the minimum wage saw nearly half their budget devoured by the water bill. Even collecting rain water in rooftop tanks on a farm became illegal without a permit. In April the people of Cochabamba had had enough. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets to protest, which ended in clashes with the police, and the death of six protestors.”
“In Bolivia this demonstration of people power was successful – International Waters was kicked out of Bolivia and the industry renationalised. But if current negotiations in the WTO are successful, governments will be forced to privatise services and the sale will be irreversible.”
World Development Movement

More information on GATS and water services
•	Alliance for Democracy. "Don't let the WTO get hold of our water!" Waltham, MA: Alliance for Democracy, 2000.
http://www.afd-online.org/campaigns/2000/Globalization/water.htm
•	Maude Barlow. Blue Gold. San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, June 1999.
http://www.ifg.org/bgsummary.html
Resources
Non-governmental
•	Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Help Citizens. Quarterly Report: International Trade. Paris: Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Help Citizens, 2001.
http://attac.org/attacinfoen/commerceen1.pdf
•	Ruth Caplan. “GATS Handbook (WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services).” Waltham, MA: Alliance for Democracy, 2000.
http://www.afd-online.org/campaigns/2000/Globalization/handbook.htm
•	Corporate Europe Observatory. “GATS: Undermining Public Services Worldwide.” Corporate Europe Observer, Issue 9. Amsterdam: Corporate Europe Observatory, June 2001.
•	GATSwatch
A joint initiative of Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute
http://www.xs4all.nl/%7Eceo/gatswatch/
•	Ellen Gould. "The 2001 GATS Negotiations: the Political Challenge Ahead." Waltham MA: Alliance for Democracy, 2001.
http://www.thealliancefordemocracy.org/campaigns/2000/Globalization/2001_gats_negotiations.htm
•	Ellen Gould. “Separating WTO Fact and Fiction.” Council of Canadians Web site, 2001.
http://www.canadians.org/campaigns/campaigns-tradepub-gats-fact_fiction.html
•	Ellen Gould and Clare Joy. "In whose service? The threat posed by the General Agreement on Trade in Services to economic development in the South." London: World Development Movement, December 2000.
http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/WTO/Inwhoseservice.htm
•	Allyson Pollock & David Price. “Rewriting the regulations: how the World Trade Organisation could accelerate privatisation in the health-care systems.” London: The Lancet, December 9, 2000.
http://mai.flora.org/forum/23379
•	Public Citizen Global Trade Watch. “General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).”  Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 2001
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/gats
•	David Woods. "Lies, damn lies, and what the GATS really says." Commentary in the Internet newsletter, World Trade Agenda. Dec. 2000.
http://www.tradeagenda.com/files/commentaries/wta0023c.html
Woods was Director of Information at the GATT and the World Trade Organization for 13 years.
•	World Development Movement. “GATS Campaign – Stop the GATSastrophe.” London: World Development Movement, 2001.
http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaign/GATS.htm
•	World Development Movement. “WDM’s summary response to the World Trade Organisation document ‘GATS - FACT AND FICTION.’” London: World Development Movement, April 2001.
http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/Wto/factfictionrebuttal.htm
•	World Development Movement. “General Agreement on Trade in Services - Press Briefing - March 2001.” London: World Development Movement, March 2001.
http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/WTO/gatsmarch.htm
Governmental
•	South Centre. “GATS 2000 Negotiations: Options for Developing Countries” (T.R.A.D.E. Working Papers 9). Geneva: South Centre, December 2000.
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/gats/toc.htm
•	Government of Canada - Services. “GATS 2000 Negotiations.”
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/sk00002e.html
•	European Commission. “Opening World Markets for Services.” INFO-POINT on World Trade in Services Web site, 2001.
http://gats-info.eu.int/
•	European Commission Directorate General for Trade
Trade in Services
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/services/index_en.htm
EC Approach To Services
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/services/seaserv.htm
•	Office of the United States Trade Representative
Sectors – Services
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/services/services.shtml

Official WTO Web site
•	General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
See GATS page

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The WTO restricts less-developed countries’ use of trade as a tool to foster balanced development.  It also attacks special trade arrangements that make up for past injustices.

Most developing countries have not prospered in the brave new world of liberalized trade.  Small farmers in both poor and rich countries have fared particularly poorly.
From 1995 to 1999, one index of export prices of primary commodities fell from 106 to 87 (where 1990 = 100).  This means that developing countries, which export mainly such commodities, earn less for their exports, although they still have to pay rising prices for manufactured imports from industrialized countries.  These shifting terms of international trade are dragging the world’s poorest people deeper into poverty.
Overall, as trade barriers have been torn down, income disparities have increased between developing and industrialized countries and within countries.  According the the United Nations, the gap between the fifth of the world’s people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest grew from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 60 to 1 in 1990, and then to 74 to 1 in 1997.  By the late 1990s, the richest fifth enjoyed 86 percent of total world income while the poorest fifth received only one percent.  Another U.N. study reported that internal wage inequality has increased in those developing countries that have rapidly liberalized their trade policies.
From 1985 to 1998, developing country exports as a share of total world exports dropped from 31% to 28%, although trade volume grew sharply.  The share of exports by the least-developed countries has fallen by two-thirds during this period, from 1.5% to 0.5% of the world total.  And the United Nations projects that wealthy countries will gain more than twice as much from liberalized trade as the rest of the world.
The World Trade Organization has made this situation worse in several ways.  It fosters the agro-industrial production of export crops over local food self-sufficiency.  Wealthy countries use it, along with other trade pacts and the International Monetary Fund, to push too many developing countries into trying to export the same agricultural commodities.  This keeps their prices permanently depressed.  At the same time, the WTO forces poor countries to open their markets to cheaper exports from developed countries.  For their part, developed countries have not reduced their agricultural tariffs or subsidies concomitantly, and these continuing trade barriers cost the South more than twice the total of all development aid from the North.
The WTO has also been used to successfully attack fair-trade provisions like the Lomé Convention between Europe and its former colonies, which offered special trade privileges to make up for past injustices and to encourage development.
Although the U.S. grows no bananas, the Clinton administration brought a successful WTO case against the European Union to force it to drop its Lomé Convention preferences for Caribbean bananas.  CEO Carl Lindner of Chiquita Brands, a U.S.-based banana grower that lobbied the U.S. government to bring the challenge, made large donations to the Democratic and Republican parties around the times that critical U.S. decisions on the case were made.
Before the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade recognized the “special and differential status” (SDS) of developing countries, allowing them some room to use trade policies to foster industrialization.  The WTO agreements, however, weakened SDS and deprived Third World countries of most trade policies that they had used as tools for development.
While the Asian “tigers” such as South Korea and Malaysia had previously harnessed foreign investment to domestic industrialization goals through mechanisms such as local-content requirements, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) prohibited such measures.  And although the U.S., Germany, and Japan in their time had all “borrowed” technological innovations from other countries in order to industrialize, the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) bolstered patent protections and shut the gate on technological diffusion for poor countries.
Another WTO treaty, the Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) prevents governments from favoring local, small or women-owned businesses to encourage economic development.
Agreement on Agriculture discussions stalled
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is an area of particular concern for many developing countries, most of whose economies depend heavily on agricultural exports and imports.  The AoA, along with the Special Ministerial Agreement of Marrakesh (April 1994), promised increased market access for Third World agricultural imports in industrialized countries, reductions of agricultural subsidies in the latter, and assistance to net food-importing countries to offset higher prices caused by these reduced subsidies.
None of these promised improvements has materialized.  On the contrary, the level of overall agricultural subsidies in the OECD (industrialized) countries nearly doubled from $182 billion in 1995 to $362 billion in 1998.  Although AoA negotiations are currently part of the built-in agenda of the WTO, talks in this area collapsed at the Seattle Ministerial in 1999 and remain contentious.  Although some developing countries, especially from Africa, began to submit negotiating proposals during 2000 and 2001, the majority still found their concerns marginalized and excluded by closed-door consultations among powerful countries and interests—the same secrecy and lack of transparency that led to the Seattle fiasco.

Opinions

"[The] enhancement of human freedom is both the main object and the primary means of development."
— Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize-winning economist, India
~
"The new rules of globalisation - and the players writing them - focus on integrating global markets, neglecting the needs of people that markets cannot meet. The process is concentrating power and marginalising the poor, both countries and people."
— United Nations Development Programme
~
“In almost all developing countries that have undertaken rapid trade liberalization, wage inequality had increased, most often in the context of declining industrial employment of unskilled workers and large absolute falls in their real wages, on the order of 20-30% in Latin American countries.”
— United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
~
"We will strive to ensure that trade policies are conducive to fostering food security for all through a fair and market orientated [sic] world trade system".
—World Food Summit plan of action, 1996
~
“The founding Charter of the International Trade Organization [proposed in the 1940s] had broader basic principles. But then they ditched the commodity agreements. They ditched the technology-transfer code. They ditched the code on restrictive business practice. They ditched the code of conduct for transnational corporations and the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations. The Uruguay Round was the Empire striking back against all these attempts to regulate.
“We at Third World Network turn the whole thing upside down. Instead of ‘trade-distorting’ we say ‘development-distorting’... We want to examine all the existing agreements under a new principle called ‘Development and Equity.’ That should be the operational principle of the WTO – sustainable development. Actually, if you look at its constitution, its objective is ‘sustainable development’ – not trade liberalization, which is only a means.”
— Martin Khor, Director, Third World Network, Malaysia
~
“In contrast to the loose GATT framework, which had allowed some space for development initiatives, the comprehensive and tightened Uruguay Round was fundamentally anti-development in its thrust.”
— Walden Bello, Director, Focus on the Global South, Bangkok, Thailand
~
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture “has perpetuated the unevenness of a playing field which the multilateral trading system has been trying to correct. Moreover, this has placed the burden of adjustment on developing countries relative to countries who can afford to maintain high levels of domestic support and export subsidies.”
— Cesar Bautista, former Secretary of Trade, the Philippines
~
“The WTO is driven by a mission to ‘liberalize’ world trade and ‘open’ every country to its balm.  This is supposed to be good for everyone.  In practice it has proved very much better for some than for others, and no good at all for most of the world’s people.  The more world trade grows the wider becomes the yawning gulf between rich and poor, both within and between countries.”
—New Internationalist magazine, May 2001, UK
~
“Via Campesina rejects the neoliberal policies that push countries into cash crop export production at the expense of domestic food production.  These policies contribute to low commodity prices that are far less than the real costs of production.  Developing countries are forced to adopt these policies in order to pay their external debt.  These countries must also open their borders to the importation of food which leads to even greater debt.  There is no doubt that the WTO is an instrument that places greater control and profits in the hands of the transnational corporations.”
— Via Campesina, a world-wide organization of small-farmer associations
~
“The further ‘liberalization’ of trade in agricultural products will mean greater freedom for the big to drive out the small, forcing people everywhere to depend for their daily meals on distant global markets with unpredictable price swings.  It also means another mass exodus from rural areas and the further growth of cities, and could lead to the final triumph of inefficient and ecologically destructive monocultures over ecologically rational and sustainable farming practices.”
— Peter Rosset, Executive Director, Institute for Food and Development Policy, U.S.

Legal Basis
The following treaties are enforced by the World Trade Organization.
Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP)
See AGP page
Some exceptions to the non-discrimination principles of national treatment and most-favored nation status have become widely accepted around the world. Government procurement practices, for example, have not been covered by previous trade agreements. Although some procurement standards may violate non-discrimination principles, they generally do this in order to further legitimate policy goals such as fair employment, a living wage, or encouraging local businesses in poor communities.
The Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP), however, turns these exceptions into illegal trade barriers. It also prohibits members who have signed it from withholding government contracts from companies or nations who violate labor, human rights or environmental standards. Under the AGP, government support for the international boycott against South African apartheid probably would have been illegal.
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
See TRIMS page
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).
See TRIPS page
Agreement on Agriculture (AOA)
See AOA page

Cases & Controversies
•	U.S. v. EU on bananas
See Chiquita Banana Case page
The U.S., on behalf of Chiquita Brands, won this dispute over Europe's Lomé Convention preferences for small banana producers in former colonies.
•	U.S. v. India on law excluding plants and animals from patenting
See Plant and Animal Patents Case
TRIPS requires that by 2005 developing countries must change their patent laws to allow foreign companies to patent local plant varieties.
•	U.S. v. Thailand on traditional medicines
See Traditional Medicines Controversy
•	Small Mexican corn farmers in Mexico after NAFTA
Under NAFTA, which has similar agriculture provisions to those of the WTO, Mexico eliminated aid to the country’s 2.7 million small corn farmers and lowered barriers to cheap, subsidized U.S. corn.  As a result, an enormous number of campesinos have been forced off their lands and into the labor pool for Mexican and U.S. agribusiness.  Many more have swelled the shanty-towns of Mexican cities and the barrios of the U.S.

Resources
Non-governmental
•	Dean Baker & Mark Weisbrot. “Will New Trade Gains Make Us Rich? An Assessment of the Prospective Gains from New Trade Agreements.” Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, October 3, 2001.
http://www.cepr.net/will_new_trade_gains_make_us_ric.htm
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millenium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
”Agriculture, Food, and Public Health,” pp. 20-27.
”Finance and Investment,” pp. 36-41.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	Walden Bello. “Why Reform of the WTO is the Wrong Agenda.” Oakland, CA: Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy, January 2000.
http://www.foodfirst.org/progs/global/trade/wbello.html
•	Walden Bello. "UNCTAD: Time to Lead, Time to Challenge the WTO."
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000: pp. 163-174.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
•	James K. Boyce. “The Globalization of Market Failure? International Trade and Sustainable Agriculture.” Amherst, MA: Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, no date (2000?).
http://www.wtowatch.org/library/admin/uploadedfiles/Globalization_of_Market_Failure_International_.htm
•	Jorge G. Castañeda. “Seattle: First Fruit of a Changing Epoch.” Managua, Nicaragua: envío, April 2000.
http://www.uca.edu.ni/publicaciones/revistas/envio/2000/eng/april/First%20Fruit%20of%20a%20Changing%20Epoch.htm
•	William R. Cline. Trade and Income Distribution: The Debate and New Evidence. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, Sept. 1999.
•	Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité (CIDSE - International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity). Belgium.
http://www.cidse.org
•	Bhagirath Lal Das. Strengthening Developing Countries in the WTO. Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 2001.
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/td8.htm
•	Ranjit Devraj/Inter Press Service. “TRIMS – Trade-Related Investment Measures: Room at the Top.” Oxford, UK: new internationalist, Issue 334, May 2001.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue334/glass.htm#trims
•	Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy (U.S.)
http://www.foodfirst.org
•	Ferial Haffajee/Inter Press Service. “TRIPs – Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: TRIPping up the poor.” Oxford, UK: new internationalist, Issue 334, May 2001.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue334/mario.htm#trips
•	Tetteh Hormeku. “Draft Declaration by WTO Chairman. Clean Text for WTO Ministerial; Dirty Slap in Face of Africans.” Paris: ATTAC, October 9, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2001/1010attac.htm
•	Japan Times. “Japan, EU Agree to Block Farm Trade Liberalization.” Japan Times, October 14, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2001/1016euja.htm
•	Martin Khor. “The situation at the WTO a year since Seattle.” South-North Development Monitor. Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 5 December 2000.
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/twr123a.htm
•	Martin Khor. Globalisation and the South: Some Critical Issues. Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 2000.
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/mk9.htm
•	Aileen Kwa. “WTO Ignores Developing Countries … Again.” Bangkok: Focus on Trade, #63, May 2001.
http://www.wtowatch.org/library/admin/uploadedfiles/WTO_Ignores_Developing_Countries_…_Again.htm
•	John Madeley. “Trade liberalisation and food security: recent evidence.” Overseas Development Institute Web site.
http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/madeley.html
•	Oxfam. “Intellectual Property and the Knowledge Gap.” Oxford, UK: Oxfam Policy Papers, December 2001.
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/knowledge/knowledge.html
•	Oxfam. “Is the WTO serious about reducing world poverty? The Development Agenda for Doha.” Oxford, UK: Oxfam Briefing Paper 7, 2001.
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/doha.html
•	Chakravarthi Raghavan. “In Trade, Business as Usual Won’t Do.” International Herald Tribune, October 5, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2001/1005round.htm
•	David Ransom. “A world turned upside down.” Oxford, UK: New Internationalist, Number 334, May 2001.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue334/upside.htm
•	Katy Salmon/Inter Press Service. “The Agriculture Agreement: Where there are no subsidies.” Oxford, UK: new internationalist, Issue 334, May 2001.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue334/mario.htm#food
•	Prof. Amartya Sen (Web site)
http://www.nd.edu/~kmukhopa/cal300/calcutta/amartya.htm
•	Kalinga Seneviratne. “'New Development Agenda' in Doha?” Inter Press Service, October 15, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2001/1016agenda.htm
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
”The WTO and Developing Countries.” Pp. 130-149.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
•	Mark Weisbrot. “Tricks of Free Trade.” Sierra Magazine. San Francisco: Sierra Club, September-October 2001.
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200109/weisbrot.asp 
•	Mark Weisbrot, Dean Baker, Egor Kraev & Judy Chen. “The Scorecard on Globalization 1980-2000: Twenty Years of Diminished Progress.” Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2001.
http://www.cepr.net/globalization/scorecard_on_globalization.htm
Governmental
•	UNDP. Human Development Report 2001. Geneva: United Nations Development Programme, 2001.
http://www.undp.org/hdr2001
•	UNCTAD. The Least Developed Countries 2000 Report. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2000.
http://www.unctad.org/en/pub/ps1ldc00.en.htm
•	UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report 2001. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2001.
http://www.unctad.org/en/pub/ps1tdr01.en.htm
•	South Centre – An Intergovernmental Organisation of Developing Countries
http://www.southcentre.org
•	South Centre. “Defining a Development Agenda for WTO.” Geneva, South Centre, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2001/1010devafr.htm
•	European Commission Directorate-General for Trade
Trade and Development
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/devel/index_en.htm
“European Commission adopts new Generalised Scheme of Tariff Preferences (GSP) Regulation to foster sustainable development.”
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/devel/ngsp_reg.htm
Trade and development in the new WTO round
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/devel/tradedevel.htm
Agriculture – International Trade Relations
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/wto/index_en.htm
New Round: EC Approach on Agriculture
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/goods/agri/ecapragr.htm
Trade & Investment: New Round – EC Approach
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/invest/1806ti.htm
•	Office of the United States Trade Representative
Trade & Development
http://www.ustr.gov/gsp/index.shtml
Sectors – Agriculture
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/agriculture.shtml

Official WTO Web site
•	Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP)
See AGP on WTO Treaties page
•	Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
See TRIMS on WTO Treaties page
•	Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right (TRIPS)
See TRIPS on WTO Treaties page
•	Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)
See AoA on WTO Treaties page
•	The WTO In Brief: Developing countries
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr04_e.htm
•	Trade and development on the WTO website
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/devel_e.htm
•	Trading Into the Future: Introduction to the WTO. Developing Countries
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev0_e.htm
•	The World Trade Organization: A Training Package. Developing countries and the WTO
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto01/wto1_16.htm
•	Interactive electronic guide to WTO and Developing countries
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/wtodc.exe
•	Technical cooperation on the WTO website
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/teccop_e/teccop_e.htm
•	Trade and Development Centre
Run jointly by the World Trade Organization and the World Bank's Economic Development Institute, under a programme called Information Technologies for Development (ITD).
http://www.itd.org/

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The WTO weakens the power of citizens to champion human and labor rights through the policies of their governments.

Basic principles of the WTO, such as most-favored nation status (MFN) and blindness to production and processing methods (PPM), prohibit distinguishing among trading partners because of bad human or labor rights records.  For example, a congressional study has confirmed that a proposed U.S. law banning the importation of products made with child labor would violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the main WTO treaty. This is because child labor is a production method, not a physical property of the product.
U.S. federal courts have cited WTO challenges in striking down Massachusetts' 1996 "selective-purchasing" law, which denied government contracts to companies doing business with the military government of Myanmar (Burma), a notorious human-rights violator.  Europe and Japan had begun dispute-settlement proceedings against the law in the WTO, which they dropped when the U.S. courts ruled the legislation unconstitutional.
In 1998, the Maryland state legislature also narrowly defeated a similar law targeting the Nigerian dictatorship.  The Clinton administration lobbied heavily against the legislation, focusing on potential challenges to it under the WTO.
The elimination of such legal leverage weakens the power of citizens to defend human rights through the policies of their governments.  For example, the widespread government sanctions against South Africa’s apartheid system would probably have been illegal under the WTO.
The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, meeting in August 2001, adopted three resolutions expressing concern about the impact on human rights of the liberalization of trade in services, the expansion of intellectual property rights, and other trade-related aspects of globalization.

Opinions

“We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question.”
WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration – 13 December 1996
~
“The battle against the unfreedom of bound labor is important in many third world countries today for some of the same reasons the American Civil War was momentous.”
Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize-winning economist
~
“If the actions of Massachusetts, which put the human rights of the Burmese people above the interests of a few multinational companies, do not comply with WTO rules, then the WTO rules need changing, not the actions of Massachusetts.”
Bill Jordan, general secretary, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
~
“The current system of global trade and investment rules has failed miserably on many counts. It has weakened the bargaining power of workers all over the world, has undermined legitimate national regulations designed to protect the environment and public health, and has exacerbated financial instability and growing inequality worldwide. We need a rules-based global trading system that protects workers' and human rights, the environment, communities' priorities, public health, and consumers.”
AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney, U.S.
~
“Fortunately, there is much agreement already over the substance of core labor rights.  Last year, business, labor and government representatives from 173 nations reaffirmed core labor standards as fundamental human rights, including freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively.  They also called for the elimination of forced labor, child labor, and employment-related discrimination.  Virtually every independent labor federation has endorsed the ICFTU’s [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions] call for building labor rights into the global trading system.  The divide is not between North and South; it is between workers everywhere and the great concentrations of capital and the governments they dominate.”
—Jay Mazur, President, UNITE (Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees), Chair of AFL-CIO International Affairs Committee, U.S.
~
“The rules of the currently 137-member WTO, the two authors said, ‘reflect an agenda that serves only to promote dominant corporatist interests that already monopolize the area of international trade.’
“Human rights, they added, were given only an oblique reference in the founding documents of the WTO, which was launched at an international conference in Marrakesh in 1994 to replace the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
“‘The net result is that for certain sectors of humanity -- particularly the developing countries of the South -- the WTO is a veritable nightmare,’ the jurists declared.”
Reuters story quoting J. Oloka-Onyango of Uganda and Deepika Udagama of Sri Lanka, authors of a United Nations report on trade and human rights
~
“The WTO’s rule is not restricted to such matters as tariff barriers. When the organization was formed, environmental and labor groups warned that the WTO would soon be rendering decisions on essential matters of public policy. This has proven absolutely correct. Currently, the WTO is considering whether "selective purchasing" laws – like a Massachusetts law barring state agencies and local governments from buying products made in Burma and intended to withdraw an economic lifeline to that country’s dictatorship – are a violation of "free trade." It is feared that the WTO will rule out these kinds of political motives from government policy making. The organization has already ruled against Europe for banning hormone-treated beef and against Japan for prohibiting pesticide-laden apples.”
Ellen Frank in Dollars and Sense magazine, U.S.

Legal Basis
These treaties are enforced by the World Trade Organization.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947)
See GATT page
Article I - Most-Favored Nation Treatment (MFN)
Article III - National Treatment (non-discrimination between domestic and foreign products).

Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
See TRIMS page

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
See TBT page

Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP)
See AGP page
Some exceptions to the non-discrimination principles of national treatment and most-favored nation status have become widely accepted around the world. Government procurement practices, for example, have not been covered by previous trade agreements. Although some procurement standards may violate non-discrimination principles, they generally do this in order to further legitimate policy goals such as fair employment, a living wage, or encouraging local businesses in poor communities.
The Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP), however, turns these exceptions into illegal trade barriers. It also prohibits members who have signed it from withholding government contracts from companies or nations who violate labor, human rights or environmental standards. Under the AGP, government support for the international boycott against South African apartheid probably would have been illegal.

Cases & Controversies
TBT, AGP & TRIMS
•	EU and Japan v. U.S. on Massachusetts law targeting Burmese military dictatorship
See Myanmar Sanctions Case page
AGP
•	Defeat of Maryland sanctions against Nigerian dictatorship by Clinton administration lobbying
While the Myanmar case was pending, state legislators in Maryland proposed selective-purchasing legislation prohibiting the state from doing business with the military dictatorship of Nigeria or with firms operating there.
The Clinton administration lobbied heavily against the law.  A State Department official testified: “All State and local sanctions are perceived to violate the rules [of the WTO], they can cause counterproductive disagreements. … [W]e would like to work with you to ensure that we don’t expose ourselves to a potential WTO challenge.”
The law had initially been favored to pass; after the Clinton lobbying campaign, it lost by one vote.

Resources
Non-governmental

•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
”The Burma Case: Human Rights Affected By Finance and Investment.” Pp. 38-39.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	Center for International Development at Harvard University - Global Trade Negotiations Home Page – Labor
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/labor.html
•	Kimberly Ann Elliott. "Finding Our Way on Trade and Labor Standards." Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, April 2001
http://www.iie.com/policybriefs/news01-5.htm
•	Robert Evans. “UN: Report Calls WTO 'Nightmare'.” Geneva: Reuters, August 11, 2000.
http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/headlines/2000/285.html
•	Ellen Frank. “Are Labor Standards Elitist?” Somerville, MA: Dollars & Sense, January - February 2000.
•	Ferial Haffajee/Inter Press Service. “TRIPs – Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: TRIPping up the poor.” Oxford, UK: new internationalist, Issue 334, May 2001.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue334/mario.htm#trips
•	Global Unions – WTO Day of Action 2001
http://www.global-unions.org/wto-action.asp
•	Human Rights for Workers – Information on the Need for Global Rules
http://www.senser.com/global.htm
•	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions - Trade & Labour Standards
http://www.icftu.org/focus.asp?Issue=trade&Language=EN
•	John J. Sweeney. "Statement by AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney on Workers' Rights and the WTO." Washington, DC: American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, October 29, 1999.
http://www.aflcio.org/publ/press1999/pr1029.htm
•	Lawyers Committee for Human Rights – Workers’ Rights Program
http://www.lchr.org/labor_new/fr.htm
•	Arvind Panagariya. “TRIPS and the WTO: An Uneasy Marriage.” University of Maryland, August 1999.
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/videoconf/panagariya.pdf
•	Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourke and Archon Fung. "Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace." Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 2000.
http://web.mit.edu/afung/www/papers/RLS2.pdf
•	Jose M. Salazar-Xirinachs. “The Trade–Labor Nexus: Developing Countries' Perspectives.” Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, November 15, 1999.
http://www.odc.org/commentary/salazar.html
•	Katy Salmon/Inter Press Service. “The Agriculture Agreement: Where there are no subsidies.” Oxford, UK: new internationalist, Issue 334, May 2001.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue334/mario.htm#food
•	Robert Senser. "Globalization and the WTO: What's at Stake for Canada, and What We Can Do About It." CAW/Quebec Council, December 2000.
http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Issues/senser.pdf
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 7: ”Human and Labor Rights Under the WTO.” Pp. 172-192.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
•	WTOWATCH.org - Fast Facts: WTO and Labor
http://www.wtowatch.org/faq/faq.cfm?faq_id=5
Governmental
•	United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. “Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights” (Resolution 2001/5). Geneva: United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 25th meeting, 15 August 2001.
http://attac.org/nonewround/doc/doc08.htm
•	United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. “Liberalization of trade in services, and human rights” (Resolution 2001/4). Geneva: United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 25th meeting, 15 August 2001.
http://attac.org/nonewround/doc/doc07.htm
•	United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. “Intellectual property and human rights” (Resolution 2001/21). Geneva: United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 26th meeting, 16 August 2001.
http://attac.org/nonewround/doc/doc06.htm
•	J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights.  (Preliminary Report). Geneva: United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 15 June 2000.
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/2848af408d01ec0ac1256609004e770b/21a92d3d0425a0cec125693500484d2f?OpenDocument&Highlight=2,Oloka-Onyango
•	International Labor Organization (United Nations)
http://www.ilo.org 
•	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Trade Union Advisory Committee
http://www.tuac.org
•	Simon Tay. "Trade, the Environment, and Labor: Texts, Concepts, and Institutions." World Bank, December 1999.
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/manila/tr_envir_labor.pdf
•	South Centre. “The Global Labour Standards Controversy: Critical Issues for Developing Countries.” Geneva: South Centre, October 2000.
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/labour/toc.htm
•	European Commission Directorate-General for Trade
The European Commission adopts strategy to promote core labour standards and social governance globally
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/devel/cls.htm
EC approach to Government Procurement
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/gov_proc/seaproc.htm
•	Office of the United States Trade Representative
Labor and Environment “Toolbox”
http://www.ustr.gov/toolbox.pdf

Official WTO Web site
•	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
See GATT page
•	Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
See TRIMS page
•	Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
See TBT page
•	Agreement on Government Purchasing (AGP)
See AGP page
•	Singapore Ministerial Declaration – 13 December 1996
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm
•	Trading Into the Future: Beyond the agreements. Labour standards: not on the agenda.
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey7_e.htm

The WTO v. democracy

WTO processes favor big business and rich countries.
The WTO's undemocratic decision-making mechanisms are weighted in favor of the industrialized nations and against developing countries.  Transnational business groups exert heavy influence on policies and negotiations, while citizen groups are marginalized and excluded.

The WTO and its defenders argue that it is democratic because all countries officially have one vote and decisions are usually made by what they call “consensus.”  In practice, however, votes are almost never taken.  Rather, the U.S. and other major powers work with the WTO Director General to broker "Green Room" decisions in secret among small, handpicked caucuses of compliant countries.  They then present the results as faits accomplis to the other member countries.  At the Seattle Ministerial in 1999, such longstanding practices finally ignited a revolt by some less-developed countries and ultimately led to the failure to launch a new round of trade negotiations.
Smaller and poorer countries cannot afford to maintain the representatives and trade lawyers necessary to make their voices heard on policy issues at the WTO headquarters in Geneva.  WTO dispute-resolution processes, too, are slanted against such countries, which don't have the resources to defend themselves against complaints by rich countries.  Often just the threat of a complaint forces them to settle a dispute in favor of transnational enterprises and against the interests of the majority of their citizens.
The dominant governments, for their part, often take their cues from powerful industry consortia such as TransAtlantic Business Dialogue (TABD).  These exert a disproportionate influence on WTO decision-making, much stronger than that of most governments of poor countries.  Meanwhile, non-governmental organizations representing the interests of ordinary citizens are shut out of policy decisions and the dispute-settlement process.
For example, although the United States and the European Union set up consumer and environmental dialogues as an expedient response to political criticism, these groups were excluded from the 1999 TransAtlantic Economic Partnership negotiations by both governments.  Officials of the TransAtlantic Business Dialogue, in contrast, provided detailed recommendations to the negotiators and were consulted during the summit by high officials of both governments.
In a case of apparent influence buying, CEO Carl Lindner of Chiquita Brands, a U.S. transnational, persuaded the U.S. government to mount a successful challenge of the E.U.’s Lomé Convention quotas for Caribbean small banana growers in former European colonies.  The U.S. acted on Chiquita’s behalf even though the firm grows no bananas in the U.S.  Lindner’s lobbying strategy included $850,000 in contributions to the Democratic and Republican parties at critical moments in the decision-making process.
The main international standards bodies whose decisions the WTO treaties reference and impose on members are also dominated by industry and inaccessible to public input.  For example, the Codex Alimentarius—the set of food-safety standards adopted by the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures—has been heavily influenced by U.S. agribusiness.  Another body to which the WTO defers, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), is a private-sector body that sets technical, product and environmental standards according to the needs of industry without public scrutiny.

Opinions

“The process, including even at Singapore [the first WTO ministerial meeting] as recently as three years ago, was a rather exclusionary one.  All meetings were held between 20 and 30 key countries. … And that meant 100 countries, 100, were never in the room. …[T]his led to an extraordinarily bad feeling that they were left out of the process, and that the results even at Singapore had been dictated to them by the 25 or 30 privileged countries who were in the room.”
—Charlene Barshefsky, former U.S. Trade Representative
~
“These deals aren’t about free trade.  They’re about the right of these guys [corporate agribusinesses] to do business the way they want, wherever they want.”
Eugene Whelan, former Canadian federal agriculture minister
~
The WTO is "the place where governments collude in private against their domestic pressure groups."
—Anonymous WTO official quoted by the Financial Times
~
“I think nobody had any idea where the Uruguay Round was headed, you know. There wasn’t some great conspiracy. There were just all kinds of pressures. I mean, everybody has to look after themselves... The pharmaceutical companies, American Express, they know what’s going on. No-one has to tell them. They tell governments what’s going on! So they can protect their interests, and they take the initiative. It’s just normal. …”
“I don’t know whether I should say this or not, but... There is a feeling in many countries that their interests should not be subordinated to some overall ideology... The worst situation is in the countries that are acceding to the WTO. We see very extraordinary things, really disturbing. Some countries are asked to make many more commitments than existing members are. They’re being pushed to liberalize to the maximum.”
—Murray Gibbs, official of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
~
“Transnational corporations, particularly the largest, control directly or indirectly over two-thirds of world trade.  What we call trade is at least one-third IBM trading with IBM, Ford with Ford, etc., and a further third is TNCs trading among themselves. … It should surprise no one that the US brought suit against the EU in the banana case on behalf of Chiquita Brands banana production in Central America and Ecuadorthe US produces no bananasthis just makes explicit what is, or ought to be, perfectly obvious.”
Susan George, Vice-President, Association for Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens (ATTAC), France.
~
“The WTO is increasingly intruding into people’s lives, no matter who they are or where they live. There should be a set of strong rules to protect the interests of the weak against exploitation by the powerful. These rules should encourage democracies at all levels to prioritize their social aims above the interests of transnational companies. If the WTO cannot be reformed so that it agrees new rules and administers some of them as part of an overall framework, we need a new organization that can.”
Barry Coates, Director, World Development Movement, U.K.
~
“Though corporations have no standing in the WTO — the organization is, officially, open only to its member countries — the numerous advisory bodies that provide technical expertise to delegates are overflowing with corporate representation. The delegates themselves are drawn from trade ministries and confer regularly with the corporate lobbyists and advisors who swarm the streets and offices of Geneva, where the organization is headquartered. …”
“Large corporations are essentially ‘renting’ governments to bring cases before the WTO, and in this way, to win in the WTO battles they have lost in the political arena at home.”
Ellen Frank in Dollars and Sense, U.S.
~
“As critics feared, the WTO’s built-in bias against public participation has made the institution a perfect venue for industry and governments to pursue agendas that would fail in open democratic forums.”
Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, U.S.

Legal Basis

The WTO’s lack of democracy and tilted playing field are not explicitly codified in the formal rules of WTO, many of which sound fine in theory.  Rather, they surface in how business is actually conducted within the organization and in changes from the pre-Uruguay Round rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on how disputes are settled.

The following treaties are enforced by the World Trade Organization.

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
See Dispute Settlement Understanding page

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
See TRIPS page
Three major industry lobbying groups dominated the negotiations that created the TRIPS agreement:
•	Intellectual Property Committee. A coalition of 12 of the biggest U.S. transnational corporations, including General Electric, General Motors, IBM, DuPont and Monsanto.
•	Keidanren.  A group of Japanese economic organisms.
•	Union of Industrial and Employees Confederations.  A body representing European business and industry.
These groups directly molded the agreement in close cooperation with government negotiators.  However, no non-governmental organizations from any country were allowed to participate in or even comment on the negotiations.

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
See TRIMS page

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
See SPS page
Effectively establishes international standards as ceilings, including those set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), both industry-dominated bodies.

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
See TBT page
Limits the right of countries to adopt standards more stringent than those set by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).

Cases & Controversies
•	U.S. & Canada v. EU on hormone-treated beef
See Hormone- Treated Beef Case page
•	U.S. v. EU on Caribbean bananas
See Chiquita Banana Case page
The U.S., on behalf of Chiquita Brands, won this dispute over Europe's preferences under the Lomé Convention for small banana producers in former colonies.
•	Thailand, Pakistan, India, and Malaysia v. U.S. on shrimp caught without sea turtle excluder devices
See Shrimp/Sea Turtle Case page
Large shrimping corporations used India to dispute U.S. ban on shrimp caught without sea-turtle protections.
•	U.S. v. Guatemala on baby-food trademark
See Baby-Food Trademark Controversy page
The threat of WTO action by the U.S. on behalf of a transnational firm’s intellectual property rights damaged public health efforts in a poor country.
•	U.S. v. Denmark on ban on lead compounds
See Lead Compounds Controversy page
The U.S. threatened to challenge a Danish ban on lead compounds. Even the threat of WTO action by a powerful country can have a chilling effect on small countries’ efforts to protect their citizens.

Resources
Non-governmental
•	Dean Baker & Mark Weisbrot. “Will New Trade Gains Make Us Rich? An Assessment of the Prospective Gains from New Trade Agreements.” Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, October 3, 2001.
http://www.cepr.net/will_new_trade_gains_make_us_ric.htm
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
“Mechanisms of WTO Governance,” pp. 7 – 10.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	Walden Bello. “Why Reform of the WTO is the Wrong Agenda.” Oakland, CA: Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy, January 2000.
http://www.foodfirst.org/progs/global/trade/wbello.html
•	Corporate Europe Observatory. “Transatlantic Business Dialogue: Putting the Business Horse Before the Government Cart.” Amsterdam: Corporate Europe Observatory, 25 October 1999.
http://www.xs4all.nl/~ceo/tabd/berlinbriefing.html
•	Corporate Europe Observatory. “WTO Millennium Bug: TNC Control Over Global Trade Politics.” Corporate Europe Observer. Amsterdam: Corporate Europe Observatory, Issue 4, July 1999.
http://www.xs4all.nl/~ceo/wto/wtobug.html
•	Corporate Watch. “Who Owns the WTO? Corporations and Global Trade.” Corporate Watch Web site.
http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/feature/wto/index.html
•	Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy (U.S.)
http://www.foodfirst.org
•	Martin Khor. “The situation at the WTO a year since Seattle.” South-North Development Monitor. Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 5 December 2000.
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/twr123a.htm
•	Martin Khor. Globalisation and the South: Some Critical Issues. Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 2000.
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/mk9.htm
•	Simon Retallack. “The W.T.O. Places Corporate Interest Above Humanity and the Environment.” San Francisco: CorpWatch (Web site), 1997.
http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/globalization/corp/wto.html
•	David Ransom. “A world turned upside down.” Oxford, UK: New Internationalist, Number 334, May 2001.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue334/upside.htm
•	Myriam Vander Stichele. “Towards a World Transnationals' Organization?” Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, April 30, 1998.
http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/globalization/treaties/trade7.html
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 2: “The WTO, Food Safety Standards and Public Health,” pp. 52-85.
Chapter 5: “The WTO and Developing Countries,” pp. 130-149.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
•	Mark Weisbrot. “Tricks of Free Trade.” Sierra Magazine. San Francisco: Sierra Club, September-October 2001.
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200109/weisbrot.asp
•	Mark Weisbrot, Dean Baker, Egor Kraev & Judy Chen. “The Scorecard on Globalization 1980-2000: Twenty Years of Diminished Progress.” Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2001.
http://www.cepr.net/globalization/scorecard_on_globalization.htm
•	World Development Movement. “Multinationals and the World Trade Organisation.” San Francisco: CorpWatch (Web site), September 1999.
http://www.corpwatch.org/issues/wto/background/1999/1-mncs.html
Governmental
•	Codex Alimentarius Commission
http://www.codexalimentarius.net
“Understanding the Codex Alimentarius: Codex and the international food trade.”
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e06.htm
•	International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
http://www.iso.ch
•	European Commission - Corporate Social Responsibility
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/csr_index.htm

Official WTO Web site
•	Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
See Dispute Settlement page
•	Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)
See TRIPS page
•	Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
See TRIMS page
•	Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
See SPS page
•	Agreement on Technical Barriers To Trade (TBT)
See TBT page

The WTO resolves disputes unfairly behind closed doors.
The WTO dispute-resolution process is secretive, biased and exclusive, concentrating power in the hands of international-trade insiders.  It does not include procedural safeguards or due process protections, yet it exerts tremendous coercive power over member countries.

Dispute-settlement cases in the World Trade Organization are heard by small panels of "trade experts" appointed from among a small coterie of trade officials and lawyers.  In many cases, they have little or no expertise in the non-legal issues in question, particularly environmental, scientific or social concerns.  Most are ideologically predisposed to oppose public-interest regulations and to support unrestricted commerce.  Despite this built-in bias, the process includes no safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of the judges.
Implicit in WTO treaties themselves are strong presumptions in favor of “free” trade that must be followed in rulings.  They push the burden onto national governments to justify any public protections that have even a minimal effect on trade, rendering them guilty until proven innocent.
The process and records of WTO dispute-settlement bodies are closed.  They allow no inputsuch as amicus briefsfrom interested non-governmental organizations (unless NGOs can convince a government to submit them) and no unofficial observers.  They produce no public record of deliberations, only a final ruling.
The WTO dispute-settlement process reverses by 180 degrees that of the pre-Uruguay Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO’s predecessor.  Before, dispute panel reports could be adopted only by consensus of all GATT parties, including the country ruled against.  This allowed countries to block rulings against their domestic regulations, although this was rarely done.  In this way, the old GATT provided the basic safeguards of national sovereignty previously typical of most international agreements.
The WTO turns this approach upside-down by requiring a consensus of all member countries to overturn any dispute-settlement ruling, thus eliminating national sovereignty protections.  In its place, WTO dispute-settlement bodies assume binding power to strike down democratically adopted national laws protecting the public or the environment, when it finds that these conflict with trade regulations.
Challenger countries have won the great majority of WTO disputes.  And many developing nations do not have the resources to mount or defend a case before the WTO.  Because of the prohibitive costs of defense, poorer countries are more susceptible to even threats of challenges to their laws by wealthier countries.
Compared with the International Court of Justice (World Court) and other similar international judicial bodies, the WTO dispute-settlement process lacks legitimacy because of its built-in bias, lack of due-process protections, exclusivity and closed proceedings.  Yet its coercive force multiplies the effects of all the other injustices built into the WTO.

Opinions

“Environmental and labor concerns can provide a convenient additional excuse for raising trade barriers.”
Kym Anderson, economist who served on the WTO dispute-settlement panel for the U.S.-E.U. banana case
~
“The WTO today is less than a multilateral trading system and it is also more than a multilateral trading system – and that is its problem.”
“It is less than a multilateral trading system because there are many big chunks of international trade that don’t come under the WTO. For example, commodity prices. To a normal developing country that is often the number-one trade issue. And you know what has happened. Commodity prices have collapsed. The rich countries have grown rich at the expense of the poor...”
“On the other hand, the WTO is more than a multilateral trading system. It has accumulated issues that are non-trade and not in its mandate. An example – the prime example – is TRIPs. This is not a liberalization device, it’s a protectionist device...”
“Why is this happening? One reason is that the WTO has an enforcement mechanism. That’s why they have chosen it as the vehicle.”
—Martin Khor, Director, Third World Network, Malaysia
~
“The heart of the WTO … is not its delegates, but its dispute resolution system. With the establishment of the WTO, corporations now have a place to complain to when they want trade barriers — or domestic regulations that limit their freedom to buy and sell — overturned. … [T]he resolution process violates most democratic notions of due process and openness. Cases are heard before a tribunal of ‘trade experts,’ generally lawyers, who, under WTO rules, are required to make their ruling with a presumption in favor of free trade. The WTO puts the burden squarely on governments to justify any restriction of what it considers the natural order of things. There are no amicus briefs (statements of legal opinion filed with a court by outside parties), no observers, and no public record of the deliberations.”
Ellen Frank, Dollars and Sense magazine, U.S.
~
“As was evident in Seattle, the public has legitimate concerns with the work of the WTO and deserves to be part of the trade policy-making process.   Currently the international process is almost entirely closed to public scrutiny or participation.  The first steps toward a more transparent WTO are: 
1.	opening the dispute settlement and appellate body proceedings to public observation;
2.	NGO participation in discussions of environment-related issues by other WTO decision-making forums, such as the SPS Committee, the TBT Committee, the TRIPS Council, the Agriculture Committee, the Committee on Trade and Environment, and relevant negotiating groups; and
3.	the development of a consultative process between the WTO, NGOs, member governments and businesses.”
Center for International Environmental Law, U.S.
~
“After an in-depth analysis of the decisions reached by WTO dispute resolution panels, this book concludes that no democratically achieved environmental, health, food safety or environmental law challenged at the WTO has ever been upheld.  All have been declared barriers to trade.”
Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, U.S.

[Note: Since the publication of their book and the failure of the Seattle Ministerial, a WTO dispute-settlement panel ruled against Canada in favor of French regulations banning asbestos. See Asbestos Case.]
~
“[Rubens] Ricupero[, secretary-general of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,] … echoed the commentaries frequently heard in negotiating circles about the expanding authority of the WTO’s dispute settlement system, which includes special panels and the Appellate Body. Today, it is often more fruitful to utilise dispute settlement proceedings to gain access to markets than to rely on multilateral negotiations, said the Brazilian diplomat.”
Gustavo Capdevila, Inter Press Service
~
“Carlos Correa, a jurist and expert on intellectual property rights, criticised the WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body for the power they have assumed.  Correa, who serves as trade adviser to several developing nations, called for the rigorous examination of the resolutions handed down by the WTO panels, which had not only declared their own jurisdiction over assessing and interpreting the provisions of trade treaties, but also proclaimed their right to interpret the laws of individual nations.  The specific case Correa cited had been initiated by the US against India for applying a provision of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The WTO ruled in favour of the US.”
Gustavo Capdevila, Inter Press Service

Legal Foundations

These regulations are enforced by the World Trade Organization.

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
See Dispute Settlement Understanding page

Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
See Dispute Settlement Understanding page

Cases & Controversies
•	Partisan dispute-settlement panelist in U.S.-E.U. banana case
Economist Kym Anderson, a widely published critic of the use of trade rules to foster environmental or labor objectives, served on the WTO dispute-settlement panel for the U.S.-E.U. banana case [WT/DS27/15, 7 January 1998].  Yet the banana case involved precisely the intersection of trade and labor issues: preferences given by Europe to small Caribbean banana producers to encourage family farms over plantation-style banana production by U.S. agribusinesses in Latin America.  Such corporations have long been criticized for abusive labor conditions and undermining of local democracies, even giving coinage to the term “banana republic.”
See Chiquita Banana Case.
•	Conflict of interest for panelist in dispute over U.S. policy towards Cuba
Arthur Dunkel, former director of GATT, was appointed in 1996 by the WTO as one of the panelists to judge a challenge by the European Union to the U.S. Helms-Burton Act.  This law imposes sanctions on foreign companies with investments in former U.S. assets expropriated by Cuba after its 1959 revolution.  At that time Dunkel also served on the board of directors of Nestle, S.A. and chaired of the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).  Nestle has done business in Cuba since 1930 and the ICC commission strongly and publicly opposed Helms-Burton.  The U.S. Trade Representative claimed two years after the WTO appointment that it had been unaware of Dunkel’s role in the ICC.
See “Arthur Dunkel Serves As Chairman of Body Critical of the Law He Was to Consider As WTO Panelist.” Public Citizen Global Trade Watch Web site, May 19, 1998.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/Dispute/articles.cfm?ID=5570

Resources
Non-governmental
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
“Mechanisms of WTO Governance,” pp. 7 – 10.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	Walden Bello. “Why Reform of the WTO is the Wrong Agenda.” Oakland, CA: Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy, January 2000.
http://www.foodfirst.org/progs/global/trade/wbello.html
•	Center for International Environmental Law - Trade Program
http://www.ciel.org/TAE/programtae.html
•	Center for International Development at Harvard University - Global Trade Negotiations Home Page – Dispute Settlement
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/dispute.html
•	Geoffrey Garrett and James Smith. "The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement.” New Haven, CT: Yale University, September 1999.
http://www.yale.edu/leitner/pdf/1999-05.pdf
•	John H. Jackson. “Dispute Settlement and the WTO.” Cambridge, MA: Center for International Development, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 5-6, 1999.
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/Trade_Workshop/jackson.pdf
•	Martin Khor. “DSU process becoming an outrage of law and justice, says critic.” Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network Web site, 2000 (no date).
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/twr123i.htm
•	Chakravarthi Raghavan. The WTO and its Dispute Settlement System: Tilting the balance against the South. Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 2000.
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/dsu.htm
•	Third World Network - Dispute settlement system and development
http://www.twnside.org.sg./trade_8.htm
•	Lori Wallach. "Testimony of Lori Wallach Regarding The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Powerful Enforcement of Unbalanced, Extensive Regulations Without Basic Due Process Protections." U.S. Senate Finance Committee, Subcommittee on International Trade. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, June 20, 2000.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/Dispute/articles.cfm?ID=5581 
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 8: ”The WTO’s Unprecedented Dispute Resolution System.” Pp. 194-212.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
•	World Wildlife Federation. “Dispute Settlement in the WTO: A Crisis for Sustainable Development.” World Wildlife Federation, May 1998.
http://panda.org/resources/publications/sustainability/wto-98
Governmental
•	United Nations Conference On Trade And Development (UNCTAD). “Building Capacity through Training in Dispute Settlement in International Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property.” UNCTAD training project, September 2000.
http://www.unctad.org/dispsett/index.htm
•	Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis. "Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing Country Interests." World Bank, April 1999.
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/papers_2000/BPdisput.PDF
•	Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis. "WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance." World Bank, November 1999.
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/papers_2000/dispute_settlement.pdf
•	South Centre. “Issues Regarding the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.” Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) Working Papers 1. Geneva: South Centre, February 1999.
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/trade/dispute.pdf
•	Organization of American States – Foreign Trade Information System - WTO Dispute Settlements
http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/wtoindex.asp
•	European Commission Directorate-General for Trade - Dispute Settlement
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/dispute/index_en.htm
•	United States Trade Representative – Monitoring & Enforcement – Dispute Settlement
http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/dispute.shtml

Official WTO Web site
•	Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
See Dispute Settlement Understanding page
•	Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
See Dispute Settlement Understanding page

Visions of change

Alternative paths to fairer trade rules
Key proposals on how to impose sustainable societal values on international commerce

Alan Greenspan recently called protesters against the World Trade Organization misguided and said they offered no solutions to the "alleged failures" of globalization. He apparently had not looked very hard.
The following proposals on how to reform or replace the WTO represent a sampling of critical viewpoints. Ranging from detailed programs to brief position statements, all point toward solutions to the problems inherent in the current governance of international trade. A few also address more general issues of trade and development.
Following the proposals on trade is a section covering the often-overlapping issues of finance, investment and debt.

Opinions
"The alternative to a powerful WTO is not a Hobbesian state of nature. It is always the powerful that have stoked this fear. The reality of international economic relations in a world marked by a multiplicity of international and regional institutions that check one another is a far cry from the propaganda image of a ‘nasty’ and ‘brutish’ world. Of course, the threat of unilateral action by the powerful is ever present in such a system, but it is one that even the powerful hesitate to take for fear of its consequences on their legitimacy as well as the reaction it would provoke in the form of opposing coalitions.
"In other words, what developing countries and international civil society should aim at is not to reform the WTO but, through a combination of passive and active measures, to radically reduce its power and to make it simply another international institution coexisting with and being checked by other international organizations, agreements, and regional groupings. These would include such diverse actors and institutions as UNCTAD, multilateral environmental agreements, the International Labor Organization (ILO), evolving trade blocs such as Mercosur in Latin America, SAARC in South Asia, SADCC in Southern Africa, and ASEAN in Southeast Asia.”
"It is in such a more fluid, less structured, more pluralistic world with multiple checks and balances that the nations and communities of the South will be able to carve out the space to develop based on their values, their rhythms, and the strategies of their choice."
—Walden Bello, Director, Focus on the Global South, Bangkok, Thailand
~
“Markets are not the first nor the last word in human development.  Many essentials for human development are provided outside the market, but these are being destroyed and squeezed by the pressures of the global competition.  When the market dominates social and political outcomes, the rewards of globalization spread unequally.  When the market gets out of hand, the instabilities show up in the boom or bust cycles as evident in the Asian financial crisis.  When the profit motive of the market gets out of hand, it sacrifices respect for justice and human rights.”
“The time has come to step back from this mania for free trade at any cost, assess the damage, and seek a new start.  The goal is not to stop international trade.  In appropriate circumstances and under the right conditions, international trade can support local economic development, provide needed goods that cannot be produced domestically, and create jobs.  But trade bills and treaties designed to favor the wealthiest and most powerful corporations at the expense of everyone else are wrong.  Recognizing the potential of trade, there is a need for a set of principles to serve as the basis for a different kind of trade policy, one under which the benefits of trade might flow primarily to the countries and communities most in need.  What they add up to is selective or negotiated integration into the global economy, as opposed to indiscriminate globalization and trade liberalization.”
—Anuradha Mittal, Policy Director, Institute for Food and Development Policy, U.S.

Proposals – WTO and trade
Non-governmental
•	Michael Albert
o	“What Are We For?” Woods Hole, MA: ZNet, September 6, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/econ/2001/0906gbz.htm
Rejecting capitalist globalization, supporting global justice.
o	“A Q&A on the WTO, IMF, World Bank, and Activism.”
http://www.zmag.org/ZMag/articles/jan2000albert.htm
o	Albert is an editor of Z Magazine.
•	David Bacon
o	"Will a Social Clause in Trade Agreements Advance International Solidarity?"
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000: pp. 124-128.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
"An alternative program for international labor solidarity."
o	Bacon writes on labor issues for The Nation and Inter Press Service.
•	Walden Bello
o	“Why Reform of the WTO is the Wrong Agenda.” Oakland, CA: Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy, January 2000.
http://www.foodfirst.org/progs/global/trade/wbello.html
See especially the two final sections:
Should One Try to Reform a Jurassic Institution?
Building a Pluralistic System of Trade Governance.
o	"UNCTAD: Time to Lead, Time to Challenge the WTO."
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000: pp. 163-174.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
Bello outlines an approach to reforming the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and suggests four areas in which it could serve as a counterweight to the WTO and Bretton Woods institutions: an agreement on "Special and Differential Treatment" for developing countries; the nexus of trade and environment; reform of the global financial architecture; and a "New Deal" for agriculture in developing countries.  Rather than replacing the WTO and IMF, he proposes that UNCTAD take an active role in reducing their powers.  “UNCTAD should become, as Secretary General Ricupero put it, ‘a world parliament on globalization.’”
o	Bello is director of Focus on the Global South in Bangkok, Thailand.
•	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) 
o	Duncan Green, CAFOD, and Shishir Priyadarshi, South Centre. "Proposal for a 'Development Box' in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture." London: CAFOD, October 2001.
http://www.cafod.org.uk/policy/devbox.htm
"This paper makes the case for introducing a package of changes to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) to provide enhanced Special and Differential Treatment (S & D) measures in the Agreement, in order to enable developing countries to better address their food security concerns and to preserve and improve rural livelihoods."
o	"CAFOD is a major British charity that has been fighting third world poverty since 1962."
•	Alexander Cockburn, Jeffrey St. Clair & Allan Sekula
o	5 Days That Shook the World: Seattle and Beyond. London: Verso, 2000.
Chapter 7 - "What Are We Fighting For?" Pp. 113 - 118.
o	Cockburn is a syndicated columnist.
•	Council of Canadians
o	Maude Barlow. The Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization - An Analysis." Ottawa, Ontario: Council of Canadians, October 16, 2001.
http://www.canadians.org/campaigns/campaigns-tradepub-4minmtg.html
Focuses on six areas of concern: services, government procurement, investment, competition policy, intellectual property rights, and agriculture.
o	“Our World Is Not For Sale - WTO: Shrink or Sink.” Council of Canadians, 2001.
http://www.canadians.org/campaigns/campaigns-trade-notforsale.html
Revised and expanded version of the Shrink or Sink letter on the Public Citizen Global Trade Watch site (listed below).
o	The Council of Canadians is "an independent, non-partisan citizens' interest group providing a critical and progressive voice on key national and international issues."
•	Environmental Research Foundation
o	"The WTO Turns Back the Environmental Clock."
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000: pp. 129-134.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
Proposes 1) true pollution prevention with bans; 2) the precautionary principle; and 3) eco- and social labeling. Methods that impose societal values on the economy.
o	Environmental Research Foundation was "founded in 1980 to provide understandable scientific information about the influence of toxic substances on human health and the environment."
•	Food First/Insitute for Food and Development Policy 
o	Peter Rosset. "Food First Trade Principles." San Francisco: Food First/Insitute for Food and Development Policy Backgrounder, Vol. 5, No. 2, Fall 1999.
http://www.foodfirst.org/pubs/backgrdrs/1999/f99v5n2.html
"In appropriate circumstances and under the right conditions, international trade can potentially benefit local economic development, provide needed goods that cannot be produced domestically, and create jobs. But trade bills and treaties designed to favor the wealthiest and most powerful corporations at the expense of everyone else are profoundly wrong. Recognizing the positive potential of trade, we ask: Under what conditions could trade contribute to human well-being and broad-based development? In that light we present a set of principles to serve as the basis for a different kind of trade policy, one under which the benefits of trade might flow primarily to the countries and communities most in need."
o	Food First is "a member-supported, nonprofit 'peoples' think tank and education-for-action center. Our work highlights root causes and value-based solutions to hunger and poverty around the world, with a commitment to establishing food as a fundamental human right."
•	Susan George
o	"Fixing or Nixing the WTO."
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000: pp. 57-58.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
"Thanks to the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme statistics, we know a great deal about levels of material and human development worldwide.  Suppose the ILO and the United Nations Development Programme were to classify all countries at a given level of development--including the most advanced--according to the respect they show for labor law and for nature.  The best, at each level, would be granted tariff preferences or even exemption from customs duties, while the products of the others would be taxed according to their classification.  Such a system would allow a review of the hallowed most-favored-nation clause, which in fact favors nothing but a rush to the abyss."
o	George is Vice-President of the Association for Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens (ATTAC) in France and a fellow of the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam.
•	The Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament
o	"WTO and corporate globalisation." Strasbourg, France: The Greens/European Free Alliance, European Parliament, 27 June 2001.
http://www.greens-efa.org/en/documents/detail.php?id=18&lg=en
o	"Background document." Strasbourg, France: The Greens/European Free Alliance, European Parliament, June 2001.
http://www.greens-efa.org/en/documents/detail.php?id=19&lg=en
o	"Background document - AgriCulture / Food Security / Fair Trade." Strasbourg, France: The Greens/European Free Alliance, European Parliament, September 2001.
http://www.greens-efa.org/en/documents/detail.php?id=41&lg=en
o	"The politics of the WTO contradict the principles of our programme for a fair, ecological and social trade. Therefore we support the abolition of the WTO, as set out in the Global Greens Statement from Canberra. That is clearly a longer term strategy. In order to reduce the worst effects of the WTO in the short-term, ..." the document outlines a ten-point programme for reform of the WTO.
o	"The Greens/European Free Alliance is a European parliamentary group made up of Greens and representatives of stateless nations." 
•	William Greider
o	"Global Agenda. After the WTO Protest in Seattle, It's Time to Go on the Offensive. Here's How." New York: The Nation, January 31, 2000.
http://past.thenation.com/cgi-bin/framizer.cgi?url=http://past.thenation.com/issue/000131/0131greider.shtml
Suggests "right to know" legislation mandating collection and disclosure of vital data by U.S. multinationals on “environmental damage and workplace conditions in their overseas production--including the subcontractors and suppliers where the most abusive practices typically occur.  The information would flow not just to Americans but to the workers and communities in foreign countries where the damage is done. Citizens and civic organizations would be empowered to sue violators and collect damages.”
o	"Trading With the Enemy." New York: The Nation, March 26, 2001: pp. 11-14.
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010326&s=greider
”A new season of trade politics is under way among Washington insiders, with an astonishing twist: America's major multinational corporations are love-bombing labor and environmentalists.”  Greider analyzes this as primarily part of the effort to win fast track negotiating authority on trade agreements for the Bush administration, but also sees it as an indication that the critiques of the “Seattle movement” have shifted the tone of the dialogue.  The idea of “right to know” legislation, he says, has now been drafted into a legislative proposal already supported by 180 civil organizations, including the AFL-CIO and major environmental and human-rights groups.
o	Greider is National Affairs Correspondent for The Nation.
•	Indigenous Peoples' Caucus
o	"Indigenous Peoples' Seattle Declaration."
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000: pp. 85-91.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
Proposals on Agreement on Agriculture, TRIPS and liberalization of services and investments.
•	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
o	“Trade Unions declare Global Day of Action for 4th WTO Ministerial Conference.”  Brussels: ICFTU, 2001.
http://attac.org/nonewround/wto/wto04.htm
http://www.icftu.org
http://www.global-unions.org/wto-action.asp
”At the WTO Conference, Global Unions will be calling for:
Protections of basic workers’ rights from the exploitation that results from world trade;
Reforming the world trading system to benefit the poor in developing countries;
The right to quality universal public education and health services, free from WTO rules;
Cheap and affordable medicines to fight diseases like HIV/AIDS;
Opening up the WTO system to consultation with trade unions and other democratic representatives of civil society.”
o	The ICFTU represents more than 156 millions workers in 148 countries and territories, and is a member of Global Unions.
•	International Forum on Globalization
o	John Cavanagh, ed. "Beyond the WTO - Alternatives to Economic Globalization - A Preliminary Report." San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, November 26, 1999.
http://www.ifg.org/beyondwto.html
Three sections:
I. Principles of an Alternative Agenda
II. Views on Global Institutions: Internationalism, Not Globalization
III. The Future of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO
o	The International Forum on Globalization is "an alliance of sixty leading activists, scholars, economists, researchers and writers formed to stimulate new thinking, joint activity, and public education in response to economic globalization." It sponsored a major public forum during the 1999 Seattle Ministerial.
•	Deborah James
o	"Free Trade, Not Fair Trade."
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000: pp. 188-194.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
Principles of and different approaches to fair trade. The Coffee Alternative. WTO Challenges. Fair trade and eco-labeling.
o	James is director of Global Exchange’s Fair Trade Coffee Program.
•	Martin Khor
o	"WTO at the Crossroads: Why the 'New Round' Is a Wrong Idea and How WTO Should Be Re-oriented." Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 27 May 2001.
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/crossroads.htm
A paper first presented to the Group of 15 Economic Ministers at the G15 Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia. Proposes positions for developing countries on investment, government procurement, and competition, and suggests:
1. rethinking the nature and timing of liberalisation
2. reorienting the WTO towards development as the main priority
3. rethinking the scope of the WTO's mandate over issues and the role of other agencies.
o	"The situation at the WTO a year since Seattle." Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network,  5 December 2000.
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/situation.htm
”Part III:  Some Measures Needed to Improve the Situation” lists nine steps developed countries should take to meet the demands of developing countries.
o	Khor is director of the Third World Network in Penang, Malaysia.
•	Bhagirath Lal Das
o	“Strengthening Developing Countries in the WTO.” (Trade and Development Series No. 8). Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, no date (1999?).
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/td8.htm
The Future Course (the final section) includes:
Strengthening National Decision-Making Institutions
Change in Strategy and Approach
Preparation Process
Regional and Group Efforts
Change in the WTO Negotiating Process
o	Lal Das was India’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to GATT and Deputy Permanent Representative to UNCTAD.
•	Caroline Lucas & Colin Hynes 
o	"Time to Replace Globalisation. A Green Localist Manifesto for the World Trade Organisation Ministerial." Strasbourg, France: The Greens/European Free Alliance, European Parliament, October 2001.
http://www.carolinelucasmep.org.uk/publications/pdfs_and_word/Replace%20globalisastion.pdf
Proposes a new General Agreement on Sustainable Trade (GAST) to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It includes the following sections:
'What’s the alternative to Globalisation?'
Rewriting the Rules for Sustainable Trade
Comparison of WTO Rules with those of the General Agreement on Sustainable Trade
Conclusion: The Role of the European Union
o	Lucas is a member of the European Parliament for the Green Party of the U.K. Hynes is the author of Localization: A Global Manifesto.
•	Anuradha Mittal
o	“The South in the North.”
In Sarah Anderson, editor. Views from the South: The Effects of Globalization and the WTO on Third World Countries.  San Francisco: Food First and International Forum on Globalization, 2000: pp. 164-176.
Enumerates 13 ”principles to be met by any trade bill, treaty or policy.”
o	Mittal is Co-Director of Food First/The Institute for Food and Development Policy in Oakland, CA.
•	Oxfam
o	“Is the WTO serious about reducing world poverty? The Development Agenda for Doha.” Oxford, UK: Oxfam, 2001.
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/doha/doha.html
”This briefing outlines the issues which the WTO should address if it is to make an effective contribution to poverty reduction in developing countries. The paper, prepared in advance of the Ministerial Conference in Doha, argues that 1) Uruguay Round outcomes were unfair to poor countries, 2) Ministers should therefore commit the WTO to rebalance present agreements and address specific implementation measures, and 3) new issues should not be added to the existing negotiation agenda. The decisions at Doha will be an acid test for rich-country commitment to development and for the legitimacy of the WTO.”
o	"Oxfam GB is a development, relief, and campaigning organisation dedicated to finding lasting solutions to poverty and suffering around the world." 
•	Peasant Meeting
o	“Peasants Demand: ‘End Global Hunger! WTO Out of Agriculture!’” (press release). Bangkok, Thailand: Peasant Meeting, August 28, 2001.
www.poptel.org.uk/panap/caravan.htm
"The alternative solution that we would like to call for is food sovereignty. Food sovereignty is the right of a people and its nation to define their own agricultural and food policy, which take precedence over any macro economic policies.  It is the right of each nation to maintain and develop its capacity to produce its basic food for a balance diet, respecting cultural and productive diversity.  As a conclusion we resolve our demands with 'End Global Hunger! WTO Out of Agriculture!'."
•	Public Citizen Global Trade Watch
o	”Fast Track.” Washington: Global Trade Watch, 2001.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/fasttrack/index.cfm
”Take action now to stop Fast Track!”
o	“WTO - Shrink or Sink! The Turnaround Agenda.” Washington: Global Trade Watch, 2000.
http://www.tradewatch.org/gattwto/ShrinkSink/shrinksink.htm
”Over 1000 citizen, labor, consumer, environmental, religious, women' s, development groups from 77 countries have signed on to the new campaign. The Turnaround Agenda espoused in the ‘WTO: Shrink or Sink’ statement demands 11 fundamental changes to WTO's procedures and substantive rules. It was developed by hundreds of NGOs from many countries.”
o	"Global Trade Watch leads the way in educating the American public about the enormous impact of international trade and economic globalization on our jobs, the environment, public health and safety, and democratic accountability."
•	David Ransom
o	“A world turned upside down.” Oxford, UK: new internationalist, Number 334, May 2001.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue334/upside.htm
”David Ransom talks to seasoned observers [including Murray Gibbs of UNCTAD and Martin Khor of the Third World Network] about what to do with the WTO – and how to set the world the right way up again.”
o	Ransom is an editor of new internationalist magazine.
•	Steven Shrybman
o	"Trade Now, Pay Later." In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000: pp. 158-162.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
Compares WTO treaties, especially GATS, and multilateral environmental treaties. Suggests a hypothetical WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Measures to Combat Global Warning. Proposes creating a Global Environment Organization with WTO-like enforcement powers to complement reform of the WTO.
o	Shrybman is former Executive Director of the West Coast Environmental Law Association in Canada.
•	Third World Network
o	“Re-thinking TRIPS in the WTO.” Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, no date (2001?).
http://attac.org/nonewround/wto/wto02.htm
NGO demands for the review and reform of TRIPS:
Undertake a fundamental review and reform of TRIPS.
End bilateral pressures and bullying tactics.
Extend implementation deadlines for developing countries.
Moratorium on dispute settlement action.
Review of TRIPS' place in WTO.
o	The Third World Network is an independent non-profit international network of organizations and individuals involved in issues relating to development, the Third World and North- South issues."
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza
o	Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 9: “Recommendations & Conclusions,” pp. 214-222.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
Includes Seattle Ministerial Declaration, seven recommendations for reform.
o	Wallach is the director and Sforza is a staff member of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch in Washington, DC.
•	World Development Movement
o	”The Tricks of the Trade: How trade rules are loaded against the poor.” London: World Development Movement, September 2001.
http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/Wto/tricks.pdf
”Introductory briefing on how trade rules are loaded against the poor.”
o	”If it's broke, fix it: The case for trade reform at the 4th WTO Ministerial.” London: World Development Movement, August 2001.
http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/Wto/brokefix.pdf
”More detailed report on the case for trade reform in the WTO.”
o	"Trade: WTO Campaign." London: World Development Movement, February 1999.
http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaign/WTO.htm
1. Trading rules must put people first.
2. Reform must address the fundamental problems.
3. The "Built-in" agenda - negotiations since Seattle
o	"The World Development Movement is campaigning to tackle the underlying causes of poverty."
•	World Social Forum
o	Porto Alegre, Brazil. January 25-30, 2001.
http://www.worldsocialforum.org
The first WSF produced a multiplicity of programs and positions.  The next WSF is scheduled for January 31 to February 5, 2002 in Porto Alegre.
o	For one interpretation, see:
Naomi Klein. "A Fete for the End of the End of History." New York: The Nation, March 19, 2001: pp. 19-23.
http://www.thenation.com
o	See also:
"New Reference Point for Globalisation Debate." Inter Press Service Daily Journal, 1 February 2001.
"Little accord over globalisation." London: Financial Times, 29 January 2001.
"Alternative Davos to be annual." London: British Broadcasting Company, 29 January 2001.
"Brazil hosts alternative Davos." London: Financial Times, 26 January 2001.
"Alternative to Davos Agenda." London: Financial Times, 24 January 2001.
o	"The World Social Forum is an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed to building a planetary society centred on the human person."
Governmental
•	Kofi Annan
o	“Opening Statement at the Special Event on the Challenge of Eradicating Poverty for Sustainable Development: International Community Response.” Brussels: Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, May 14, 2001.
http://www.un.org/events/ldc3/conference/address/sg-event.htm
”I believe the best hope for LDCs, and indeed for the developing world in general, lies in a new round of global, multilateral trade negotiations. And this time it must be a true ‘Development Round.’ The new Round must aim to eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers in the developed countries to trade in agricultural products, textiles and other products of special interest to the LDCs. And it should review the progress made in implementing agreements reached in the last Round - the Uruguay Round.”
•	United Nations Secretary General
o	International trade and development. Report of the Secretary-General. United Nations General Assembly, 19 September 2000.
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a55396.pdf
Covers developments on multilateral trading systems; the Bangkok Plan of Action, adopted by UNCTAD X, and its relevance for the WTO process; and the report of the Trade and Development Board.
•	South Centre
o	“Defining a Development Agenda for WTO.” Geneva, South Centre, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2001/1010devafr.htm
This article extracts some long and short-term objectives for “development content” in the trade agenda from an UNCTAD contribution to a recent meeting of African trade ministers.  It focuses on linking trade to poverty reduction.
o	South Center is an organization of developing countries.
Proposals – finance, investment & debt
Non-governmental
•	50 Years Is Enough: U.S. Network for Global Economic Justice
o	"Platform Summary." Washington, DC: 50 Years Is Enough Web site.
http://www.50years.org/platformSummary.html
1) Institutional reform: openness, full public accountability and the participation of affected populations in decision making at the World Bank and the IMF.
2) A shift in economic-policy reform policies to support equitable, sustainable and participatory development.
3) An end to environmentally destructive lending; support for more self-reliant, resource-conserving development that preserves biodiversity.
4) The scaling back of the power of the World Bank and the IMF and rechanneling of their financial resources into development assistance alternatives.
5) A reduction in multilateral debt to free up additional capital for sustainable development.
50 Years Is Enough: U.S. Network for Global Economic Justice is a coalition of over 200 U.S. organizations dedicated to the profound transformation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
•	Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh
o	"Bearing the Burden: The Impact of Global Financial Crisis on Workers and Alternative Agendas for the IMF and Other Institutions." Insitute for Policy Studies, April 2000.
http://www.ips-dc.org/downloads/BEARING%20THE%20BURDEN.pdf
"Alternative Agendas," the final section, "outlines the official debate on resolving the crisis as well as components of an emerging North-South citizens agenda on the global financial crisis that advances the interests of workers.
o	John Cavanagh is the Director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC, and Sarah Anderson is the Director of the Institute’s Global Economy Program.
•	Tony Clarke
o	“Control capital: Rewriting the rules.” London: new internationalist, January-February 2000.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue320/rules.htm
o	"Rewriting the Rules for Global Investment."
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000: pp. 182-187.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
These two articles outline principles and key elements of an Alternative Investment Treaty.  This approach contrasts with the WTO’s TRIMS and the parts of GATS related to investment.
o	Clarke is director of the Polaris Institute in Ottawa and a leader of the Council of Canadians.
•	Jane D’Arista, interviewed by Wayne Ellwood
o	“Establish a global financial authority: Ousting the Oligarchs.” London: new internationalist, January-February 2000.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue320/ousting.htm
”National governments have lost control of their ability to manage their own economies. The world needs a new international regulatory agency to reduce volatility and inefficiency in global financial markets – a Global Central Bank.”
o	D’Arista is an economist and Director of Programs at the Financial Markets Center in Virginia.
•	Wayne Ellwood
o	“Deal with debt: Solving insolvency.” London: new internationalist, January-February 2000.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue320/solving.htm
”Massive debt loads are crippling Third World nations and destabilizing the global economy. Debt cancellation is needed now. But there also needs to be an agreed procedure to ensure that debt-strapped nations are dealt with fairly and given a chance for a new start.”
o	Ellwood is a Canada-based editor of new internationalist magazine.
•	Jubilee USA Network 
o	"Platform." Washington, DC: Jubilee USA Network Web site.
http://www.j2000usa.org/campaign/platform.html
This platform calls for "cancellation of the crushing international debt in situations where countries burdened with high levels of human need and environmental distress are unable to meet the basic needs of their people," in a way that "benefits ordinary people and facilitates their participation in the process of determining the scope, timing and conditions of debt relief, as well as the future direction and priorities of their national and local economies."
Jubilee USA Network is an faith-based network in the U.S. allied with sister groups around the world.
•	Robin Round
o	“Time for Tobin!” London: new internationalist, January-February 2000.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue320/tobin.htm
o	"Time For a Tobin Tax.”
In Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000: p. 175.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
The Tobin Tax, originally suggested by Nobel laureate James Tobin of Yale University, would be a small tax of less than one-half of one percent levied by all countries on foreign-exchange transactions.  The Canadian Parliament approved the idea in principle in 1999.  “A tax on financial speculation could help stabilize global markets and capture much-needed funds for global development.”
o	Round is with the Halifax Initiative, a coalition of Canadian NGOs working for the democratization of economic decision-making.
•	World Development Movement.
o	"The Missing Link: Debt and Trade." London: World Development Movement, 2001.
http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/Debt/debtandtrade.htm
“Debt and trade are inextricably linked.  Unfair trade rules left Africa in debt and debt has allowed creditors to impose further unfair trade rules on Africa.”
--Charles Abugre, Third World Network
Debt rooted in unfair trade.
Free trade forced on debtors.
One track minds – IMF/World Bank/World Trade Organisation.
Whose rules?
Debt and trade – changed by the free market.
o	"Making investment work for people: An international framework for regulating corporations." London: World Development Movement, February 1999.
http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/Wto/TNCs.htm
”WDM’s aim is to ensure that foreign investment, particularly from multinational corporations, delivers the maximum benefits to all stakeholders – particularly the poor – while inflicting the minimum costs.”
1. Introduction- Maximising benefits, minimising costs
2. An international framework for investment
3. An International Investment Agreement
4. Complementary international action
5. Action by governments
6.  Pressure from civil society
o	"The World Development Movement is campaigning to tackle the underlying causes of poverty."
Governmental
•	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
o	Trade and Development Report 2001. United Nations General Assembly, 19 September 2000.
http://www.unctad.org/en/pub/ps1tdr01.en.htm
Part I: Global Trends and Prospects
Part II: Reform of the International Financial Architecture

WTO Cases & Controversies

The following cases have been decided by the World Trade Organization dispute settlement process.  The controversies have been conducted outside the formal process.

Cases
Hormone-Treated Beef Case
Pesticide Residues Case
Uncooked Salmon Case
Asbestos Case
Gasoline/Clean Air Act Case
Automobile Fuel-Efficiency Case
Shrimp/Sea Turtle Case
Tuna/Dolphin Case II
Tuna/Dolphin Case I
Plant and Animal Patents Case
Chiquita Banana Case
Myanmar Sanctions Case
Controversies
Eco-Labeling Controversy
Genetically Modified Foods Controversy
Greenhouse Gases Controversy
Longhorn Beetle Controversy
Electronics-Industry Pollution Controversy
Lead Compounds Controversy
AIDS Drugs Controversy
Baby-Food Trademark Controversy
Traditional Medicines Controversy

Cases

Hormone-Treated Beef Case
Complaints by: U.S. and Canada
Complaints against: European Union
WTO Cases WT/DS26 (U.S.) and WT/DS48 (Canada)

EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones). Complaint by the United States. Report of the Panel. [WT/DS26/R/USA, 18 August 1997]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/horm1.wp5
EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones). Complaint by the Canada. Report of the Panel. [WT/DS48/R/CAN, 18 August 1997]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/horm2.wp5
Appellate Body Report (U.S. and Canada complaints) [WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/hormab.pdf
Decision by the Arbitrators (U.S. complaint) [WT/DS26/ARB, 12 July 1999]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/26arb.pdf
Decision by the Arbitrators (Canada complaint) [WT/DS48/ARB, 12 July 1999]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/48arb.pdf

“In 1980, as a result of consumer concern over reports of harm caused by eating hormone-treated meat, the EU [European Union] instituted a series of bans on the use of growth hormones in meat production and, subsequently, on the import of meat from animals treated with such hormones. In 1996, the United States and Canada challenged the European ban as a violation of the WTO rules.
…
“A WTO dispute panel found [the bans] to violate the WTO Agreements [food-safety rules] because the EU had not definitively demonstrated that the beef would cause harm to consumers. While the EU argued that it had the right to protect its citizens against uncertain risks from the hormones, the panel concluded that the WTO rules require proof of such harm before trade can be restricted.
…
“Despite the Appellate Body’s determination that the European hormone ban violated the WTO rules, the EU refused to rescind the ban. As a result, the WTO granted the United States permission to impose $116.8 million in retaliatory trade sanctions each year that the EU maintains its ban.”
Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund
Opinions
“As you recommended, we have initiated action against the EU ban under the dispute settlement procedures of the World Trade Organization.”
Letter from U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to the National Cattlemen’s Association, February 8, 1996
~
“The WTO SPS [Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures] agreement has had a terrible impact on the right of the world’s citizens to safe food.  Canada and the U.S. successfully used the SPS agreement to strike down a European ban on North American beef containing harmful, possibly cancer-causing hormones.  The EU, deeply sensitive to lingering concerns about Mad Cow disease, implemented a ban on the non-therapeutic use of  hormones in its food industry, citing many studies linking them to illness.  The WTO panel demanded ‘scientific certainty’ that these hormones cause cancer or other adverse health affects, thus eviscerating the precautionary principle as a basis for food safety regulations.”
Maude Barlow, national chairperson, Council of Canadians
~
“The EU has banned the non-therapeutic use of hormones in its food industry, citing many studies that indicate that hormones, particularly implants of pellets containing estradiol, could cause cancer.  Following the challenge by the U.S. and Canada, citing the onerous provisions of the SPS Agreement and other WTO rules, the WTO ruled against Europe’s ban.
“The WTO panel demanded scientific certainty that hormones cause cancer or other adverse health effects, thus eviscerating the precautionary principle as a basis for food safety regulations.  This ruling has frightening implications for the ability of governments to set high standards to protect public health.  It means that European consumers and governments are forced to accept imports of beef raised with hormones or be penalized with harsh trade sanctions.  Public opinion in Europe is strongly demanding defiance of this WTO ruling.  The U.S. and Canada have produced lists of exports important to Europe, including luxury items such as prosciutto, cheeses, and Dijon mustard, among other things, on which they intend to slap 100 percent tariffs if the EU fails to comply.  These retaliatory measures will total more than $125m.”
Debbi Barker and Jerry Mander, International Forum on Globalization
Resources
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
“The Beef Hormone Case,” p. 26.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	Bruce Barnard. “Meat is Politics in Europe.” London: Journal of Commerce, November 1999.
http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/feature/wto/4-meat.html
•	International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. “EU Parliament Backs Beef Hormone Ban.” Geneva: BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, 16 January 2001. http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?browse=1&Issue_ID=1927&Bulletin_ID=14&SID=
•	Chakravarthi Raghavan. “EC Challenges U.S. Hormone Safety Claims.” Geneva: SUNS, May 19, 1999.
•	J. Martin Wagner & Patti Goldman. “Comments to the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization concerning European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones).” San Francisco, CA: Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, October 31, 1997.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/harmonization/comments/articles.cfm?ID=5582
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
“WTO Record on Food Safety and Quarantine Laws. Case 1: The WTO Insists Europe Accept Artificial Hormone-Treated Beef’” pp. 59-61.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
•	Mark Weisbrot. “Trade Wars, Round 2: Where’s the Beef?” Washington, DC: Preamble Center, August 1999.
http://www.cepr.net/columns/weisbrot/trade_wars.htm

Pesticide Residues Case
Complaint by: U.S.
Complaint against: Japan
WTO Case WT/DS76

Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products - Communication from Japan and the United States [WT/DS76/12, 30 August 2001]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/76-12.doc

Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products - Report of the Appellate Body [WT/DS76/AB/R, 22 February 1999]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/76ABR.DOC

Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products - Report of the Panel [WT/DS76/R, 27 October 1998]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/76R.DOC

In this case, the U.S. challenged Japan’s public-health standards requiring testing for pesticide residues in certain imports of fruits and nuts.  The testing was required when a poisonous chemical, methyl bromide, was used to fumigate these products against infestation by coddling moths.  Because Japan’s safety standards were higher than relevant WTO standards, the WTO found that they violated WTO agreements.
A dispute-settlement panel ruled in October 1998 that Japan’s requirements for testing of agricultural imports was not based on “sufficient scientific evidence” as required by Article 2.2 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. An appellate body upheld the ruling in February 1999.  The two countries finally issued a joint letter settling this dispute in August 2001.
Resources
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
”Pesticide Residue Levels,” pp. 26-27.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html

Uncooked Salmon Case
Complaint by: Canada
Complaint against: Australia
WTO Cases WT/DS18 and WT/DS21

Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon – Complaint by Canada – Report of the Appellate Body [WT/DS18/AB/R, 20 October 1998]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/18ABR.DOC

Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon – Complaint by Canada – Report of the Panel [WT/DS18/R, 12 June 1998]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/18R00.DOC

Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmonids – Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution [WT/DS21/10, 1 November 2000]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/SPS/W40A1.doc

Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmonids – Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States [WT/DS21/4, 11 May 1999]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/21-4.DOC

In June 1998, a WTO dispute-settlement panel ruled in favor of Canada against Australia’s quarantine against imports of uncooked wild salmon, and in October of that year an appellate body upheld the ruling.  Australia had imposed the limitation after a 1994 risk assessment found that such imports posed a threat to Australian wild salmon.  Roughly 20 bacteria found in Canadian and U.S. salmon but not in Australia, it concluded, posed a risk of spreading to and infecting wild Australian salmon.
The WTO ruling found that Australia’s risk assessment was inadequate and not based on sound science.  As a result, it said, the ban was “more trade-restrictive than required to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary protection” and exceeded international standards.  Because it was arbitrarily and unjustifiably discriminatory, it violated the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).
This ruling shifted the burden further onto importing countries that want to exclude a product to prove that the product is unsafe, rather than requiring exporting countries to prove that the products they send abroad are safe.  It required expensive risk assessment measures to determine precise levels of risk, although health authorities must often adopt protections because the exact level of risk cannot be known.  With it, the WTO added yet another precedent that under SPS countries cannot err on the side of caution.
In May 1999, the U.S. filed a related complaint alleging that the Australian prohibition on imports of fresh, chilled, or frozen salmonids appeared to be inconsistent with:
1. the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Articles 2, 5, 7 and 8;  and
2. the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article XI.
The U.S. complaint was settled with a joint communiqué with Australia in October 2000. It stated that a mutually satisfactory solution had been reached involving amendments to Australia’s quarantining policies on uncooked salmonids introduced in May 2000.
Resources
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
”Case 2: Australian Salmon – WTO Adds Difficulty, Cost to Animal Health Protections,” pp. 62-64.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Asbestos Case
Complaint by: Canada
Complaint against: France
WTO Case WT/DS135

European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products - Report of the Appellate Body [WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135abr_e.pdf

European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products - Report of the Panel [WT/DS135/R & WT/DS135/R/Add.1, 18 September 2000]
Part I
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135r_a_e.pdf
Part II
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135r_b_e.pdf
Part III
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135r_c_e.pdf
Addendum Part I
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135ra1_a_e.pdf
Addendum Part II
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135ra1_b_e.pdf

In this challenge brought by Canada against France’s ban on chrysotile or white asbestos, a WTO dispute-settlement panel ruled in favor of France.  This was the first case in which the WTO upheld national public-health protections.  The initial ruling occurred 10 months after the Seattle Ministerial meeting.
The Canadian government argued that French regulations should not have banned asbestos outright when it could have restricted its use, citing an International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard for regulating asbestos. The ISO is an industry-dominated body, however, and requiring the use of such international standards tends to reduce national standards to the least common denominator.
Canada also charged that France discriminated in favor of asbestos substitutes.  It claimed that the French ban "nullifies and impairs" benefits from Uruguay Round tariff concessions.  This line of reasoning, had it been accepted, would make it harder to ban dangerous substances after a trade agreement is adopted.
The dispute-settlement panel ruled in September 2000 that the ban was justified to protect the health of French workers under Article XX(b) of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which provides a general exception to WTO rules for measures considered necessary to protect human health.  But the panel agreed with Canada that France had discriminated against Canadian asbestos; it concluded that white asbestos and less-dangerous domestic substitute fibers are “like” products as defined by Article III:4 of GATT, which should in principle be accorded the same treatment on the French market.  The WTO Appellate Body upheld the ruling on Article XX(b), but reversed the initial panel’s decision on Article III:4.
The European Commission called the ruling a "landmark."  Canadian asbestos producers protested, however, that the ruling favored affluent countries, who consider asbestos dangerous, over developing countries, where they claimed asbestos cement helps to reduce mortality rates.
Opinions
“We are very much of the view that evidence related to the health risks associated with a product may be pertinent in an examination of the 'likeness' under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994."
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products - Report of the Appellate Body [WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001, §113]
Resources
•	Bridges Between Trade and Sustainable Development. “Asbestos Ruling Breaks New Ground in ‘Like Product’ Determination” Geneva: International Centre For Trade And Sustainable Development, January-April 2001.
http://www.ictsd.org/English/BRIDGES5-1-3.pdf
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. “Health Risks Pre-Eminent As WTO Upholds French Asbestos Ban.” Geneva: International Centre For Trade And Sustainable Development. Vol. 5, Number 9, 13 March, 2001.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1956&browse=1&SID=
•	Bernard Cassen. “Amiante : l'OMC avale son chapeau libre-échangiste.” Paris: Le Monde diplomatique, 19 juin 2000.
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/amiante
•	FIELD. “Joint Amicus Brief in European Communities — Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products.” London: Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, February 2001.
http://www.field.org.uk/papers/pdf/asbestosamicus.pdf
•	FIELD, Greenpeace International, IBAS and WWF. “NGOs Welcome WTO green light to French ban on Asbestos but remain sceptical about the WTO dispute settlement process” (joint statement). London: Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, 14 March 2001.
http://www.field.org.uk/papers/pdf/asbest~2.pdf
•	Scott Morrison & Frances Williams. “Canada to appeal against WTO ruling on asbestos.” London: Financial Times, September 19, 2000.
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?id=000919000996&query=asbestos
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 7: ”Human and Labor Rights Under the WTO.” Pp. 182-186.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Gasoline/Clean Air Act Case
Complaint by: Venezuela and Brazil
Complaint against: U.S.
WTO Cases WT/DS2 and WT/DS4

United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline. Appellate Body Report and Panel Report. Action by the Dispute Settlement Body. [WT/DS2/9, 20 May 1996]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gasoline.wp5

“The 1990 [U.S.] Clean Air Act Amendments require the use of reformulated gasoline in areas out of compliance with air quality standards in order to reduce toxic motor vehicle emissions. The EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] … defined the methods that refineries must use in calculating their compliance with the reformulated gasoline requirements.
“Venezuela and Brazil challenged the rule before the WTO. The WTO found the U.S. rule to violate the WTO rules because it treated foreign refineries differently from domestic ones, without any concern for the enforcement and air quality consequences of that ruling. [An appellate panel upheld the ruling of the original dispute-settlement panel.]
“To comply with the WTO decision, EPA changed its regulations to allow foreign refineries to use all alternative methods of calculating their compliance with the gasoline requirements, provided the refineries’ governments agree to subject the refineries to U.S. inspection and enforcement authority. … [This change allowed] Venezuelan gasoline with higher concentrations of certain pollutants into the United States.”
Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund

In setting gasoline cleanliness standards, the EPA attempted to be fair to all gas refiners.  While it could have set a single standard and forced all producers to meet it, this might have resulted in reduced supply, shortages and higher prices.  It opted instead to set a baseline for each refiner and to measure improvement against it.  Domestic and foreign producers who had cleanliness data from 1990 used that year as a baseline.  Domestic and foreign producers who did not have 1990 data had to match the actual average 1990 contaminant level of those who did.  
Venezuela and Brazil, however, complained that a foreign producer without data might have to meet a higher standard than a U.S. producer whose 1990 cleanliness record was poor, and the WTO upheld the complaint.
Opinions
“In 1996 the WTO Appellate Body ruled that air qualified under GATT Article XX as an ‘exhaustible natural resource’ worthy of protection but that the U.S. government-set gasoline cleanliness requirements discriminated against foreign gasoline and thus failed to satisfy Article XX’s chapeau.”
Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch
Resources
•	Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund. "The Case for Rethinking the WTO." November, 1999.
http://www.wtowatch.org/faq/faq.cfm?faq_id=6
•	Public Citizen Global Trade Watch. “WTO Talking Points: The World Trade Organization Ruling Against the Reformulated Gasoline Regulations of the U.S. Clean Air Act.”  Washington, DC: Public Citizen, May 16, 1998.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/gats/documents/articles.cfm?ID=1621
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
“Case 1: U.S. Weakens Clean Air Rule to Implement WTO Order,” pp. 19-22.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Automobile Fuel-Efficiency Case
Complaint by: E.U.
Complaint against: U.S.
GATT Case DS31

GATT, United States – Taxes on Automobiles (DS31/R), Report of the Panel, Oct. 11, 1994. [Pre-WTO, not available on WTO Web site.]

In the wake of 1970s energy crisis, the United States passed Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards that were successful in doubling the average fuel economy of passenger cars operating in the U.S. by the early 1990s.  These rules contributed to substantially cutting U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases and were consistent with United Nations standards on reducing global warming.
The CAFE standards applied equally to all U.S. and foreign automobile manufacturers.  They aimed to reduce emissions by all passenger vehicles sold in the U.S. by requiring that the average fuel-efficiency of all the cars sold by each firm fall below a given figure.  For U.S. companies who also imported foreign-made vehicles, it required that both the foreign and the domestic fleets meet the same fuel-efficiency standards.
U.S. car manufacturers complied and began to produce smaller, more fuel-efficient models.  But although many European manufacturers had met CAFE standards in the 70s and early 80s, they later shifted  to a strategy of exporting more profitable, less fuel-efficient luxury cars to the U.S. market.  They voluntarily chose not to comply with the CAFE standards and as a result paid substantial penalties under the law.
In 1993, Europe challenged the CAFE standards under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, now enforced by the WTO), arguing that their effect was to discriminate against European automobile manufacturers.  The GATT panel upheld the challenge, ruling thatregardless of its intentthe requirement that each separate fleet meet the standards had a negative impact on European manufacturers and thus violated GATT non-discrimination rules.
This ruling established an apparent precedent that even if a rule is not discriminatory, a party that chooses not to comply with it and then suffers the consequences can claim discriminatory effect.  This perverse logic is an invitation to foreign firms in any country to violate standards designed to protect the environment or people and then claim injury under the WTO.
See also the Greenhouse Gases Controversy. In this dispute, the U.S. and the E.U., on behalf of their auto industries, used similar arguments to challenge Japan’s implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases.
Resources
•	International Energy Agency. Energy Efficiency and the Environment. 1991.
•	U.S. Department of Transportation. Summary of Fuel Economy Performance. September 1993.
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
“U.S. Fuel Efficiency Hypocrisy: Japan Feels WTO Heat,” pp. 32-33.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Shrimp/Sea Turtle Case
Complaint by: India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand
Complaint against: U.S.
WTO Case WT/DS58

United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. Final Report. [WT/DS58/R, 15 May 1998]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58r00.pdf
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58r01.pdf
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58r02.pdf

United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. Report of the Appellate Body. [WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf

United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. Recourse to article 21.5 by Malaysia. [WT/DS58/RW, 15 June 2001]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58rw_e.pdf

“In 1989, Congress amended the U.S. Endangered Species Act to prohibit the import of shrimp from countries that do not have sea turtle protections comparable to those of the U.S. [which requires turtle excluder devices in shrimp fishing]. Thailand, Pakistan, India, and Malaysia mounted a trade challenge in the WTO. According to the WTO, the U.S. went too far when it blocked trade because other countries did not have the desired conservation policies in place. …
“All the countries involved acknowledged the sea turtles are endangered, that it is a legitimate goal to protect the turtles, and that turtle excluder devices are effective and inexpensive. Nonetheless, the United States could not prohibit imports of shrimp from countries that did not require turtle excluder devices unless the other countries agreed to such a requirement. Moreover, the United States had to allow each country an opportunity to prove that its fishing practices did not cause excessive harm to sea turtles. …
“The U.S. has promised the WTO that it will change its regulations in early December 1999.”
Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund

After the U.S. made the changes in the Endangered Species Act required by the Dispute Settlement Body's November 6, 1998 recommendations, Malaysia continued to assert that the U.S. had not fully complied with the WTO ruling.  In a May 16, 2001 ruling, a WTO compliance panel ruled in favor of the U.S.  It found that the U.S.'s continuation of the import ban on shrimp and shrimp products was justified under Article XX(g) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which provides a general exception to GATT rules for measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
Opinions
“The purpose of the WTO is to regulate world trade. However, it is now being used as the forum through which to resolve other international issues, such as protection of the environment. The fact that the WTO is the arena in which global environmental issues are being argued and decided is frightening. By stepping beyond the bounds of regulating trade, the WTO is creating a precedent by which global environmental decisions are made in a trade (rather than scientific) framework and in a manner that does not include public participation. …”
“The outlook for sea turtles is bleak. The WTO has always ruled against environmental measures when they conflict with commerce. This ruling has set the wheels in motion for the dismantling of the US law. The WTO is creating the path for the rapid destruction of our global resources and the plundering of local economies.”
Sea Turtle Restoration Project, U.S.
Resources
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999: p. 18.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	Walden Bello. “The ‘Shrimp-Turtle Controversy’ and the Rise of Green Unilateralism.” Focus on Trade, July 1997.
In Walden Bello. The Future in the Balance: Essays on Globalization and Resistance. Oakland, CA: Food First Books & Focus on the Global South, 2001: pp. 170-176.
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. “WTO In Brief. Shrimp-Turtle: WTO Panel Allows US to Uphold Import Ban.” Geneva: ICTSD, June 19, 2001.
http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/19-06-01/wtoinbrief.htm
•	Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund. "The Case for Rethinking the WTO." November, 1999.
http://www.wtowatch.org/faq/faq.cfm?faq_id=6
•	Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund. "The World Trade Organization’s Threat to the Environment." No date (1999?).
http://www.wtowatch.org/faq/faq.cfm?faq_id=4
•	Ellen Frank. “The ABCs of the Global Economy. The World Trade Organization (WTO)” Cambridge, MA: Dollars and Sense, March-April 2000.
http://www.dollarsandsense.org/2000/0300collect.html
•	Sea Turtle Restoration Project. “The Story of the WTO versus the Sea Turtle.” San Francisco: CorpWatch (Web site), 1999.
http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/feature/wto/4-seaturtles.html
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
”Case 3: The WTO Rules Against Endangered Species Act,” pp. 26-29.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Tuna/Dolphin Case I
Complaint by: Mexico
Complaint against: U.S.
GATT Case DS21

GATT, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS21/R), Report of the Panel, Sept. 3, 1991. [Pre-WTO, not available on WTO Web site.]

The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) banned from the U.S. market domestic or imported canned tuna caught by purse seine fishing. This method incidentally killed large numbers of dolphins. In a case brought by Mexico, a GATT panel ruled against Section 101(a)(2) of the MMPA.  But GATT never adopted the decision, so the ruling never took effect.
The GATT panel interpreted language in Article III that prohibits discrimination between products on basis of where they are produced to also prohibit discrimination on basis of how they are produced.  Article III:4 says that "like products" produced domestically and abroad must be given equal treatment, but the panel ruled that the phrase "like products" pertains to products' physical characteristics and that how they are produced, harvested or processed is not relevant.  This exclusion could also apply, for example, to child labor in the production of soccer balls.
In1994, a GATT panel also ruled against the MMPA, this time in favor of Europe (Tuna/Dolphin Case II).
Resources
•	WTO. ”Trading Into the Future: Beyond the agreements. The tuna-dolphin dispute.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
”Case 2: Clinton Administration Guts Dolphin Protection,” pp. 22-25.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Tuna/Dolphin Case II
Complaint by: European Community
Complaint against: U.S.
GATT Case DS29

GATT, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS29/R), Report of the Panel, June 1994. [Pre-WTO, not available on WTO Web site.]

In 1994, following the 1991 ruling against the U.S. in favor of Mexico (Tuna/Dolphin Case I), a GATT panel ruled in favor of Europe against the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) dolphin protections.
In 1997, President Clinton finally succeeded in pushing through changes gutting the dolphin-protection provisions of the MMPA in order to comply with the GATT ruling.
Resources
•	”Trading Into the Future: Beyond the agreements. The tuna-dolphin dispute.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
”Case 2: Clinton Administration Guts Dolphin Protection,” pp. 22-25.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Plant and Animal Patents Case
Complaint by: U.S.
Complaint against: India
WTO Case WT/DS50

India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products. Report of the Panel. [WT/DS50/R, 5 September 1997]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/trips.wp5

India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products. Report of the Appellate Body. [WT/DS50/AB/R, 19 December 1997]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/tripab.pdf

In this case, the U.S. challenged an Indian law that, in an effort to keep prices down on pharmaceuticals and other products, excluded plant and animal varieties from patenting. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) requires that by 2005 developing countries change their patent laws to allow foreign companies to patent local plant varieties.
Even though the deadline had not yet been reached, the WTO dispute-settlement panel ruled that India was not moving fast enough towards compliance. As a result, India must grant monopolies to foreign corporations on plant and animal varieties based on patents granted by any other WTO member.
Opinions
“[M]onths before the July 1997 decision of a dispute settlement panel of the WTO, which agreed with the U.S. that India had failed to implement the so-called "mail-box" provisions of Article 70 of TRIPs, the U.S. Ambassador to India had announced that "certain areas of research and training will be closed to cooperation" if India failed to amend its patent laws, threatening some 130 scientific projects supported by the U.S.-India Fund. (Despite the five-year transition period for developing countries, Article 70 requires them to establish legal procedures for receiving applications for patents on pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals immediately so that, upon their full implementation of TRIPs, patents can be back-dated to the date of filing. India had developed a legal administrative procedure, which the dispute panel deemed insufficient.)”
Kristin Dawkins, Director of the Trade and Agriculture Program, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, U.S.
Resources
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999: p. 34.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	Kristin Dawkins. “US Unilateralism: A Threat to Global Sustainability?” Bridges Between Trade And Sustainable Development, Volume 1, Number 4, October 1997.
http://www.ictsd.org/html/review4.9.htm

Chiquita Banana Case
Complaint by: U.S.
Complaint against: European Union
WTO Case WT/DS27

European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Complaint by the United States - Report of the Panel [WT/DS27/R/USA, May 22, 1997]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/27RUSA.WPF
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. [WT/DS27/15, 7 January 1998]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/27-15.pdf
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU - Decision by the Arbitrators [WT/DS27/ARB, 9 April 1999]
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/1735d.pdf

This dispute was initiated by the U.S. government on behalf of Chiquita Brands, a U.S.-based corporation, in response to Europe’s Lomé Convention preferences for small banana producers in former European colonies in the Caribbean. Chiquita grows bananas in Latin America and exports them to Europe and the rest of the world.
In the Lomé Convention, the European Union granted its former colonies special low tariffs and quotas on bananas.  The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations exempted these preferences from the most favored nation requirements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  GATT, now enforced by the World Trade Organization, allows rich countries to grant preferential tariffs to poor countries to encourage development.
The economies of most of the Caribbean islands aided by the tariff breaks depend solely on bananas, and most of the banana producers who benefit are small farmers.  They cannot compete with the large Latin American plantations of Chiquita Brands and the other agribusiness giants who grow two-thirds of the world's bananas.  Chiquita already controls 50 percent of the EU banana market, while Caribbean island producers supply only 8 percent.  Without the Lomé preferences, as the prime minister of Santa Lucia has pointed out, these countries "would have little or no possibility of participating in the global trading system."
In 1997, a WTO dispute-settlement panel decided in favor of the the Clinton administration's challenge. Arbitration panels in 1998 and 1999 upheld the original panel's decision.
These WTO rulings striking down the EU-Caribbean arrangement threaten to undermine higher-priority U.S. efforts in the region.  "I really do not see why it is in the interest of the United States that poor countries in the Caribbean and elsewhere, which are not able to do anything other than grow bananas, should be driven into more dangerous economic activity such as drug trafficking," commented EU Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan. The commander of U.S. forces in the region, Marine General John Sheehan, concurred: if Caribbean banana producers are deprived of their only means of providing for their families, he said, they will resort to drug dealing or illegal migration.
None of Chiquita's bananas are grown in the United States.  Yet CEO Carl Lindner effectively hired the United States government to represent his firm.  In 1996, two days after the Clinton administration filed a complaint with the WTO against the EU banana policy, Lindner donated $500,000 to the Democratic Party.  A model of bipartisanship, Lindner also showered $350,000 on the Republican National Committee and campaign committees in 1998.  One month later, the Republican Senate leadership introduced a bill imposing retaliatory tariffs on the EU.
On April 11, 2001, the U.S. and E.U. reached an agreement to begin to dismantle the barriers to which the U.S. banana companies object.  In July 2001, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick said the U.S. was satisfied with Europe’s implementation of the agreement and the Bush administration lifted $191 million worth of retaliatory trade sanctions the U.S. had imposed on the E.U.
Opinions
“[B]ananas are ‘like’ products, for purposes of Article I, III, X and XIII of GATT, irrespective of whether they originate in the EC, in ACP countries, in BFA countries or in other third countries.”
— WTO. “European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Complaint by the United States - Report of the Panel.” WT/DS27/R/USA, May 22, 1997.
Resources
•	Edward Alden & Deborah Hargreaves. “US and EU agree on banana imports.” London: Financial Times, Apr 12, 2001: p. 22. http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?id=010412001168&query=banana+AND+Chiquita
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
“The Banana Case,” p. 26.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. “WTO Confirms EU Banana Regime Violates Rules.” Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Vol. 1, No. 33, 15 September 1997.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?browse=1&Issue_ID=243&Bulletin_ID=14&SID=
•	Martin Crutsinger. “Trade Sanctions Lifted in Banana Case.” London: The Independent, July 2, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2001/0702banana.htm
•	Datamonitor. “World trade: Ecuador not bananas about pact.” Datamonitor, 18 April, 2001.
http://www.datamonitor.com/viewnewsstory.asp?id=2267
•	Michael Jessen. “USA: Going Bananas.” AlterNet, February 6, 2001.
http://www.corpwatch.org/news/2001/0033.html
•	Brian Lavery. “Trade Feud on Bananas Not as Clear as It Looks.” New York Times, February 7, 2001.
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/01/business/07BANA.html0
•	Russel Mokhiber & Robert Weissman. “USA: Banana Republic.” San Francisco: CorpWatch (Web site), April 1, 1999.
http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/corner/worldnews/other/334.html
•	Jonathan Peterson. “Costly trade war? Bananas causing bunch of trouble.” Seattle Times, March 4, 1999.
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis/web/vortex/display?slug=bana&date=19990304
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
“The WTO and Developing Countries. Case 1: U.S. Attacks Caribbean Bananas for Chiquita,” pp. 141-145.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Myanmar Sanctions Case
Complaint by: EU and Japan
Complaint against: U.S.
WTO Case WT/DS88

United States – Measure Affecting Government Procurement - Lapse of Authority for Establishment of the Panel – Note by the Secretariat [WT/DS88/6 & WT/DS/95/6, 14 February 2000]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/88-6.DOC

United States – Measure Affecting Government Procurement – Communication from the Chairman of the Panel [WT/DS88/5 & WT/DS95/5, 12 February 1999]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/88-5.DOC

United States – Measure Affecting Government Procurement – Request for Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities [WT/DS88/3, 9 September 1998]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/88-3.DOC

United States – Measure Affecting Government Procurement – Request to Join Consultations - Communication from Japan [WT/DS88/2, 2 July 1997]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/88-2.WPF

United States – Measure Affecting Government Procurement – Request for Consultations by the European Communities [WT/DS88/1 & GPA/D2/1, 26 June 1997]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/88-1.WPF

The state of Massachusetts passed a government purchasing law in 1996 barring companies doing business with Myanmar from bidding for major public contracts.  The military government of Myanmar (formerly Burma) has been recognized by many human-rights groups and the U.S. State Department as an egregious violator of basic human rights.
In 1997, The European Community and Japan initiated dispute-settlement consultations with the U.S., arguing that the Massachusetts legislation violated provisions of the WTO Agreement on Government Purchasing (AGP).   They also argued that it was unfair to foreign investors under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
The WTO challenge was allowed to lapse in 2000 because two U.S. courts had struck down the Massachusetts law as an unconstitutional restriction by a state of federal foreign-policy prerogatives.  The courts also cited the WTO challenge in their rulings.  The two cases were filed by the National Foreign Trade Council, a private-sector body which represents many of the most important U.S. multinational businesses.
Resources
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999.
”The Burma Case: Human Rights Affected By Finance and Investment.” Pp. 38-39.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 7: ”Human and Labor Rights Under the WTO.” Pp. 172-192.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Controversies

Eco-Labeling Controversy
Complaints by: U.S. & Canada
Complaints against: European Union
Proposals discussed: 1996 in WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade & WTO Committee on Trade and Environment. Formal WTO dispute-settlement procedure not initiated.

In 1996 in the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade and the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, the U.S. and Canadian governments raised the argument that even the voluntary labeling of products as environmentally friendly is a technical regulation that should be scrutinized under TBT.
Eco-labeling in a broad sense involves a certification that a product meets certain environmental or social criteria of concern to consumers.  It can be mandatory or voluntary, public or private.  In the U.S., the energy-efficiency ratings for appliances, fair-trade designations for coffee, and the former “Dolphin Safe” label on tuna cans (now removed in response to WTO complaints) are common examples.  The Europe Union has had a voluntary eco-labeling program since 1992.  Because eco-labeling relies on informed consumer choice within the market to achieve environmental or social goals, it is one of the least intrusive forms of regulation.
The U.S. position was based primarily on a proposal by a U.S. industry coalition to severely restrict eco-labeling.  U.S. environmental and consumer groups campagined against the proposal, and the EU, Norway and Australia resisted parts of it within the WTO.  The issues were never resolved and the WTO committees finally adopted a neutral report.
In more recent disputes, the EU’s country-of-origin labels (“Made in France” for example) have also provoked U.S. criticism as restrictions of trade.  And the U.S. and Canada have again used the Committee on TBT to oppose labeling of genetically modified foods by the U.K. and other European countries.
See also Genetically Modified Foods Labeling Controversy.
Resources
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. “GMOs: Consumer's Right To Know Poses Challenges.” BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. Vol. 3, No. 23. June 14, 1999.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1496&browse=1&SID=
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. “TBT Committee Discusses Labelling, Standards.” BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. Vol. 3, No. 23. June 14, 1999.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1496&browse=1&SID=
•	Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp
•	Codex Alimentarius Commission
www.codexalimentarius.net
•	Keith Koffler. “Administration to Bring Seven Trade Complaints to the WTO.” Congress Daily, May 3, 1999.
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
“Threat 4: U.S. Threatens Voluntary Eco-Labeling as WTO-Illegal,” pp. 29, 36-38.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Genetically Modified Foods Controversy
Raised by: U.S.
Directed against: European Union, Japan & Australia
Discussed: 1999 to present.  No formal WTO discussions or dispute-settlement procedure were initiated.

Since 1999, the United States has criticized initiatives by Europe, Japan and Australia to regulate and label genetically modified (GM) foods and has challenged the legality of such provisions under the WTO.
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are produced by introducing genes from one species into another in order to transfer desirable traits. The safety of GM foods for consumers and the environment is a concern for many consumers around the world in the absence of long-term testing of these new biotechnologies.  Polls indicate that 93 percent of Americans and 74 percent of Europeans favor the labeling of GM products.  Many scientists and consumer advocates fear that crops engineered to resist pesticides and herbicides could increase reliance on those chemicals and damage environments, pass the new tolerances on to weeds, and ultimately diminish biological diversity.
In the U.S., products containing GMOs are not regulated.  European governments, however, have passed GMO regulations in response to growing public outcry after a series of food-related health crises such as mad-cow disease.  Currently the EU has imposed a three-year moratorium on the approval of new GM crops.  Over the past two years, the U.S. and the EU have blustered and negotiated over this issue.
U.S. agribusiness, which is the primary exporter of GM food, argues that it is the victim of protectionism on this issue.  In its support, the U.S. government claims that European GMO regulations may violate three WTO agreements:
•	The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), which requires that a government wishing to regulate a GMO must justify the regulation with a risk assessment based on scientific evidence that the organism is a threat.  Lack of reliable and long-term data, however, is precisely what has raised concerns about GMOs.
See also "You must first prove a substance dangerous before restricting its use."
•	The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which requires that product regulations use the least-trade-restrictive means to accomplish their goals, and that they conform to international standards.
See also "You must use the 'least trade-restrictive' method—not the most effective one—to protect people and the environment."
•	The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which enhances the commercial rights of patented GMO products, potentially conflicting with biodiversity and food security concerns.
See also "You must treat life forms and life-saving drugs as commodities."
The U.S. carried this battle into the 1999-2000 talks that adopted the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, part of the United Nations Environment Programme’s Convention on Biological Diversity.  There, it led a group of countries that attempted to weaken restrictions on trade in GMOs.  In the Codex Alimentarius Commission of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, as well, the U.S. has opposed mandatory GMO food-labeling as WTO-inconsistent.
See also Eco-Labeling Controversy.
Opinions
“The European Commission on 25 July released their long-awaited proposals for new labelling and traceability regulations related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) aimed at ending the European de facto moratorium on GMO approval, in place since mid-1999. Together with the recently adopted revisions to the EU directive on the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment, the proposed regulations would establish what the Commission called the ‘world's most stringent’ rules on controlling and monitoring the release of GMOs. …”
“Despite the Commission's assurances that the new regulations took account of the EU's international trade commitments, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick strongly criticised the proposal, which he said ‘extends far beyond health protections for consumers and in fact creates onerous and impractical regulatory barriers.’ He added that the rules would impede developing countries' efforts to use biotechnology for improving nutrition, lowering food costs and reducing reliance on pesticides. The US and other GMO exporting countries, such as Canada and Argentina, are wary that the system would affect their exports and say that it could run counter to WTO rules.”
BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 5, Number 29, July 31, 2001.
~
“These laws will ensure that the regulatory framework in the EU is up to the high standard consumers expect.  We believe the package of measures is well balanced and that industry will be able to trade.”
David Byrne, EU food safety commissioner, July 25, 2001
~
“The provisions for traceability ensure a high level of environmental and health protection and pave the way for a proper labelling system.  Certainly, there is a cost for the producers and for trade, but what is at stake is our ability to build public confidence.”
Margot Wallstrom, EU environment commissioner, July 25, 2001
~
“On 11 January, the Consumer Federation, a coalition of the biggest US consumer groups, issued a report on the current situation of regulation for biotechnology in foods. The report, written by Thomas McGarity, a University of Texas law professor, recommended that the FDA should abandon its ‘substantial equivalent’ assumption [which sees GM foods as practically identical to conventional foods and therefore requiring no special treatment], require extensive testing of GM foods, set up a mandatory labelling scheme for products with more than a negligible amount of biotech material and require mandatory consultations with federal regulators for developers of GM foods.”
BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 5, Number 1, January 16, 2001.
Resources
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999: p. 27.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. “GMO Update: EU Labelling Of GMOs; Brazil; Thailand.” BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 5, Number 29, July 31, 2001.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=2026&browse=1&SID=
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. “Organic Farming And GMOs In The News.” BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 5, Number 1, January 16, 2001.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1927&browse=1&SID=
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. ”GMOs Continue to Create a Stir.” BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 4, Number 29, July 25, 2000.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1825&browse=1&SID=#GMOs%20Continue%20to%20Create%20a%20Stir
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. “GMOs: Consumer's Right To Know Poses Challenges.” BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. Vol. 3, No. 23. June 14, 1999.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1496&browse=1&SID=
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. “TBT Committee Discusses Labelling, Standards.” BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. Vol. 3, No. 23. June 14, 1999.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1496&browse=1&SID=
•	Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp
•	Codex Alimentarius Commission
www.codexalimentarius.net
•	Michael Mann. “Genes, greens and global trade disputes.” London: Financial Times, July 25, 2001.
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3IXL1GLPC&live=true
•	Michael Mann. “EU food move may raise trade tensions.” London: Financial Times, July 25, 2001.
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3OGVEGLPC&live=true
•	Panos. "More Power to the World Trade Organization? The international trade controversy." Panos Briefing No. 37, November 1999.
http://www.wtowatch.org/faq/faq.cfm?faq_id=3#36
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
Chapter 3, “Emerging Issues: Genetically Modified Organisms,” pp. 86-95.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Greenhouse Gases Controversy
Complaint by: U.S. & E.U.
Complaint against: Japan
Discussed: 1999.  Formal WTO dispute-settlement procedure not initiated.

Commmittee on Technical Barriers to Trade - Notification 99.003. Letter from European Commission Industrial Secretariat, 1999.

In accordance with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, Japan adopted auto fuel-efficiency proposals to curtail greenhouse gases.  In 1999, the U.S. (acting on behalf of Ford and Daimler-Chrysler) and the E.U. threatened WTO action against the revised Japanese energy law.  They invoked prohibitions in the WTO Agreement on on Technical Barriers to Trade against unecessarily trade-restrictive standards in letters to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The controversy centered on 1998 revisions to Japan’s “Law Concerning the Rational Use of Energy,” which tightened what had been less stringent fuel-efficiency standards for medium-weight automobiles.  As a benchmark, the law uses the emission levels of the least-polluting engine in the medium weight class, which happens to be made by Mitsubishi.  But auto manufacturers can use any engine that matches or surpasses that level of fuel efficiency; the law does specify how the level must be achieved.
Nearly 90 percent of middle-weight cars in Japan are imported from Europe.  Because of this, the U.S. and E.U. complained that the new standards put the heaviest burden on European cars.  Japan said its standards merely targetted those cars that were putting out the worst CO2 emissions, which could prevent it from meeting its Kyoto Protocol obligations.
As in the Automobile Fuel-Efficiency Case, the argument of the U.S. and E.U., if accepted, would seem to create incentives for foreign manufacturers to ignore clean-air standards and then claim de facto discrimination against their products when they fail to meet those standards.
See also the Automobile Fuel-Efficiency Case.
Opinions
“On September 8, 1998, the Diet (the Japanese Parliament) passed a law that required the national government, prefectural governments and local governments to draw up ‘action plans’ for reducing greenhouse gases in line with Japan’s Kyoto Protocol obligations. A significant aspect of these plans will be improvements in the efficiency of government-owned buildings and the purchase of low emission vehicles for government-owned fleets.”
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. “Japan. 4. National Energy Policy and Energy Overview.”
~
“[A]lthough the use of these technical criteria for the definition of the scheme does not appear to be per se discriminatory, the regime … puts a comparatively heavier burden on imported products.”
E.U. letter to the WTO TBT Secretariat, 1999
Resources
•	Cable News Network. “Global Warming: U.S. turns its back on Kyoto.” CNN.com / In-Depth Specials.
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/globalwarming
•	Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  (full text of protocol).  CNN.com Interactive.
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1997/global.warming/stories/treaty
•	Susan R. Fletcher. “98-2: Global Climate Change Treaty: The Kyoto Protocol.” Congressional Research Service – Report for Congress, March 6, 2000.
http://www.cnie.org/nle/clim-3.html
•	“Kyoto Protocol.” International Energy Agency Web site.
http://www.iea.org/ieakyoto/index.htm
•	Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. “Japan. 4. National Energy Policy and Energy Overview.” Energy Research & Development: Global Trends in Policy and Investment. Washington, DC: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, May 1999.
http://energytrends.pnl.gov/japan/ja004.htm
•	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control
http://www.unfccc.org
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999: pp. 31-34.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Longhorn Beetle Controversy
Complaints by: Hong Kong
Complaints against: U.S. & Canada
Complaints to WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Formal WTO dispute-settlement procedure not initiated.

Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures – Notification –  United States – Solid wood packing material - Addendum [G/SPS/N/USA/137/Add.3, 26 November 1999]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/SPS/NUSA137A3.DOC

Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures - Summary of the Meeting Held on 11 - 12 November 1998 - Note by the Secretariat [G/SPS/R/13, 15 January 1999]
ii. United States - interim rule affecting solid wood packaging material.
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/SPS/R13.DOC

Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures - Notification - Canada [G/SPS/N/CAN/44, 23 November 1998]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/SPS/NCAN44.DOC

Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures - Interim Rule Affecting Solid Wood Packaging Material (G/SPS/N/USA/137) - Statement by the United States at the Meeting of 11-12 November 1998 [G/SPS/GEN/107, 23 November 1998]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/SPS/GEN107.DOC

Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures – Notification – United States [G/SPS/N/USA/137, 30 September 1998]
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/SPS/NUSA137.DOC

Wood-boring Asian longhorned beetles, indigenous to Japan, Korea and China, have become a dangerous invasive species in North America, where they face no natural predators.  Once they have infested a tree, pesticides are useless: they can be eliminated only by uprooting and burning it.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture predicted in 1998 that direct economic damages from these beetles, mainly to maple syrup and timber producers, might exceed $130 billion if they infested U.S. forests.  Canada also expressed concern for potential damages to its economically important maple trees.  The U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), which had to uproot and burn thousands of trees to stop infestations, called the pests a "serious threat" to U.S. agriculture and forests.  The agency traced infestations of the beetles to imported solid wood packing material from China and Hong Kong.  Roughly half of China’s exports to the U.S. are shipped via Hong Kong.
On September 30,1998, the U.S. responded to the infestations by notifying the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) that it was amending its regulations to require that wooden packing material imported from China be heat treated, fumigated or treated with preservatives prior to departure.  Canada also announced in November 1998 that it was imposing similar measures to deal with recent infestations of the beetle.
Although China was not a WTO member at the time, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (part of China and a WTO member) filed a complaint against the regulations before the SPS Committee on November 11, 1998.  It pointed to the requirement of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures that a risk assessment be conducted before imposing such regulations, and that the methods of treatment required by the U.S. were damaging to the environment.  And it claimed that the measures were discriminatory because they did not apply to other nations through which Chinese imports are shipped to the U.S.
Hong Kong did not pursue the complaint in the WTO and the U.S. did not rescind the regulations.  Rather, it amended the rule in November 1999 to require that wood articles fumigated with methyl bromide or other fumigants be aerated before shipping because it had detected dangerously high levels of methyl bromide in some shipping containers.  However, the dispute shows the potential of WTO complaints to coerce members into dropping or weakening environmental regulations, particularly if made by a more powerful country against a weaker country.
Opinions
“The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is amending the regulations for importing logs, lumber and other unmanufactured wood articles by adding treatment and documentation requirements for solid wood packing material imported from China.  This change means that wooden pallets, crating, dunnage, and other wooden packing material imported into the United States from China will have to be heat treated, fumigated or treated with preservatives prior to departure from China.  This action will affect anyone who uses solid wood packing material in connection with exporting commodities from China to the United States.  This action is necessary to control the risk that solid wood packing material from China could introduce dangerous plant pests, including forest pests, into the United States, a risk demonstrated by many recent incidents where exotic pests were detected in solid wood packing material from China.”
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures – Notification – United States [G/SPS/N/USA/137, 30 September 1998]
~
“The representative of Hong Kong, China observed that Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, and also the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), required that SPS measures be based on a risk assessment which evaluated the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of the pests concerned.  However, it appeared that no such risk assessment had been conducted in respect of Hong Kong, China.  As a WTO Member and separate customs territory, Hong Kong, China should be treated separately in the application of trade rules from the mainland of China.  Her authorities were also concerned about the environmental consequences of the proposed US measure which required treatment of solid wood packing material by one of three possible methods:  heating, pressure treatment, and fumigation with Methyl Bromide.”
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures - Summary of the Meeting Held on 11 - 12 November 1998 - Note by the Secretariat [G/SPS/R/13, 15 January 1999]

Resources
•	Tom Baldwin. “Bug Casts Giant Shadow.” Journal of Commerce, September 28, 1998.
•	Tom Baldwin & P.T. Bangsberg. "USDA Acts Ahead of Pallet Ban." Journal of Commerce, November 17, 1998.
•	P.T. Bangsberg. “China Criticizes ‘Unfair’ Beetle Ban.” Journal of Commerce, September 22, 1998.
•	Global Trade Watch. “Challenge of U.S. Forest Protection Rule (Asian Longhorned Beetles).” Public Citizen Web site, no date.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/ENVIRONMENT/articles.cfm?ID=4327
•	Global Trade Watch. “Wood Articles; Solid Wood Packing.” Public Citizen Web site, no date.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6820
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
”Threat 5: Hong Kong Complains About U.S. Anti-Invasive Species Rule at WTO,” pp. 38-39, 63.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Electronics-Industry Pollution Controversy
Raised by: U.S.
Directed against: EU
Discussed: 1999.  Formal WTO discussions and dispute-settlement procedure not initiated.

In 1999 the U.S. State Department, acting at the behest of the American Electronics Association, sent an official message to the European Union Directorate General of Trade  suggesting that a European proposal to control electronics pollution was WTO-illegal.  The U.S. argued that the EU proposal’s restrictions on trade in certain heavy metals used to manufacture electronics products were more restrictive than necessary to satisfy its objective and were not based on international standards.  U.S. environmental groups, however, supported the E.U. proposal for holding the electronics industry to a high standard on pollution.
Resources
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
“Threat 1:U.S. Pressures EU to Abandon High Standards for Curtailing Electronics Industry Pollution,” pp. 30-31.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

Lead Compounds Controversy
Raised by: U.S.
Directed against: Denmark
Discussed: 1999.  Formal WTO discussions and dispute-settlement procedure not initiated.

Denmark notified the European Community that it intended to ban some 200 lead compounds from paints and other chemicals.  The basis for the ban wathat lead compounds have been shown to cause brain damage in young children.  In 1999, the U.S. threatened to challenge Denmark in the WTO if it implemented the ban.
Resources
•	Paul Brown. “Danes Fear Bid to Block Ban on Lead.” London: The Guardian, May 3, 1999.

AIDS Drugs Controversy
Raised by: U.S. & international pharmaceutical industry
Directed against: South Africa, Thailand and Brazil
Discussed: From at least 1998 to present.  No formal WTO discussions and dispute-settlement procedure was initiated.

The United States and the international pharmaceutical industry have used the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to attack developing countries trying to develop their own AIDS drugs or using compulsory licensing and parallel importing, mechanisms that help obtain cheaper drugs.  TRIPS requires most developing countries to implement patent protections by 2000, which has made public health problems worse by raising drug prices and reducing access for poor people.  The poorest countries must implement patent protections by 2006, which will further exacerbate the problem.
Although TRIPS allows certain exceptions for public health reasons, the U.S. had threatened trade sanctions over this issue against South Africa and Thailand.  But after anti-AIDS activists targeted the presidential campaign of then Vice President Al Gore, the Clinton administration backed off on some threats.  It did, however, complain to the WTO about some provisions of Brazil’s patent law allowing compulsory licensing of critical drugs.  And in Thailand, U.S. pressure forced the government to disband its Pharmaceutical Review Board, which had dramatically reduced the price of AIDS drugs.  The U.S. argued that the board was inconsistent with TRIPS.
In 1998, 39 pharmaceutical countries brought a lawsuit against South Africa’s medicines act, which encourages generic drugs, compulsory licensing and parallel imports to provide cheaper and more available medicines.  After an international campaign by non-governmental organizations and extensive negative publicity, the industry abandoned its case on April 19, 2001.
In response to a call for a debate by African member states, who said that TRIPS faced “a crisis of legitimacy,” the WTO held a forum June 20, 2001 on “Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines” in WTO’s Council on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  Over 100 non-governmental organizations called for the meeting to adopt a moratorium on dispute-settlement actions on the issue, agree not to pressure developing countries to forgo their rights under TRIPS, and extend the deadline for implementing patent protections for the poorest countries.  Most member governments described the meeting as a first step, and will consider whether to discuss the issue at the Doha ministerial in November.

Opinions
“Concerned about the situation in which one third of the world’s population has no guaranteed access to essential drugs, in which new world trade agreements may have a negative impact on local manufacturing capacity and the access to and prices of pharmaceuticals in developing countries” … nations must “ensure that public health rather than commercial interests have primacy in pharmaceutical and health policies and to review their options under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to safeguard access to essential drugs.”
Executive Board of the World Health Organization, a body of the United Nations
~
"What we must see now is pressure being brought on the WTO to change the trade rules which prevent poor people buying life-saving medicines."
Justin Forsyth, Oxfam, U.K.
~
“Brazil is showing that no one who dies of AIDS dies of natural causes. Those who die have been failed  by feckless leaders who see weapons as more alluring purchases than medicines, by wealthy countries (notably the United States) that have threatened the livelihood of poor nations who seek to manufacture cheap medicine and by the multinational drug companies who have kept the price of antiretroviral drugs needlessly out of reach of the vast majority of the world's population..”
“Brazil, by defying the pharmaceutical companies and threatening to break patents, among other actions, has made drugs available to everyone who needs them. Its experience shows that doing this requires something radical: an alteration of the basic social contract the pharmaceutical companies have enjoyed until now.”
Tina Rosenberg, New York Times Magazine
~
“The [drug] companies counter [criticisms] with an economic argument: these [anti-AIDS] drugs would not exist if not for the monopoly profits that finance research and development. But there are other ways to fund this researchin fact many of most expensive new drugs were discovered with the help of public funds.”
“From a strictly economic point of view, a patent monopoly is a very inferior means of financing research. A basic principle of standard microeconomics is that the price of a good should be equal to the cost of producing an additional unit. Monopoly pricing, especially at 15 or 20 times the cost of productionis enormously wasteful and inefficient. And in the case of essential medicines, the toll of this inefficiency is measured in human lives.”
Mark Weisbrot, co-director, Center for Economic and Policy Research, U.S.
Resources
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. “Drug Companies Drop Case Against S. African Government.” Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Vol. 5, No. 15, 24 April 2001. http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue_ID=1983&browse=1&SID=
•	Philippe Rivière. “Recul des multinationales pharmaceutiques. Après Pretoria, quelle politique contre le sida?” Paris: Le monde diplomatique, 20 avril 2001.
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/pretoria
•	Rachel L. Swarns. “Free AIDS Care Brings Hope to Botswana.” New York Times, May 8, 2001.
•	Mark Weisbrot. “Why We Need Free Trade for Life-Saving Medicines” Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, March 19, 2001. Also published in Baltimore Sun, March 21, 2001.
•	Frances Williams. “Battle over cost of pharmaceuticals moves to WTO.” London: Financial Times, June 20, 2001. http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010620001154&query=TRIPS+AND+WTO
•	WTO - TRIPS Council’s discussion on ‘Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines’ – 20 June 2001
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/counciljun01_e.htm

Baby-Food Trademark Controversy
Raised by: U.S.
Directed against: Guatemala
Discussed: 1993 – 1995. No formal WTO dispute-settlement procedure was initiated.

This dispute on the marketing of infant formulas and baby food was initiated against Guatemala at the behest of Gerber, the U.S. baby-food producer. A million and a half infants die each year in poor countries, primarily from diarrhea, because their mothers mix infant formula with unclean water.  In 1983, Guatemala had passed a law based on the Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes drafted by the World Health Organization and UNICEF.  The law was successful in reducing infant mortality rates, and UNICEF cited it as a model.
The Guatemalan code was non-discriminatory in trade terms because it made no distinction between foreign and domestic producers of breast-milk substitutes.  All other foreign and domestic suppliers changed their packaging to comply with the law.  But Gerber refused to comply by removing its “Gerber Baby” from its packaging, negotiating for years with the Guatemalan Health Ministry.  Ultimately an administrative tribunal agreed with the ministry that the image violated the law, which prohibits packaging that might associate formula or baby food with healthy, fat babies in the eyes of illiterate parents.
In 1993, the firm filed a complaint with the U.S. Trade Representative asserting that the code violated international trademark protections: it said in effect that its intellectual property right to use its chubby baby logo trumped Guatemala's right to protect its mothers and infants.  Finally in 1995, under threat of a WTO challenge by the U.S. State Department, Guatemala changed its law to allow labelling of imported baby food products that violates WHO/UNICEF guidelines.  For multinational corporations and rich countries, this case established a precedent for using the WTO to undermine public-health standards in poor countries.
Opinions
“Idealizing its infant feeding products has been a trademark of Gerber since it first introduced its baby foods in 1928. In order to create an image of allure, charisma and trust for its products, it fathered the ‘Gerber Baby’ face to launch its first advertising campaign. The rest is history and the now famous face continues to seduce new parents to a product not in the least worthy of the irresistible expression. Exploitation by image is hardly a new concept; however, when this impacts negatively on the nutritional well-being of infants, those responsible for health care have an obligation to respond. In its historic International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, the World Health Organization recognized the potential for harm when it structured its labelling requirements for breast milk substitutes: ‘neither the container nor the label should have pictures of infants, nor should they have other pictures or text which may idealize the use of infant formula.’ …”
“Under the rules of trade agreements such as the World Trade Organization countries retain autonomy to regulate health and consumer standards. Yet even these rules will give way to bully tactics when large global corporations with compliant governments use their economic and political power to undo regulations that exist to protect the health of the most vulnerable of citizens. Even the Canadian government under the NAFTA agreement refuses to implement regulations protecting infant and young child nutrition by not demanding International Code compliance by the infant food industry.”
INFACT (Canada)
Resources
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999: p. 35.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
•	The Right Reverend Simon Barrington-Ward. “Putting babies before business.” The Progress of Nations. UNICEF, 1997.
http://www.unicef.org/pon97/14-21.pdf
•	INFACT (Canada)
http://www.infactcanada.ca
“The Gerber Baby--Trademark or Con Artist?”
http://www.infactcanada.ca/newsletters/winter96/gerbbaby.htm
WHO's Breastmilk Substitute Code
http://www.infactcanada.ca/whocode/codeview.htm
Innocenti Declaration On the Protection, Promotion and Support of Breastfeeding. 1 August, 1990, Florence, Italy
http://www.infactcanada.ca/whocode/innocent.htm
•	UNICEF. “Protecting Breast-Milk from Unethical Marketing.” The Progress of Nations. UNICEF, 1997.
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
”Threat 2: U.S., Gerber Trade Threats Pressure Guatemala to Weaken Infant Formula Law,” pp. 115-118.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081
•	World Health Organization. International Code of Marketing Breast-Milk Substitutes. 1981.
http://www.who.int/dsa/cat98/mat8.htm#International%20Code%20of%20Marketing%20of%20Breast-Milk%20Substitutes

Traditional Medicines Controversy
Raised by: U.S.
Directed against: Thailand
Discussed: 1997.  Formal WTO discussions and dispute-settlement procedure not initiated.

On April 21, 1997, the U.S. State Department sent a letter to the Royal Thai Government regarding draft legislation in the Thai parliament that would grant protections to traditional medicines by allowing healers to register them.  The letter stated: “Washington believes that such a registration system could constitute a possible violation of TRIPs and hamper medical research into these compounds.”  It requested answers to 11 questions, beginning with “What is the relationship of the proposal to the granting of patent protection in Thailand?” and ending with “Does the RTG envision a contractual system to handle relationships between Thai healers and foreign researchers in the future?”
The Thai legislation was motivated by a history of incidents in which foreign firms patented Thai plants and derivatives long used by Thai healers and farmers.  In the ‘80s, Thai non-governmental organizations (NGOs) discovered that a Japanese firm had patented and was selling an extract of plao noi, a Thai plant traditionally used to treat ulcers.  Later, U.S. researchers patented a protein from a Thai bittergourd.  And Thai farmers feared that the U.S. firm RiceTec, which had already patented a variety of Basmati rice despite its origins in India and Pakistan, would take a similar approach with their native Jasmine rice.
In a June 30, 1997 letter to U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, over 200 NGOs and individuals from dozens of countries expressed “concern at the manner in which the United States government is intervening in the domestic affairs of numerous other nations regarding their intellectual property laws.”  Despite the need for signatory governments to conform to international agreements, they wrote, it is neither “the United States' responsibility nor its right to interfere with their national democratic processes for doing so.”  They suggested that the State Department’s letter to Thailand evidenced an interest in the transfer of traditional Thai knowledge to U.S. researchers and its subjection to U.S. patents
In related cases, the U.S. has filed formal complaints with the WTO against India (see Plant and Animal Patents Case) and Pakistan, has unilaterally imposed retaliatory import duties against Argentina, and has threatened Ecuador with cancellation of trade preferences in disputes over patent laws.
In a subsequent 1998 case, the Thai government requested the return from a British university laboratory of over 200 strains of marine fungi taken from Thailand for a research project sponsored by a pharmaceutical company.
In a 1999 statement, the Royal Government of Thailand continued to oppose the United States on this issue: “United States allows plants, animals or even human genes to be patented under U.S. law. However, the Royal Government of Thailand refuses to agree that biotechnology can be or should be patented.”
See also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
See also “Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.” (intellectual property).
Opinions
“Thailand is strongly against the use of patents on biotechnology and the patenting of different types of plants. The large industrialized nations are able to take advantage of the less industrialized nations by exploiting different varieties of plants and herbs that have been produced for centuries by these countries. Thailand is worried that large corporations are profiting from the knowledge and tradition of the poor farmers in these less industrialized nations.”
Royal Government of Thailand
~
“We're not trying to stop commercial development and we're not challenging the principle of intellectual property rights.  But we don't want to be taken advantage of any more. We pay a lot for drugs and we need to have some rules, some self-defence.”
Dr. Pennapa Subcharoen, Director, National Institute for Thai Traditional Medicine at the Ministry of Public Health
~
“Ten years ago, Thai NGOs discovered that Plao Noi, a local plant whose medicinal properties are inscribed in the ancient palm leaf herbalist books, was patented in Japan. It is a good medicine for ulcers and the Japanese extracted its active ingredient. Now, Kelnacthe patented producthas annual sales of 800 million baht ($20 million) for the sole benefit of Japan.”
“More recently, Thai television featured a chronicle about U.S. researchers patenting the Map-30 protein from a native Thai bittergourd. Thai scientists were also researching it for its anti-HIV compounds. Once again, Thais are being pushed out of a market for a medicine derived from the country's indigenous biodiversity.”
Witoon Lianchamroon & Piengporn Panutampon, Third World Network, Malaysia
~
“The Convention on Biological Diversity also obligates parties to ‘respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities’ relevant to biodiversity. And the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources of the FAO provides for ‘Farmers Rights.’ Now under revision, negotiators are grappling with the task of devising legal and financial instruments to support farming communities in the ongoing development and conservation of the germplasm and technologies their ancestors cultivated collectively over many generations. The patenting of seeds, plants and animals would seem to conflict with these emerging legal principles, as well.”
Kristin Dawkins, Director of the Trade and Agriculture Program, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, U.S.
Resources
•	Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme
http://www.biodiv.org
•	Prangtip Daorueng. “Thailand: Tussle Over Fungi Strains Brings Painful Lessons.” Inter Press Service, September 4, 1998.
http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/sept98/08_54_007.html
http://mai.flora.org/forum/6816
•	Prangtip Daorueng. “Farmers Protest Copycat ‘Jasmine’ Rice.” Inter Press Service, May 13, 1998.
http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/may98/04_30_007.html
•	Kristin Dawkins. “US Unilateralism: A Threat to Global Sustainability?” Bridges Between Trade And Sustainable Development, Volume 1, Number 4, October 1997.
http://www.ictsd.org/html/review4.9.htm
•	Prangtip Daorueng. “Thailand: Tussle Over Fungi Strains Brings Painful Lessons.” Inter Press Service, September 4, 1998.
http://mai.flora.org/forum/6816
•	Witoon Lianchamroon & Piengporn Panutampon. “Jasmine Rice of Thailand.” Synthesis/Regeneration 17, Fall 1998.
http://www.greens.org/s-r/17/17-20.html
•	David Pilling & Ted Bardacke. “Genetic Pirates Walk the Plank.” London: Financial Times, January 9-10, 1999: p. 7.
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ik/thailand.htm
•	Royal Government of Thailand. “Policy Position Paper.” 1999.
http://www.oz.uc.edu/~harknerj/thaipp.htm
•	Vandana Shiva. “TRIPs and the Environment.” Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 2001.
http://www.twnside.org.sg./title/trips-ch.htm
•	Vandana Shiva. Biopiracy, The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge. Boston: South End Press, 1997.
http://www.southendpress.org/books/biopiracy.shtml
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999.
”Threat 1: U.S. Charges Thai Anti Bio-Piracy Policy Violates WTO,” pp.  108-112.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081

WTO Treaties

The following treaties are enforced by the World Trade Organization. The full texts and background information listed below are available on the official WTO Web site.

Legal texts: the WTO agreements. A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm

What is the WTO?
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP)
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
Agreement on Agriculture (AOA)
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
(Part of Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements On Trade In Goods)

“It all began with trade in goods. From 1947 to 1994, GATT was the forum for negotiating lower customs duty rates and other trade barriers; the text of General Agreement spelt out important rules, particularly non-discrimination.”
“Since 1995, the updated GATT has become the WTO’s umbrella agreement for trade in goods. It has annexes dealing with specific sectors such as agriculture and textiles, and with specific issues such as state trading, product standards, subsidies and actions taken against dumping.”
”The WTO in brief: The WTO agreements.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr03_e.htm#goods

The WTO Web site makes the full GATT treaty available in two parts:
•	Full text of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947), which includes GATT up to 1986, when the Uruguay Round began.
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47.pdf
•	Full text of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), which explains what was added to GATT in the Uruguay Round, which concluded in 1994 with the birth of the WTO.
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt.pdf
•	GATT and the Goods Council on the WTO website
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gatt_e/gatt_e.htm
•	The World Trade Organization: A Training Package. GATT 1994
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto02/wto2_2.htm

General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
(Annex 1B to Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization)

“Banks, insurance firms, telecommunications companies, tour operators, hotel chains and transport companies looking to do business abroad can now enjoy the same principles of freer and fairer trade that originally only applied to trade in goods.”
“These principles appear in the new General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). WTO members have also made individual commitments under GATS stating which of their services sectors they are willing to open to foreign competition, and how open those markets are.”
”The WTO in brief: The WTO agreements.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr03_e.htm#services

•	Full text of treaty
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf
•	Services: rules for growth and investment
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm5_e.htm
•	The services negotiations
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm
•	The World Trade Organization: A Training Package. Services: GATS
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto06/wto6_1.htm
•	WTO service talks press ahead, 2 April 2001 (press release)
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr217_e.htm
•	GATS – Fact and fiction
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gats_factfiction_e.htm

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
(Part of Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements On Trade In Goods)

“Technical regulations and industrial standards are important, but they vary from country to country. Having too many different standards makes life difficult for producers and exporters. If the standards are set arbitrarily, they could be used as an excuse for protectionism. Standards can become obstacles to trade.”
“The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade tries to ensure that regulations, standards, testing and certification procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles. The WTO’s version is a modification of the code negotiated in the 1973-79 Tokyo Round.”
“The agreement recognizes countries’ rights to adopt the standards they consider appropriate — for example, for human, animal or plant life or health, for the protection of the environment or to meet other consumer interests. Moreover, members are not prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure their standards are met. In order to prevent too much diversity, the agreement encourages countries to use international standards where these are appropriate, but it does not require them to change their levels of protection as a result.”
”Trading Into the Future: The agreements. Non-tariff barriers: technicalities, red tape, etc.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm#technical

•	Full text of treaty
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf
•	Non-tariff barriers: technicalities, red tape, etc
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm
•	Technical barriers to trade on the WTO website
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm
•	The World Trade Organization: A Training Package. Technical barriers to trade
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto03/wto3_2.htm

TBT relies on standards set by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a private-sector organization.

•	International Organization for Standardization
http://www.iso.ch

Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP)
(Annex 4(b) to Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization)

“The WTO already has an Agreement on Government Procurement. It is plurilateral — only some WTO members have signed it so far. The agreement covers such issues as transparency and non-discrimination.”
“The decision by WTO ministers at the 1996 Singapore conference does two things. It sets up a working group that is multilateral — it includes all WTO members. And it focuses the group’s work on transparency in government procurement practices. The group will not look at preferential treatment for local suppliers, so long as the preferences are not hidden.”
“The first phase of the group’s work is to study transparency in government procurement practices, taking into account national policies. The second phase is to develop elements for inclusion in an agreement.”
”Trading Into the Future: Beyond the agreements. Investment, competition, procurement, simpler procedures.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey6_e.htm#transparency

•	Full text of treaty
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94.pdf
•	Government procurement: material available on the WTO website
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gproc_e.htm
•	Beyond the Agreements: Investment, competition, procurement, simpler procedures
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey6_e.htm
•	Plurilaterals: of minority interest
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm9_e.htm

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
(Part of Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements On Trade In Goods)

“Problem: How do you ensure that your country’s consumers are being supplied with food that is safe to eat — ‘safe’ by the standards you consider appropriate? And at the same time, how can you ensure that strict health and safety regulations are not being used as an excuse for protecting domestic producers?”
“A separate agreement on food safety and animal and plant health standards (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) sets out the basic rules.”
“It allows countries to set their own standards. But it also says regulations must be based on science. They should be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. And they should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where identical or similar conditions prevail.”
“Member countries are encouraged to use international standards, guidelines and recommendations where they exist. However, members may use measures which result in higher standards if there is scientific justification. They can also set higher standards based on appropriate assessment of risks so long as the approach is consistent, not arbitrary.”
”Trading Into the Future: The agreements. Agriculture: fairer markets for farmers.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm#SPS

•	Full text of treaty
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf
•	Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_e.htm
•	The World Trade Organization: A Training Package. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto03/wto3_21.htm

SPS references the Codex Alimentarius, an international food code controlled by an industry-dominated body, and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a private-sector organization.

•	Codex Alimentarius Commission
http://www.codexalimentarius.net
“Understanding the Codex Alimentarius: Codex and the international food trade.”
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e06.htm
•	International Organization for Standardization
http://www.iso.ch

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
(Annex 1C to Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization)

“The WTO’s intellectual property agreement amounts to rules for trade and investment in ideas and creativity.”
“The rules state how copyrights, trademarks, geographical names used to identify products, industrial designs, integrated circuit layout-designs and undisclosed information such as trade secrets — ‘intellectual property’ — should be protected when trade is involved.”
”The WTO in brief: The WTO agreements.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr03_e.htm#trips

•	Full text of treaty
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf
•	Intellectual property: protection and enforcement
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm
•	TRIPS material on the WTO website
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm
•	What are intellectual property rights?
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm
•	Trading Into the Future - The Agreements – Intellectual property: protection and enforcement
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm
•	Overview: the TRIPS Agreement
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm
•	Frequently asked questions about TRIPS
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm
•	The World Trade Organization: A Training Package. Intellectual Property Rights: TRIPS
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto07/wto7_1.htm
•	Pharmaceuticals and patents
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharmpatent_e.htm

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) of the United Nations is another international body whose mandate includes the protection of intellectual property.

•	World Intellectual Property Organization
http://www.wipo.int

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
(Part of Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements On Trade In Goods)

“The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) applies only to measures that affect trade in goods. It recognizes that certain measures can restrict and distort trade, and states that no member shall apply any measure that discriminates against foreigners or foreign products (i.e. violates ‘national treatment’ principles in GATT). It also outlaws investment measures that lead to restrictions in quantities (violating another principle in GATT). An illustrative list of TRIMS agreed to be inconsistent with these GATT articles is appended to the agreement. The list includes measures which require particular levels of local procurement by an enterprise (‘local content requirements’). It also discourages measures which limit a company’s imports or set targets for the company to export (‘trade balancing requirements’).”
“Under the agreement, countries must inform the WTO and fellow-members of all investment measures that do not conform with the agreement. Developed countries have to eliminate these in two years (by the end of 1996); developing countries have five years (to end of 1999); and least developed countries seven.”
“The agreement establishes a Committee on TRIMS to monitor the implementation of these commitments. The agreement also says that WTO members should consider, by 1 January 2000, whether there should also be provisions on investment policy and competition policy.”
”Trading Into the Future: The agreements. Non-tariff barriers: technicalities, red tape, etc.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm#investment

•	Full text of treaty
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf
•	Trade and Investment
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm
•	Beyond the Agreements: Investment, competition, procurement, simpler procedures
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey6_e.htm
•	Non-tariff barriers: technicalities, red tape, etc
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm#investment
•	The World Trade Organization: A Training Package. Trade-Related Investment Measures
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto05/wto5_2.htm

Agreement on Agriculture (AOA)
(Part of Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements On Trade In Goods)

“The original GATT did apply to agricultural trade, but it contained loopholes. For example, it allowed countries to use some non-tariff measures such as import quotas, and to subsidize. Agricultural trade became highly distorted, especially with the use of export subsidies which would not normally have been allowed for industrial products.”
“The Uruguay Round agreement is a significant first step towards order, fair competition and a less distorted sector. It is being implemented over a six year period (10 years for developing countries), that began in 1995. Participants have agreed to initiate negotiations for continuing the reform process one year before the end of the implementation period. The negotiations are now underway.”
”Trading Into the Future: The agreements. Agriculture: fairer markets for farmers.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm

•	Full text of treaty
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf
•	Agriculture
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agric_e.htm
•	Trading Into the Future. Agriculture: fairer markets for farmers
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm
•	The Uruguay Round reform programme for trade in agriculture
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro00_contents.htm
•	The World Trade Organization: A Training Package. Agriculture
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto02/wto2_13.htm

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(Annex 2 to Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization)

“The WTO’s procedure for resolving trade quarrels under the Dispute Settlement Understanding is vital for enforcing the rules and therefore for ensuring that trade flows smoothly.”
“Countries bring disputes to the WTO if they think their rights under the agreements are being infringed. Judgements by specially-appointed independent experts are based on interpretations of the agreements and individual countries’ commitments.”
“The system encourages countries to settle their differences through consultation. Failing that, they can follow a carefully mapped out, stage-by-stage procedure that includes the possibility of a ruling by a panel of experts, and the chance to appeal the ruling on legal grounds.”
“Confidence in the system is borne out by the number of cases brought to the WTO — 167 cases by March 1999 compared to some 300 disputes dealt with during the entire life of GATT (1947–94).”
”The WTO in brief: The WTO agreements.” WTO Web site
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr03_e.htm#disputes

•	Full text of treaty
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf
or
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm
•	Dispute settlement
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm
•	Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/rc_e.htm
•	Trading Into the Future: Introduction to the WTO. Settling Disputes
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp0_e.htm
•	Dispute Settlement: List of panel and Appellate Body reports
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm

Sources for this site

Many books, publications and Web sites have served as references for this site. I’ve confined the list below to just a few of the most important for understanding the World Trade Organization.

Of particular interest
This site owes a huge debt to:
•	Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza. Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy. Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999. 229 pp.
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7081 
This is an essential book for understanding the WTO. It covers the organization, treaties, important cases, and effects on the world with insight, deep context, and extensive footnotes. Wallach is the director and Sforza is a staff member of Public Citizen Global Trade Watch in Washington, DC.

The following books have also proven invaluable:
•	Sarah Anderson, ed. Views from the South. San Francisco: Food First Books & International Forum on Globalization, 2000. 194 pp.
http://www.foodfirst.org/media/news/2000/viewsreview.html
Features pieces by Martin Khor, Vandana Shiva, Walden Bello, Oronto Douglas, Sara Larrain, and Anuradha Mittal, along with a forward by Jerry Mander. 
•	Debi Barker & Jerry Mander. Invisible Government. The World Trade Organization: Global Government for the New Millennium? San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, October 1999. 45 pp.
http://www.ifg.org/aboutwto.html
A briefer primer on the WTO and its effects published by the International Forum on Globalization, which organized two days of educational workshops at the Seattle Ministerial. 
•	Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach, editors. Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000. 218 pp.
http://www.commoncouragepress.com/danaher_globalize.html
A wide-ranging anthology put together shortly after the Seattle Ministerial. 

These publications and Web sites also provide excellent coverage of the WTO and related issues:
•	Association pour une Taxation des Transactions financières pour l'Aide aux Citoyens (ATTAC). "Qatar WTO - The World is not for sale." Paris (five languages).
http://attac.org/nonewround/wto/index.html 
•	BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development.
http://www.newsbulletin.org/bulletins/getcurrentbulletin.cfm?bulletin_id=14&sid= 
•	Center for Economic and Policy Research. Washington, DC.
http://www.cepr.net
•	CorpWatch. "Issue Library: WTO." San Francisco.
http://www.corpwatch.org/issues/wto 
•	Council of Canadians. "Campaigns. Trade and Investment." Ottawa, Ontario.
http://www.canadians.org/campaigns/campaigns-trade.html 
•	Financial Times. London.
http://www.ft.com 
•	Focus on the Global South. Bangkok.
http://focusweb.org
•	Global Exchange. "Global Economy - World Trade Organization."  San Francisco.
http://www.globalexchange.org/wto
•	Global Policy Forum. "World Trade Organization." New York.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/indexwto.htm
•	Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. "Trade Observatory." Minneapolis, MN. (Formerly "WTO Watch")
http://www.tradeobservatory.org 
•	Institute for Policy Studies. "Global Economy." Washington, DC.
http://www.ips-dc.org
•	Inter Press Service. Roma.
http://www.ips.org
•	new internationalist. "Blueprint for change. Redesigning the global economy." London: new internationalist, Issue 320, January-February 2000.
http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue320/title320.htm 
•	Public Citizen Global Trade Watch. "World Trade Organization." Washington, DC.
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto 
•	Third World Network. Penang, Malaysia.
http://www.twnside.org.sg 
•	World Development Movement. "Trade: WTO Campaign." London.
http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaign/WTO.htm 

The WTO's own Web site is also an indispensible information source.
•	World Trade Organization. Geneva.
http://www.wto.org 
Special thanks to the designers of the WTO site, whose graphics and layout I have shamelessly lifted.

For more information

For sources for each page, see the Resources section on that page.
For a full list of sources and relevant links for this site and The Teargas Ministerial, see:
•	Bibligraphy
•	Links
I welcome recommendations of further useful sources of information and suggestions for this site.

About the author

Peter Costantini covered the 1999 Seattle Ministerial of the World Trade Organization for Inter Press Service, a newswire based in Rome.
The Seattle-based journalist has also written about Latin America, international economics, development, and technology for MSNBC News and other news providers around the world.

Some of his other writings include:
•	The Tear Gas Ministerial
http://www.speakeasy.org/~peterc/wto/wtoint.htm
Stories for Inter Press Service and photos from the 1999 WTO battle in Seattle 
•	NAFTA and after
http://www.speakeasy.org/~peterc/nafta/naftaint.htm
A series written for Inter Press Service on the fifth anniversary of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1999 
•	Mexico 1998
http://www.speakeasy.org/~peterc/mexico/mexint.htm
"Mexico's vanishing peasants," a multi-media site on Oaxaca, coffee and emigration produced as part of the MSNBC News series "Bitter Harvest" and "Listening to the old stones of Oaxaca," a meditation on indigenous traditions and democracy. 
•	Nicaragua
http://www.speakeasy.org/~peterc/nicaragua/nica.htm
An MSNBC News multi-media piece on the proposed Nicaraguan "dry canal," coverage of the 1996 elections, and "An American tragedy," an essay published by New Internationalist magazine. 
•	Haiti 1995
http://www.speakeasy.org/~peterc/haiti/haiti.htm
Coverage of the 1995 Haitian elections for Inter Press Service and other news outlets. 

Send e-mail to: Peter_Costantini@msn.com
http://www.speakeasy.org/~peterc/wtow
November 2001